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Abstract
Essays on the Effects of Institutional Changes
Martin Mattsson
2021
Formal and informal institutions are important determinants of behavior and economic outcomes.
In this dissertation, I study the causal effects of changes to one formal and one informal institution
on individuals’ behavior. The first chapter uses an experiment in Bangladesh to show how pro-
viding information on delays in a public service provision to government bureaucrats and their
supervisors affects these bureaucrats’ behavior and the outcomes for applicants for the public
service. The second chapter (co-authored with Ro’ee Levy) shows how the MeToo movement
increased the reporting of sexual crimes to the police by changing the norms, information, or both,
about sexual misconduct.
Chapter 1: “Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information Flows in Bureaucracies: Evidence from
the Bangladesh Civil Service”
Government bureaucracies in low- and middle-income countries often suffer from corruption
and slow public service delivery. Can an information system – providing information about
delays to the responsible bureaucrats and their supervisors – reduce delays? Paying bribes for
faster service delivery is a common form of corruption, but does improving average processing
times reduce bribes? To answer these questions, I conduct a large-scale field experiment over
16 months with the Bangladesh Civil Service. I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in
service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase services
delivered on time by 11% but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for
high-performing bureaucrats. These results are inconsistent with existing theories suggesting
i
that speeding up service delivery reduces bribes. I propose a model where bureaucrats’ shame
or reputational concerns constrain corruption. When bureaucrats’ reputation improves through
positive performance feedback, this constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. Overall, my study
shows that improving information within bureaucracies can change bureaucrats’ behavior, even
without explicit incentives. However, positive performance feedback can have negative spillovers
on bureaucrats’ performance across different behaviors.
Chapter 2: “The Effects of Social Movements: Evidence from #MeToo” (Joint with Ro’ee Levy)
Social movements are associated with large societal changes, but evidence on their causal effects
is limited. We study the effect of the MeToo movement on a high-stakes decision—reporting a
sexual crime to the police. We construct a new dataset of sexual and non-sexual crimes reported in
30 OECD countries, covering 88% of the OECD population. We analyze the effect of the MeToo
movement by employing a triple-difference strategy over time, across countries, and between crime
types. The movement increased reporting of sexual crimes by 10% during its first six months. The
effect is persistent and lasts at least 15 months. Because we find a strong effect on reporting before
any major changes to laws or policy took place, we attribute the effect to a change in social norms
or information. Using more detailed US data, we show that the movement also increased arrests
for sexual crimes in the long run. In contrast to a common criticism of the movement, we do not
find evidence for large differences in the effect across racial and socioeconomic groups. Our results
suggest that social movements can rapidly change high-stakes personal decisions.
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Part I
Service Delivery, Corruption, and Information
Flows in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the
Bangladesh Civil Service
1 Introduction
The state’s capacity to implement its policies, secure property rights, and provide basic public
services is paramount for economic development. To have this capacity, the state needs a func-
tioning bureaucracy of government officials motivated to carry out their tasks. For career civil
servants, compressed wage structures, secure employment, and opportunities for rent extraction
through corruption often lead to weak or counterproductive incentives, especially in low- and
middle-income countries. While explicit incentive structures, such as pay-for-performance con-
tracts, can change the behavior of government officials, they are often hard to implement without
unintended consequences (Finan et al., 2017). Furthermore, political constraints often prevent the
introduction of explicit incentive structures altogether. However, the lack of explicit incentives
does not mean that civil servants have no incentives. Supervisors in government bureaucracies
often influence future postings and career paths of lower-level bureaucrats, which can be a strong
motivating factor for civil servants (Khan et al., 2019). Furthermore, bureaucrats may have strong
intrinsic motivations to perform their jobs well (Banuri and Keefer, 2013; Cowley and Smith, 2014).
Providing better information flows within bureaucracies about individual officials’ performance
may improve existing incentives by allowing supervisors to align postings and promotions more
closely with job performance. Regular feedback may also increase officials’ intrinsic motivation by
making their own performance more salient to themselves. Furthermore, the flexible interpretation
of information that is not directly tied to explicit incentives may avoid some of the common pitfalls
of explicit incentives structures such as the neglect of tasks not measured by the performance
indicators and opposition from individuals within the organization leading to poor implementation
1
(Banerjee et al., 2020). Historically, high-frequency information on bureaucrat performance has
often been expensive to collect, but e-governance systems can substantially reduce this cost and
increase the data quality (Singh, 2020). As low- and middle-income countries have expanded their
digital capabilities, this has created new opportunities for improved information systems in the
management of government officials.
This paper focuses on the processing time of applications for changes to government land
records in Bangladesh. An update to the government land records has to be made every time a
parcel of land changes owners and is necessary for the issuance of a land title to the new owner.
Updated land records are essential for individuals to have secure property rights over land. Land
disputes are one of the most severe legal problem in Bangladesh, with 29% of adults having
faced a land dispute in the past four years (Hague Institute for Innovation of Law, 2018). Slow
public service delivery is also a significant problem in Bangladesh. For example, only 56% of land
record change applications in my control group are processed within a 45 working day time limit
mandated by the government. Furthermore, faster service provision is a commonly stated reason
for bribe payments, suggesting that slow service delivery on average may cause corruption as some
firms and citizens pay bribes to avoid having to wait for their services.2
In an experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I provide information regarding junior
civil servants’ performance using monthly scorecards sent to the civil servants themselves and
their supervisors. The scorecards are designed to reduce delays in the processing of applications
for land record changes and are based on data from an e-governance system. There are two
performance indicators shown on the scorecards: the number of applications processed within the
official time limit of 45 working days and the number of applications pending beyond that limit.
The scorecards also show the bureaucrats’ relative performance on these indicators, compared to
all other bureaucrats in the experiment. The intervention is randomized at the level of the land
office, and there is only one civil servant per office. The experiment was carried out at a large scale
and involve 311 land offices (59% of all land offices in Bangladesh), which serve a population of
approximately 95 million people.
The scorecards had a meaningful effect on bureaucrats’ behavior. Using administrative data on
2Among households in Bangladesh reporting having paid a bribe for a public service, 23% stated that "timely service"
was one of the reasons for paying the bribe (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2018).
2
more than a million applications, I estimate that the scorecards increase the share of applications
processed within the time limit by 6 percentage points or 11%. The effect starts almost immediately
after the scorecards are first sent out and is present for the 16 month period of the experiment. The
scorecards also decreased the average processing time of applications by 13% and the applicants’
visits to government offices by 12%. The effects are almost entirely driven by bureaucrats in offices
with a below-median performance at baseline, improving their performance. This result shows
that improving the information flows within a bureaucracy can change bureaucrats’ behavior, even
without explicit incentive structures.
Since the scorecards were sent to both the bureaucrats and their supervisors, there might be
two different mechanisms for the effect on behavior. First, the bureaucrats may care about their
reputation among their supervisors, potentially because of the influence the supervisors have over
their careers. Second, the scorecards may also change bureaucrats’ behavior by causing a sense of
shame or pride through making their absolute and relative performance more salient to the bureau-
crats themselves. For ease of exposition, I will refer to these two concerns as reputational concerns.
While I cannot distinguish between these two mechanisms, I use a variation of the scorecard to test
if peer effects from having the performance information shared among bureaucrats at the same
level within the bureaucracy can motivate bureaucrats further than having the information shared
only with the supervisors. I find no evidence of meaningful peer effects beyond the effect of the
standard scorecards.
Some existing theories of corruption suggest that the average speed of public service delivery
is causally and negatively related to bribes since, when average processing times are long, some
applicants pay to avoid having to wait (Leff, 1964; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999).
I conduct a survey among applicants and use the experimental variation in processing times to
test theories of how they are related to corruption. Overall, the scorecards did not decrease bribe
payments. The point estimate of the effect is an increase of BDT 1,046 (~USD 12) or 17%, and
the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval is a decrease of 3%.3 The increase comes from a
positive effect on the bribe amounts reported (intensive margin) with no effect on the fraction of
applicants reporting bribes (extensive margin). Using an experimental information intervention
among surveyed applicants, I rule out that the lack of a decrease in bribes is due to the information
3Throughout the paper, I use a USD/BDT exchange rate of 84.3, the average exchange rate during the experiment.
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about the improved processing times not yet having disseminated among applicants.
The positive effect of the scorecards on bribe payments is concentrated among the offices
that were over-performing at baseline, i.e., the offices for which the scorecards have no effect on
processing times. In the under-performing offices, where scorecards improve processing times,
they do not affect bribes. This is inconsistent with a causal relationship between average processing
times and bribes since processing times can improve without bribes changing, and bribes can
increase without processing times changing.
I propose a model in which bureaucrats trade-off reputational concerns, bribe money, and the
utility cost of effort. The bureaucrats’ reputation is determined by their visible job performance
along two dimensions, delays and bribe extraction, which are only imperfectly observable to
supervisors. The scorecards increase the visibility of delays and thereby make them more important
for reputation. For under-performing bureaucrats, this also means that the scorecards decrease
their reputation. Therefore, the model predicts that under-performing bureaucrats reduce delays by
providing more effort. The model also predicts that when the scorecards highlight the already good
performance of over-performing bureaucrats, this relaxes their reputation constraint, allowing
them to increase bribes. Furthermore, the model is consistent with the result that the scorecards do
not affect delays for over-performing bureaucrats. For them, more visible delays increase incentives
to avoid delays (substitution effect), but the increase in reputation makes the marginal importance
of reputation smaller (income effect), so the overall effect is ambiguous.
This paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on
how incentives shape bureaucratic performance. There is an extensive literature on both monetary
and non-monetary explicit incentives (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2016, 2019). This
paper contributes to the growing literature on the effects of information flows within government
bureaucracies (Dodge et al., 2018; Muralidharan et al., 2020; Dal Bó et al., 2019; Callen et al., 2020;
Banerjee et al., 2020). In particular, I show that information flows about individual civil servants’
performance can improve public service delivery even without explicit incentives and that this
effect is persistent over time. This could be due to long-term career concerns of bureaucrats
(Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013a; Bertrand et al., 2020) or a sense of shame or pride internal to
the bureaucrats themselves (Allcott, 2011; Dustan et al., 2018). However, I find no evidence that
reputational concerns among bureaucrats at the same level in the organizational hierarchy are a
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substantial motivating factor (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Cornelissen et al., 2017). My model suggests
that reputational concerns provide incentives for performance and limit the amounts of bribes
collected by bureaucrats. However, the model also shows how improving the relative reputation of
individual bureaucrats can lead them to perform worse and be more corrupt.
Second, the paper provides empirical evidence on the connection between corruption and the
speed of public service delivery, or more generally, red tape. Slow service delivery is positively
associated with corruption (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999; Freund et al., 2016), and applicants may
have to pay bribes to increase processing speed for services (Bertrand et al., 2007). In the mainly
theoretical literature on why the speed of service delivery and corruption are associated, different
models lead to drastically different policy conclusions. One view is that corruption allows firms
and individuals to circumvent excessively onerous bureaucratic hurdles (Leff, 1964; Huntington,
1968). In this view, rooting out corruption would decrease the speed of service delivery and increase
inefficiencies of excessive bureaucratic control. An opposing view is that corruption is the driver
of red tape and delays in public services, as making the de-jure regulation more onerous allows
government officials to extract more bribes (Myrdal, 1968; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Kaufmann and
Wei, 1999).4 According to this view, we could improve service delivery by eliminating corruption.
According to both views, we could reduce corruption by providing services with fewer delays to
everyone. I contribute to the literature by showing that, in this context, increasing the average
speed of service delivery does not decrease bribe payments and that there is no evidence of a causal
relationship between the average speed of service delivery and bribes.
Third, the paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of bribe amounts. In some
settings, bribe payers’ outside option and ability to pay constrain bribe amounts (Svensson, 2003;
Bai et al., 2019), potentially leaving little room for applicant complaints or monitoring to reduce
corruption (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013b). In other settings, monitoring has been effective
in reducing corruption (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Olken, 2007). I show that, in this context,
individual bureaucrats can increase bribes and that bribes do not just reflect the difference between
the official fee and the applicants’ willingness or ability to pay for the service. Instead, my model
highlights how bureaucrats’ concerns about reputation or shame constrain bribes, explaining why
4In Banerjee (1997) and Guriev (2004), both corruption and red tape emerge from the nature of public service provision
due to the principal-agent problem between the government and its bureaucrats. The experimental results can neither
reject nor confirm these models.
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bribes are substantially below applicants’ willingness to pay for the service. The results are also
consistent with the literature on moral licensing showing that when past pro-social behavior is
made more salient, individuals tend to act less altruistically (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Clot et al., 2018).
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on the effects of e-governance in settings with low
government capacity. In some cases, e-governance systems have improved government efficiency
and reduced corruption (Banerjee et al., 2020; Lewis-Faupel et al., 2016). While in others, they
have not had substantial benefits and wasted scarce government resources (World Development
Report, 2016). This paper does not evaluate an e-governance system as a whole. Instead, it
provides evidence on the untapped potential in the data that e-governance systems generate for
the management of government officials.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context, experimental
interventions, and data. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy used to analyze the experiment.
Section 4 presents the estimated effects of the scorecards on processing times and bribes. Section
5 discusses how the results relates to existing theories of the relationship between the speed of
service delivery and corruption. Section 6 proposes a model of bureaucratic behavior explaining
the results. Section 7 concludes by discussing policy implications.
2 Context, Experimental Intervention, and Data
The context of this study is land record changes in Bangladesh, and specifically the time it takes to
process applications for such changes. Maintaining an updated record of land ownership is crucial
for secure property rights, and globally it is an example of a public service that is almost exclusively
provided by the state. More generally, the timely provision of public services is an important aspect
of government capacity. The speed of public service provision is a key determinant of a country’s
score in the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report. Timely public service provision and policy
implementation has been shown to be positively associated with poverty reduction (Djankov et al.,
2018), trade (Djankov et al., 2010), entrepreneurship (Klapper et al., 2006), and economic output
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Djankov et al., 2006). Several countries, such as India and Russia,
have explicitly stated goals to reach a certain Doing Business ranking, showing the importance that
governments in low- and middle-income countries place on increasing the speed of public service
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delivery.5
The scorecard intervention is made possible by a recently implemented e-governance system
that bureaucrats in Bangladesh use to process applications for land record changes. Appendix
Figure I.A.1 shows how governments in low- and middle-income countries have expanded their
digital capacity compared to high-income countries in four important areas of governance. The
figure shows that that public services provided using e-governance systems are now commonplace,
if not the norm, even outside high-income countries.
2.1 Land Record Changes in Bangladesh
When a parcel of land changes owners in Bangladesh, either through sale or inheritance, the official
land record has to be changed and a new record of rights issued to the new owner. Land record
changes (called "mutations" in Bangladesh) are conducted by civil servants holding the position
of Assistant Commissioner Land (ACL). Throughout the paper, I am referring to ACLs as the
bureaucrats. ACL is a junior position in the Bangladesh Administrative Service, the elite cadre of the
Bangladesh Civil Service. Each ACL heads a sub-district (Upazila) land office. The ACL is directly
supervised by an Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), the most senior civil servant at the sub-district
level. The UNO is then supervised by a Deputy Commissioner (DC), the most senior bureaucrat
at the district level. The UNO has substantial power over the ACL’s future career through an
Annual Confidential Report regarding the performance of the ACL that the UNO submits to the
Ministry of Public Administration. Throughout the paper, I am referring to the UNOs and DCs as
the supervisors.
A bureaucrat typically holds the position of ACL for one to two years and when an ACL is
transferred, it is often to a different position within the bureaucracy. For example, of the 615 ACLs I
observe in my administrative data, only 10% held the position of ACL in more than one land office.
The de-jure process for making a land record change is visually represented in Appendix
Figure I.A.2. To make a land record change, the new owner must apply for such a change at the
sub-district land office where the land is located. Hence, there is no competition between land
5India aims to be in the top 50 (https://www.livemint.com/Politics/D8U9SSxwJ741OH7CxYlZeO/India-




offices for applicants. The application is then inspected by the office staff, who verify that the
application has the required documents. The application is then sent to the local (Union Parishad)
land office of the area where the land is located. The local land office is the lowest tier of land
offices and is staffed by a Land Office Assistant who verifies the applicant’s claim to the land
by meeting with the applicant and visually inspecting the land. The Land Office Assistant then
writes a recommendation on whether to accept or reject the application to the sub-district land
office. The application is then verified against the existing government land record. Finally, a
meeting is held between the ACL and the applicant where, the application is formally approved.
The applicant then pays the official fee of BDT 1,150 (USD ~14) for the issuance of the new record
of rights. When the applicant has paid the fee, the new record of rights is issued and given to the
applicant. The sub-district land office also changes the official government land record to reflect
the new ownership. The Government has mandated that land record changes should take no more
than 45 working days, but in practice delays beyond this time limit are common. In my data, only
56% of applications in the control group were processed within the time limit and the average
processing time among processed applications was 52 working days.
2.1.1 Bureaucrats’ Discretionary Powers and Corruption
In practice, it is common for applicants to also pay bribes beyond the official fee to get their
application processed. Figure I.1 shows that among the applicants in my survey, the average
estimated bribe for a typical applicant was BTD 6,731 (~USD 80).6 Appendix Figure I.A.3 shows
that when asked, the most common response to the question of why a bribe was paid is akin to "to
get the work done" (39%), the second most common response is akin to "to avoid hassle" (39%), and
the third most common is akin to "for faster processing" (10%). This highlights that the bureaucrat
has decision making power over the application along two dimensions. First, they can decide
whether to accept or reject the application. Second, they can take actions to speed up or slow down
the application as well as create more or less hassle for the applicant. Figure I.1 shows that the
average stated valuation of getting the record of rights is BDT 1,594,664 (~USD 18,917), almost as
high as the average estimated market value of the land itself. These valuations are more than two
6Appendix Figure I.A.8 shows that this estimate is similar to an estimate by Transparency International Bangladesh
of the average bribe paid for a land record change.
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orders of magnitude larger than even the highest estimate of the average bribe payments.
On average, the applicants in my survey state that their willingness to pay for having their
application processed within seven days (the shortest reasonable processing time) is BDT 2,207
(~USD 26). Since this number is substantially lower than the average bribe paid by those reporting
a non-zero bribe and the average estimated typical bribe, it is clear that applicants are not just
paying for faster processing. Most likely they are also paying for getting the approval.
2.2 E-governance System for Land Record Changes
In February 2017, a new e-governance system for land record changes was introduced, with the
goal of simplifying the process of land record changes for both the applicants and the civil servants
processing the applications. The system was gradually implemented in sub-district and local land
offices. As the e-governance system had recently been implemented at the time of the experiment,
not all applications were processed using the e-governance system even in the sub-district offices
where it had been installed. The main reason for this was that not all local land offices within the
sub-district had had the e-governance system installed.7
The e-governance system generates administrative data on each application made in the system.
Specifically, this administrative data can be used to assess the adherence to the rule that all applica-
tions should be processed within 45 working days. However, until the start of the experiment, this
data was not presented in a format enabling evaluation of the degree of adherence to this rule or
the performance of specific sub-district land offices or ACLs.
2.3 Experimental Intervention: Performance Scorecards
Together with the Government of Bangladesh, I designed a monthly performance scorecard ad-
dressed to the ACL and sent to randomly selected sub-district land offices, as well as to the offices of
the UNO and the DC, the ACL’s two direct superiors. The scorecard is intended to decrease delays
in application processing for land record changes. Appendix Figure I.A.4 presents an example of a
performance scorecard.
The scorecard evaluates the ACL’s performance using two performance indicators. The first
7Other reasons cited for using the paper-based system were problems with internet connectivity, new officials not yet
trained in using the e-governance system, and temporary problems with the e-governance server.
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indicator is the number of applications disposed within 45 working days in the past month, where
a higher number indicates a better performance. The second indicator is the number of applications
pending beyond 45 working days at the end of the month, where a lower number indicates a
better performance. The scorecard shows both these numbers as well as the average numbers for
all sub-district land offices in the experiment. The scorecard also provides the office’s percentile
ranking for each indicator, with a short sentence reflecting the performance. Finally, to make
the score easily understandable and more salient, a thumbs-up symbol is put next to percentile
rankings between the 60th and the 100th percentile, while a thumbs-down symbol is put next to
percentile rankings from the 0th percentile to the 40th percentile. Two versions of the scorecard, one
in English and one in Bengali, were sent out in the first two weeks of each month with information
based on the previous calendar month’s e-governance data. Offices in the treatment group were
not informed that they would receive a scorecard before the start of the treatment, but the first
scorecard was followed by a phone call to the ACL where the indicators were explained and
the ACLs could ask questions about the scorecard. The scorecards are also accompanied by an
explanatory note showing how the numbers in the scorecard are calculated and a phone number to
call to ask questions about the scorecard.
2.3.1 Additional Intervention: Peer Performance List
To test for peer effects, an addition was made to the scorecards for 77 randomly selected treatment
offices in September 2019, a year after the first scorecards were sent out. The purpose was to test if
there was an additional effect, beyond the effect of the scorecard, stemming from a bureaucrat’s
performance being observable to the bureaucrat’s peers at the same position in the organizational
hierarchy. For a randomly selected group of 77 offices within the offices already receiving the
performance scorecards, a list of the percentile rankings of the two performance indicators for all
77 offices was added to the scorecard. Appendix Figure I.A.5 shows an example of the first page of
such a list. The main difference between receiving the typical scorecard and the scorecard with the
list of performances was that for the offices that received the list of performances, their performance
was observable not just to them and their supervisors but also to 76 of their fellow ACLs.
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2.4 Randomization
Figure I.2 provides a visual overview of the randomized interventions and data sources. The ran-
domization was done in two waves. In August 2018, 112 land offices were using the e-governance
system. In the first randomization wave, 56 of these offices were randomly chosen to receive the
performance scorecards, while 56 were assigned to the control group.8 In April 2019, 199 additional
offices had started to use the e-governance system and a second randomization wave was carried
out to increase the experiment’s sample size. The second randomization wave extended the treat-
ment to 99 new offices while 100 new offices were added to the control group.9 The additional list
of peer performances was added to the scorecard for 77 randomly selected offices receiving the
scorecards in September of 2019. The scorecards were sent out until March 2020, when the outbreak
of COVID-19 caused an end to the scorecards being sent out.
Both randomization waves were stratified by the number of applications processed within 45
working days in the two months preceding the randomization and the number of applications
pending for more than 45 working days at the end of the month preceding the randomization. For
the first randomization, another binary variable for being a land office where the e-governance
system was fully implemented, meaning that no applications were conducted using the traditional
paper-based method, was also used for stratification. In the second randomization, the total number
of applications received since the installation of the e-governance system was used as a stratification
variable. The randomization of offices into receiving the peer performance list was done among
the 155 offices receiving the scorecards using the same stratification variables as in the second
randomization wave. For more information about the randomizations see Appendix Section B.1.
2.5 Data
I use two main data sources, administrative data from the e-governance system and data from a
survey conducted among applicants in the 112 land offices that were part of the first randomization
wave. I use the administrative data to generate the performance scorecards as well as evaluating
the effects of the scorecards. Table I.1 shows summary statistics for both data sets. This table
contains all observations from both treatment and control offices that are used in the analysis. For a
8The first randomization was carried out by the author on 14 August 2018.
9The second randomization was carried out by the author on 10 April 2019.
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discussion of the balance of randomization, see Section 2.6.
2.5.1 Administrative Data
The observations in the administrative data are at the application level. The data contains informa-
tion about in which land office the application was made, the application start date, the date it was
processed as well as the decision to accept or reject the application. The administrative data also
contains information on the size land plot for which the change is being made.10 The administrative
data was downloaded from the e-governance system at the beginning of each month from August
2018 until October 2020.
For the main analysis, I use administrative data for applications made from 13 August 2018, one
month before the start of the experiment, until 20 January 2020. From 26 March 2020 and onwards
the COVID-19 outbreak in Bangladesh substantially increased processing times for land records
changes as measured by calendar days but also resulted in a large number of general holidays,
increasing the difference between calendar days and working days. At this time, the scorecard
intervention was also stopped. Therefore, I do not include applications made after 20 January 2020,
45 working days before the start of the general holiday caused by COVID-19. Ending the data at
this point precludes the holiday from affecting one of the main outcomes, if the application was
processed within the 45 working day time limit or not.
I impute the processing times for the 6% of applications that have not yet been processed. The
imputed value is the mean of actual processing times that are larger than the number of working
days the application that I am imputing the processing time for has been pending.11 The data set
in the main analysis contains 1,050,924 applications from all 311 offices. Appendix Section B.2.1
provides more information about the administrative data.
10The full administrative data set also contains more information about the applicants, but this data is not available for
research purposes due to privacy concerns.
11This procedure is conservative in two ways. First, it reduces any effect on processing times generated by the
scorecards since the same mean is used to impute values in both the treatment and control areas. Second, the mean used
to impute processing times in this procedure likely underestimate the time it will take to process these applications
on average since it is the mean of applications that have already been processed, which is likely to be less than the actual
average time it will take to process all applications including those currently pending. Since the point estimate of the
scorecards’ effect on the share of applications being pending is a decrease of 0.9 percentage points, using these imputed
values creates a conservative estimate of the effect of the scorecards on processing times.
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2.5.2 Survey Data
The survey data was collected in two rounds from applicants who applied in the 112 offices that
were part of the first wave of randomization. The sample of applicants was created by placing
surveyors outside land offices and interviewing all applicants entering the office for the purpose of
a land record change application, regardless of what stage in the application process they were at.
The surveyors stayed outside a specific office for at least two days and until they had completed
at least 20 interviews. The follow-up interview was conducted by phone approximately three
months after the initial interview. Surveyors were not informed about which offices had received
the scorecards or if they were calling a respondent from a treatment or control office.
Out of 3,696 people approached, a total of 3,370 applicants were successfully interviewed in the
first round interview outside of the land offices. Out of those interviewees, 3,018 were successfully
re-interviewed in the follow-up phone interview, resulting in a total attrition rate of 18%. The
estimated effect of the scorecards on the attrition rate was 3 percentage points and marginally
statistically significant at the 10% level. However, in Appendix Section B.2.3 I show that this
differential attrition is not sufficiently large to substantially affect the main findings from the survey
data. More information about the survey data can be found in Appendix Section B.2.2.
The initial interview focused on the details of the application, the applicant’s expectation for
the application processing time, the applicant’s willingness to pay for faster processing, as well
as basic information about the applicant. The follow-up interview focused on the outcome of the
application and the payments, above the official fee, that the applicant had made in relation to the
application.
Data on bribe payments was collected using two different questions. The first question asked
what the typical bribe payment is "for a normal person like yourself." If the respondent were willing
to answer this question, the amount, whether zero or positive, was recorded as the variable typical
payment. 63% of respondents provided an answer to this question and the average response was
BTD 6,731 (~USD 80) or 1.5 months of the sample’s average per capita household expenditure.12
73% of the responses were non-zero amounts.
12All continuous variables from the survey are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Averages are calculated using
observations weighted by the inverse of the number of observations in each office, making the estimates representative
for the average land office.
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The second set of questions asked about each actual payment made by the applicant to any
government official or agent assisting with the application. The outcome variable reported payment
is the sum of the bribe amounts reported in each of these questions. This variable takes the value
zero when no payments were reported. The most common response for respondents who were
not willing to talk about payments that they had made was to report no payment. Therefore, the
average reported payment is likely an underestimate of the average payment actually made. The
average reported payment was BDT 1,456 (~USD 17) and 27% of respondents provided a non-zero
value. Among those reporting a non-zero amount the average amount was BDT 5,283 (~USD 63).
2.6 Balance of Randomization
Appendix Table I.A.1 shows a balance of randomization test for the two main outcome variables
from the administrative data, the fraction of applications processed within 45 working days and
the average processing time. The data used is restricted to applications made at least 45 working
days before the start of the experiment. Applications that were not processed by the start of the
experiment were assigned an imputed processing time, using the imputation procedure described in
Section 2.5.1. There are no statistically significant differences between scorecard and control offices
before the start of the experiment. This is expected given that the random treatment assignment.13
Appendix Table I.A.2 shows that the scorecards did not affect the composition of applicants
or applications in the survey data. This is not a traditional balance of randomization table, since
the treatment may have affected which applicants decided to apply and what type of applications
to make. However, I do not find any evidence for such changes in behavior. I find no statistically
significant difference in the age or income of the applicants, or in the size or value of the land that
the applications are for. Furthermore, there are no substantial differences between the stages that
the applications are in at the time of the first interview. When using the regression specification
from Equation 1 on this data, the effect of the scorecards is not significant at the 5% for any of the
outcome variables, and significant at the 10% level only for land value.14
13Using the empirical strategy described in Section 3.1 on the data from before the start of the experiment also generates
statistically insignificant estimates of the effect of the treatment on the outcome variables. Furthermore, an F-test of joint
significance for the explanatory power of the outcome variables on the treatment variable cannot reject the null of no
explanatory power (p-value: 0.69).
14F-tests of joint significance for the explanatory power of the outcome variables on the treatment variable cannot
reject the null of no explanatory power (p-value: 0.73).
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2.7 Additional Intervention: Providing Information to Applicants
Together with the in-person survey, an intervention providing additional information to applicants
was also carried out on randomly selected days in each office where the survey took place. The
motivation behind this intervention was to ensure applicants knew about the improvements in
processing times. While it is likely that this information would eventually have spread, in the
short-term, information about changes to bureaucrat behavior may not yet have disseminated. If
the applicants are not aware of the improvements in processing times, the long-term effects on bribe
payments may not yet have been realized. To speed-up the dissemination process, and potentially
reach the long-term effect of the scorecards faster, the surveyors randomly provided information
about increased processing speeds on half of the days that the in-person survey was conducted.
The surveyors used an information pamphlet to inform applicants that the median processing
time for all land offices had been substantially reduced over the past six months and that a new
e-governance system had been installed. The information the surveyors provided was the same in
both treatment and control offices. The scorecard intervention was not mentioned to applicants.
Appendix Figure I.A.6 shows an English translation of the information pamphlet. I analyze the
effects of this intervention when testing the predictions of models connecting processing times and
corruption in Section 5.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Empirical Strategy: Overall Effects
To estimate the effects of the scorecards, I use the following regression specification:
Outcomeait = α + βTreatmenti + Stratai + Montht + εait (1)
Where Outcomeait is an outcome for application a, in land office i, made in calendar month t. Stratai
are randomization strata fixed effects. Since no randomization strata overlap the two randomization
waves, these fixed effects also control for randomization wave fixed effects. Montht are fixed effects
for the month the application was made. In the survey data, all continuous variables are winsorized
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at the 99th percentile.15 Standard errors are clustered at the land office level resulting in 311 clusters
in the administrative data and 112 clusters in the survey data. Each observation is weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations in each land office. Therefore, the estimated effect is the
average effect of the scorecard on a land office, the level at which the treatment was assigned. The
weighting also improves the estimates’ precision by making each cluster have equal weight in the
analysis.16
3.2 Empirical Strategy: Heterogeneous Effects
To better understand the mechanisms behind the overall effects, I separate offices by their baseline
performance and estimate the effect of the scorecards separately for offices performing above
and below the median at baseline.17 I calculate each office’s baseline performance based on the
average of the two percentile rankings at the time of the first scorecard. One ranking is based on the
number of applications disposed within 45 working days, while the other is based on the number
of applications pending for more than 45 working days. For offices in the treatment group, these
are the actual rankings shown on the first scorecard, while for the control group, the rankings were
not shown to the bureaucrats. I then separate all offices into over-performers, that were above the
median average ranking at baseline, and under-performers, that were below the median average
ranking at baseline.18 Since the classification of offices only uses data from before the first scorecard
was delivered, it is not affected by the treatment.
I use the following regression specification to estimate the effect of the scorecards on the two
15In the survey data, the application month variable is winsorized at November 2018, so that all application dates
before November 2018 take the value of November 2018. A separate dummy variable controls for missing start date
values.
16For a discussion of why weighting observations by the inverse of the number of observations in a cluster im-
proves precision see: https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/different-sized-baskets-fruit-how-unequally-
sized-clusters-can-lead-your-power
17Heterogeneity in the effects of performance information provision between high and low performers has been
recorded in several settings (e.g., Allcott, 2011; Dodge et al., 2018; Ashraf, 2019; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020). This was the
only heterogeneity test based on office characteristics specified in the pre-analysis plan. The two other pre-specified
tests for heterogeneity were based on the date of application and the application processing time. The estimates of
heterogeneity in the effects along those dimensions are shown in Figure I.4 and Appendix Table I.A.3, respectively.
18I classify offices in the first randomization wave into over- and under-performers by comparing them to the median
performance among these 112 offices at the time of their first scorecard (September 2018). For the offices in the second
randomization wave, I compare them to the median performance of all 311 offices in the experiment at the time of their
first scorecard (April 2019). This ensures that the over- and under-performer classification corresponds to if the content
in the first scorecards was above or below the median of comparison groups at the time.
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types of offices separately:
yait =α + β1Treatmenti ×Overper f ormi + β2Treatmenti ×Underper f ormi+
γOverper f ormi + Stratumi + Montht + εait (2)
Where β1 is the estimated effect of the scorecards for offices over-performing at baseline, β2 is the
effect for offices under-performing at baseline, and γ is the difference between over-performing
and under-performing offices in the control group.19 As in the estimation of the overall effects,
standard errors are clustered at the land office level and the regressions are weighted by the inverse
of the number of observations in land office i.
3.3 Analysis of Additional Experiments and Potential Interactions
The two additional randomized interventions, the addition of peer performance lists and the
information intervention to applicants, are not included in the main specification as these interven-
tions are not the main treatments being evaluated. For the two main outcomes, delays and bribe
payments, the full specifications, including the scorecard treatment, the additional randomization,
and the interaction, can be found in Tables I.3 and I.A.4. These tables show that neither of the two
additional experiments have substantial interactions with the scorecard treatments, validating the
approach to analyze the scorecard treatment separately as outlined in Equations 1 and 2.
4 Results: Effects on Processing Times and Bribes
This Section shows the estimates of the effects of the scorecards on processing times, visits to land
offices made by applicants, and bribes. Appendix Section C.3 investigates potential unintended
consequences of the scorecards on bureaucrats’ behavior and does not find evidence for any large
unintended consequences.
19To test the hypothesis that the treatment had the same effect on offices over-performing and under-performing at
baseline, I use a similar regression but where the first treatment variable is not interacted with the dummy variable for if
the office over-performed at baseline. I then test the hypothesis that the coefficient on the treatment variable interacted
with with the dummy variable for if the office was under-performing at baseline is zero. This test’s p-value is reported as
"P-value sub-group diff." in the regression tables reporting the heterogeneous effects.
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4.1 Effect on Processing Times
Table I.2 shows that the scorecards increased the applications processed within the government
time limit and improved processing times overall. Each column presents the result of a regression
using the specification in Equation 1. Column (1) shows the estimated effect of the scorecards on a
binary variable indicating if the application was processed within the 45 working day time limit
or not. The scorecards increased the fraction of applications processed within the 45 working day
limit by 6 percentage points or, equivalently, 11%. Column (2) shows the estimated effect on the
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation of the number of working days it took to process
the application.20 Column (2) estimates that the scorecards reduced the processing time by 13%.21
In the data, 6% of the applications are not yet processed, and for the analysis in Column (2) I
have assigned imputed processing times for these applications, using the imputation procedure
described in Section 2.5.1. Appendix Table I.A.5 shows that the results are robust to different
imputation techniques. In Appendix Table I.A.6 I test the robustness of the result to using different
functional form assumptions for the relationship between the scorecards and processing times.
For Column (3), I create an Inverse Covariance Weighted (ICW) index of the two outcomes
used in Columns (1) and (2).22 The estimated effect of the scorecards on the ICW index is 0.13
standard deviations and statistically significant. In Appendix Table I.A.7 I test the robustness of this
result with various alternative specifications. All alternative specification estimates are of the same
sign and similar magnitude as the main estimate, but some of them are not statistically significant.
Appendix Table I.A.8 shows the effects, estimated at the office by month level, on the number
of applications processed within 45 working days, the number of applications pending beyond
45 working days as well as those figures corresponding percentile rankings. The point estimates
20The IHS transformation is used instead of the natural logarithm since 0.3% of the applications were processed on
the same day as they were made and therefore have a processing time of zero working days. The results are virtually
identical when dropping the applications taking zero days to process and using the natural logarithm transformation.
21The exact effect is 13 IHS points, which are approximately equivalent to log points. A 13 log point decrease is
equivalent to a 12% decrease, but for simplicity, I will describe IHS points changes as percentage changes throughout the
paper. Appendix Table I.A.6 shows that the result is similar when dropping the observations with processing times of
zero working days and using the natural logarithm transformation.
22The ICW matrix follows the algorithm suggested by Anderson (2008) and is designed to summarize several outcome
variables into one index that, for the control group, has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Since there are
only two outcome variables in Table I.2, the ICW index is equivalent to summing the standard deviations away from
the control group mean of the two variables and rescaling the index to have a standard deviation of one in the control
group. However, in tables with more than two outcome variables, the components are weighted differently to maximize
information captured by the ICW index.
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suggest that the scorecards improved all four of these outcome variables but the effects are not
statistically significant.
4.1.1 Effect Over Time
Figures I.3 and I.4 show that there is no pattern of the effect declining over time, although the size
of the effect varies between different time periods. Figure I.3 shows the fraction of applications
processed within the 45 working day limit over time for the treatment and control group separately.
The first dashed vertical line indicates the date 45 working days before first scorecards. The second
dashed vertical line indicates the date of the first scorecards. Applications made between the first
and second vertical lines may have been affected by the scorecards if they were not processed
before the first scorecard was sent out. Starting for applications made a few days before the first
scorecards, we see a divergence between the treatment and control group. The treatment group
increased the fraction of applications that were processed within the 45 working days time limit,
relative to the control group. With a few short exceptions, the treatment offices continue to have a
higher fraction of applications processed within the time limit relative to the control offices until
the end of the experiment. The data for the offices in the second randomization wave ends earlier
relative to the start of the experiment. The third vertical dashed line marks where the data from the
second randomization wave ends. To the right of this line, the graph only contains data from the
offices in the first randomization wave. Appendix Figure I.A.7 shows the time lines for the two
randomization waves separately.
Figure I.4 shows the results of applying the regression specification from Equation 1 to applica-
tions made in the first, second, and last third of the experiment period. The outcome variable is
the ICW Index from Column (3) of Table I.2. When I split up the sample, the estimates lose some
precision, but it is clear from the graph that there is no pattern of a continuous decline of the effect
over time.
4.1.2 Effect on the Distribution of Processing Times
Figure I.5 shows two overlaid histograms, one for the distribution of processing times in the
treatment group and one for the distribution in the control group. The figure only includes
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applications that have already been processed and processing times are top coded at 200 working
days. In the treatment offices, more applications were processed within the 45 working day time
limit. The effect is relatively evenly spread over the whole span from 0 to 45 working days, with
only a minor bunching just before the 45 working day limit. This is to be expected given that
the process to approve an application is relatively long and depends on several individuals, as
described in Section 2.1. This means that even if the ACL targets a 45 working day processing
time, there will be a considerable spread around this target. Because of this, the ACLs may target a
processing time lower than 45 working days. The figure also shows that the processing times that
are reduced in frequency by the scorecards are in the whole span from 55 working days and up.
This is also reasonable given that the scorecards emphasized both processing applications within
the 45 working day limit and reducing the number of applications pending beyond 45 working
days. Overall the spread of the effect in the distribution of processing times alleviates the concern
that ACLs are "gaming" the scorecards by only speeding up the processing of applications that
would otherwise have been processed within a few working days outside of the time limit.
4.2 Mechanisms for the Effect on Processing Times
The scorecards increase the information the bureaucrats and the bureaucrats’ supervisors have
about the performance of the bureaucrat. This could improve performance through two main
channels. First, the supervisors may improve the incentive structures bureaucrats are facing
by facilitating better promotions and more attractive postings for those bureaucrats with good
scorecards, or more generally, bureaucrats with a good overall reputation of which the scorecards
are a part. This is an example of the widely studied mechanism of increased information enabling
better contracts that improve output (Holmström, 1979). It is also possible that bureaucrats care
about their supervisors receiving information about them for other reasons, such as the shaming
effect of having a negative performance being shown to a superior.
Second, bureaucrats may change their behavior due to receiving the scorecards themselves. For
bureaucrats, receiving information about their delays each month may increase this information’s
salience, causing it to be more important for their personal sense of shame or pride in their work.23
23Effects from simply being informed of one’s own performance have been found for energy conservation (Allcott,
2011). On the other hand, the effects of such information provision in private organizations have been mixed, with
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Since the scorecards were sent to both bureaucrats and their supervisors, I cannot separately
estimate the importance of these two mechanisms and I refer to them collectively as reputational
concerns.
In addition to the two mechanisms above, it is also possible that information flows between
bureaucrats at the same level in the organizational hierarchy create an additional incentive for im-
proved performance through peer effects (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010; Cornelissen
et al., 2017).24 I estimate the magnitude of such a peer effect, above and beyond the effect of the
scorecard, by sending information about other offices’ performance within a randomly selected
sub-group of the offices receiving scorecards, as described in Section 2.3.1.
Table I.3 shows the effect of the peer performance list intervention on processing times. Sharing
the performance information of a bureaucrat with other bureaucrats does not meaningfully improve
processing times beyond the effect of the performance scorecards. Column (1) of Table I.3 shows
that the estimated effect on the fraction of applications processed within the 45 working day time
limit is positive but close to zero. Column (2) shows that the effect on overall processing times is
negative but also close to zero.25
4.3 Effect on Visits to Land Office and Time Spent by Applicants
In Table I.4, I use survey data to show that the scorecard reduced the number of visits to land offices
by the applicants as well as the total hours spent on making these visits. Column (1) shows that
the scorecards reduced the number of visits by 1.0 visits, or 12%. Column (2) estimates that the
scorecards decreased the total number of hours spent on these visits by 1.6 hours, or 7%, but this
effect is not statistically significant. Column (3) estimates the effect on an ICW index of these two
outcome variables showing that the effect is not statistically significant for a combination of the two
variables. Appendix Section C.5 shows that the scorecards did not improve the stated satisfaction
several papers showing that even the direction of the effect depends on the specific circumstances (Blader et al., 2020;
Ashraf, 2019).
24In addition to the context of job performance, effects of sharing information about behavior to others have shown to
improve socially desirable behaviors such as voting (Gerber et al., 2008) and paying taxes (Bø et al., 2015; Perez-Truglia
and Troiano, 2018).
25Columns (3) and (4) of Table I.3 use the full data set and estimate the effect of the scorecard and the peer performance
list simultaneously. This is done using a dummy variable for the peer performance list treatment that takes the value of
one for applications made in offices receiving the peer performance lists, made later than one calendar month before the
first performance list was sent out. When estimating the effects of the scorecards without the effect of the performance
list, the point estimates are similar to the effect in the main estimate but only statistically significant at the 10% level.
This shows that the effect of the scorecards is not driven by the inclusion of the peer performance list.
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with the application process among applicants.
4.4 Effect on Bribe Payments
Table I.5 shows that the scorecards did not lead to a decrease in bribe payments. Instead, the esti-
mated effect on bribes is positive, although this increase is not statistically significant. As described
in Section 2.5.2, data on bribe payments was collected using two separate survey questions. The
first question asked about the typical bribe payment "for a normal person, like yourself." When this
measure is used, the column is marked as "typical." The second set of questions asked about each
payment made by the applicant. When this measure is used, the column is marked "reported."
Columns (1) and (2) of Table I.5 show the effect on the amount of bribes paid. Column (1)
shows that the effect on the perceived typical payment was BDT 1,046 (USD 12), a 17% increase,
statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (2) estimates that the scorecards increased reported
bribe payments by BDT 265, a 21% increase, but the result is not statistically significant. Columns
(3) and (4) show that there is no effect on the propensity to report a non-zero bribe. This can be
interpreted as the scorecards having no effect on the extensive margin of bribe payments. Another
interpretation is that the intervention did not affect applicants’ willingness to talk about bribe
payments in the survey. In Columns (5) and (6), the sample is restricted to those who reported
non-zero bribe payments. Bribe payments increased by 19% for typical payments and 23% for
reported payments, with both effects being statistically significant. Again these effects have two
interpretations. Either the scorecards only affected the intensive margin of bribe payments, or the
scorecards increased bribe payments for at least those applicants who were willing to describe
what bribes they paid but potentially also for other applicants.
The estimated effects for a range of alternative specifications for the main estimate in Columns
(1) and (2) of Table I.5 are shown in Panel A of Appendix Table I.A.9. All alternative specifica-
tion estimates are qualitatively similar, but some are of slightly larger magnitude and, therefore,
statistically significant.
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4.5 Heterogeneity of Results by Office Performance at Baseline
I use the empirical strategy described in Section 3.2 to understand if there are differences in the
effect of the scorecard between offices over- and under-performing at baseline.
4.5.1 Heterogeneity in Effects on Processing Times, Visits, and Time Spent by Applicants
Table I.6 shows that the effect of the scorecard on processing times is driven by offices that were
under-performing at baseline. Column (1) of Table I.6 shows that for offices that were over-
performing at baseline, the estimated effect on the fraction of applications processed within the 45
working day limit us just a 0.8 percentage point increase. For offices that were under-performing at
baseline, the effect is 12 percentage points, equivalent to a 30% increase. Column (2) shows that for
offices over-performing at baseline, the estimated effect of the scorecard on the total processing time
is a decrease of 3%. For offices that were under-performing at baseline, the effect was a decrease of
23%.
The effects in the survey data are less precisely estimated but also show that it is offices
underperforming at baseline driving the effect. Column (3) of Table I.6 shows that for offices
over-performing at baseline, the number of visits per applicant was reduced by 0.7 visits, while
for offices under-performing at baseline, the effect was a decrease of 1.2 visits, equivalent to a
12% decrease. Column (4) shows that for offices over-performing at baseline, hours spent on the
application by applicants increased by 0.4 hours while in offices under-performing at baseline the
effect was a decline of 3.0 hours, equivalent to an 11% decrease.
Overall it is clear that the improvements that the scorecards led to were almost entirely driven
by offices that were under-performing at baseline. Appendix Table I.A.10 shows that this result
is robust to other measures of baseline performance. Panel B of Appendix Table I.A.7 shows that
this result is robust to alternative regression specifications. There are several reasons for why
under-performing offices may respond more to the scorecards. For example, negative performance
feedback may create a stronger desire to improve one’s performance for subsequent scorecards.
However, it may also be the case that poorly performing offices have a larger scope for improvement
since there is more “low-hanging fruit" in terms of increasing efficiency.
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4.5.2 Heterogeneity in the effect on bribe payments
Table I.7 shows that the positive effect on bribe payments is entirely driven by the offices that were
over-performing at the start of the experiment. Column (1) shows that the effect of the scorecard on
estimated typical bribe payments among offices over-performing at baseline was an increase of
BDT 2,280 or 43% and statistically significant. Column (2) shows that the reported payments among
offices over-performing at baseline increased by BDT 638 or 70%, and is statistically significant.
The effect on offices that were under-performing at baseline is close to zero and not statistically
significant. Appendix Table I.A.10 shows that this result is robust to other measures of baseline
performance. Panel B of Appendix Table I.A.9 shows that this result is robust to alternative
regression specifications.
This result is surprising, given that over-performing offices did not change their behavior in
terms of processing times. I will discuss this result at length in Sections 5 and 6.
4.6 External Validity, Potential Biases from Surveying, and Unintended Consequences26
One advantage of the design of the experiment is that it was conducted at a large scale, with
more than half of Bangladesh’s land offices taking part in the experiment. The large scale of the
experiment makes it plausible that the results are externally valid within Bangladesh (Muralidharan
and Niehaus, 2017). Offices took part in the experiment if they had the e-governance system
installed. Therefore, the main concern for the external validity of the result within Bangladesh
is that offices that had the e-governance system installed earlier had a larger effect than offices
where the e-governance system was installed later. Appendix Section C.1 shows evidence that the
effect of the scorecards on processing times was only slightly larger in the land offices that had the
e-governance system installed earlier. Furthermore, using a linear prediction, the effect is predicted
to be positive for all offices in Bangladesh where the e-governance system is installed.
While it is unlikely, it is possible that the survey and information intervention affected the
overall effect of the scorecards. In Appendix Section C.2 I restrict the sample to applications made
before the survey took place and application made in offices where there was no survey and show
that there is no evidence that the survey or information intervention are drivers of the estimated
26Appendix Section C discusses potential biases, external validity, and unintended consequences in more detail.
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effect of the scorecards on processing times.
A common problem of quantitative performance measures is that they often lead to gaming of
the quantitative measures or other unintended consequences (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2008; Rasul and
Rogger, 2018). In Appendix Section C.3 I test for three such potential unintended consequences
that could have improved the scorecards without increasing the real service delivery speed for
applicants. First, if bureaucrats allow fewer applicants to start applications, then this may improve
their scorecards, provided that the lower number of applications help them process a larger share
of the applications within the time limit. Second, if bureaucrats allowed applications selectively
such that the average application was easier to process within the time limit, then this could have
improved their scorecards. Finally, the scorecards may lead to bureaucrats making worse decisions
regarding accepting or rejecting applications. Reassuringly, I do not find any evidence for any of
these unintended consequences.
5 Implications for Theories of the Relationship between Processing
Times and Bribes
In this Section I will show how the experimental results are inconsistent with several common
models of how bribes are related to delays in public service delivery, or more generally red tape.27
There are several theoretical reasons for why bribes may be causally related to delays. Some of
these models predict a positive causal relationship, while others predict a negative relationship. For
example, fast processing times may increase the applicants’ willingness to pay for the public service
and enable bureaucrats to extract more bribes. Bribes may also provide a piece rate incentive
for bureaucrats to process more applications and cause bureaucrats to process applications faster.
Conversely, long processing time for those paying small or no bribes may enable bureaucrats to
extract more bribes from applicants willing to pay to get their application processed fast. These
causal relationships exist both in models where corruption is efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Leff, 1964;
Huntington, 1968), as well as in models where corruption is the original cause of the slow service
delivery (Myrdal, 1968; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999).
27I use the term delays, but the theories are equally applicable to other forms of red tape, such as the need for multiple
visits to government offices or an excessive amount of paperwork to be filled out.
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It is important to understand which, if any, of these relationships are major determinants of
bribes and processing times since some of the models have opposing policy implications. If slow
service delivery causes corruption, then expanding the processing capacity of the bureaucracy
through more staff, better technologies, or better management, may not only improve processing
times but also reduce corruption. But if bribery was to be rooted out, without addressing the
underlying capacity constraints, this might lead to a worse situation for applicants if, for example,
bureaucrat had less of an incentive to process their applications or people who urgently needed
a service could not pay to get it faster. On the other hand, if corruption is the underlying cause
for slow service delivery due to intentional delays by bureaucrats for the purpose of extracting
more bribes, then providing the bureaucracy with more staff or better technology would not lead
to any improvement in processing times, let alone decrease corruption. The most important policy
priority should then instead be to eliminate corruption to remove the incentives for bureaucrats to
intentionally delay corruption.
The model the scorecard experiment was originally designed to test was a model where the
presence of corruption led to slower processing times but where faster processing times could
reduce corruption. The model was similar to monopolistic price discrimination models, and in the
model bureaucrats use delays strategically to maximize the total amount of bribes in the same way
a monopolist would strategically decrease the quality of some goods to maximize profits (Mussa
and Rosen, 1978; Maskin and Riley, 1984). The model assumes that applicants have different
willingness to pay to avoid delays, but that bureaucrats cannot perfectly observe the willingness to
pay of each applicant. Therefore, they intentionally delay applications from applicants only paying
low bribes in order to extract more bribes from applicants with a high willingness to pay to avoid
delays. The model predicts that an improvement in processing times, such as the improvement the
scorecards created, should decrease bribe payments among applicants getting their applications
processed the fastest. See Appendix A.2 for a more detailed description and an explicit test rejecting
this model in this context.
A different type of models, are models where the government officials could extract more bribes
if they wanted to, but choose not to do so because there is a trade-off between taking bribes and
some other objective of the government official. This trade-off could be between taking bribes and
the risk of getting caught (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Olken, 2007; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013a),
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but it could also be a trade-off between bribes and altruistic or social motivations for not taking
bribes. In Section 6, I develop a specific such model where taking bribes hurts bureaucrats’ utility
through bribes negative effect on reputation but where this can be compensated for by better visible
job performance in terms of processing times. I then derive predictions and test these against the
results of my experiment.
5.1 Do Faster Processing Times Decrease Bribe Payments?
The results in Section 4 are not consistent with theories of a causal relationship between faster
average processing times and lower bribe payments. While the scorecards did reduce processing
times, it did not reduce bribes, as shown in Tables I.2 and I.5, respectively. This is true even for the
offices that were under-performing at baseline and improved their processing time the most, as
shown in Tables I.6 and I.7.
One potential reason for the lack of effect from the scorecards on bribe payments could be
that the information about the improvement in processing times had not yet disseminated among
applicants. There are two reasons why this is not plausible. First, the scorecards did decrease
expected processing times. Column (1) of Appendix Table I.A.11 shows the effect of the scorecards
on the expected total processing time at the time of the first survey interview. The scorecards reduce
expected processing times by 9%, similar in magnitude to the effect on actual processing times and
statistically significant. Second, to further rule out that the lack of information about the improved
processing times limits the effect of the scorecards on bribes, I use the information treatment that
was designed to inform applicants about improvements in the processing times, as described in
Section 2.7. Column (2) of Appendix Table I.A.11 shows that the point estimate for the effect of the
information intervention on expected processing times is a reduction of 4% but that the estimate
is not statistically significant. Taken together, these results suggest that applicants are aware of
the current processing times in their sub-district land office and that providing them with more
information does not substantially change their expectations. Appendix Section C.4 shows that the
information treatment did not affect bribes, neither by itself nor in combination with the scorecards.
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5.2 Implications for Other Theories
Given the positive effect of the scorecards on bribes, is it possible that faster average processing
times lead to higher bribes? Tables I.6 and I.7 show that for offices under-performing at baseline
scorecards improved processing times the most but did not change bribe payments. This is
inconsistent with any model where average processing times has a causal effect on bribe payments.
Furthermore, for the offices over-performing at baseline, the scorecards increased bribe payments
without changing the processing times, which is inconsistent with models of a causal effect of
bribes on processing times.
The increase in bribes among the offices that were over-performing at baseline is also incon-
sistent with models where it is an applicants’ outside option or ability to pay that determine the
bribe levels (Svensson, 2003; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013b). If bribe levels change as a result
of a positive scorecard sent to the government official responsible for the service for which the
bribe is paid, without any observable change in service quality. The bribe level cannot be fully
determined by the applicants’ outside option or ability to pay. This result is most likely dependent
on the structure of the interaction in which the bribe is paid. In this context, the land office is the
only institution that can make the required land record change and there are no close substitutes
to this service. Therefore, the bribe level is expected to be determined mainly by other factors. If
there had been competition for applicants between land offices, or a close alternative to a land
record change, it is plausible that these outside options (or "exit" options) would have been more
important in determining the bribe level (Svensson, 2003).
6 Model of Bureaucrat Behavior
In this section, I will provide an overview of the model I propose to explain the results of the
experiment. Appendix Section A.1 provides a formal presentation of the model.
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6.1 Model Set-up
In the model, bureaucrats get utility from a reputational concerns term which is a function of visible
job performance in terms of delays and bribe money.28 Bureaucrats get disutility from effort, but
effort is needed to avoid delays, which decrease the reputational concerns term. Reputational
concerns has decreasing marginal utility, and so does bribe money, while effort has increasing
marginal disutility. Bribes and delays both reduce the reputational concerns term since if a bureau-
crat consistently asks for high bribes and do not process applications on time, a negative reputation
about the bureaucrat is built and becomes visible to others. The visibility of delays increases with
the scorecards, making delays more important for the bureaucrats’ reputational concerns.
Bureaucrats differ only in the extent to which they care about their reputational concerns. This
could be because of differences in discounting future career prospects, differences in the valuation
of social status from holding a high-level civil service position, or differences in intrinsic motivation
to "do a good job." What is important about these differences for the model is that they create the
difference between over- and under-performing bureaucrats.29 This assumption is also consistent
with the observation that over-performing bureaucrats collect less bribes than under-performing
bureaucrats in the control group. This would not be the case if ability is what made over-performing
bureaucrats better than under-performing bureaucrats.30
In the model, the applicants simply pay the bribe amount that the bureaucrats are demanding.
While this is clearly an abstraction from reality, Figure I.1 shows that the average stated value of
a record of rights for applicants is substantially higher than the values of bribes paid. Even the
largest estimate for the average bribe, the estimate of a typical payment, is just 0.1% of the average
estimated value of the record of rights. This difference between the applicant valuation and the
amount paid suggests that the applicants’ willingness to pay for the service is not an important
28The reputational concerns term represents reasons for why the bureaucrats cares about what others, especially
their supervisors, think of them. This could be for material reasons, such as career progression, social reasons, such as
maintaining a good social standing with others in the bureaucracy, or psychological reasons such as the negative feelings
of pride (or shame) stemming from knowing that someone else knows about one’s good (or bad) performance. The term
also encapsulates psychological reasons that are internal to the bureaucrats, such as the negative feelings stemming from
failing to perform one’s duty or breaking an internalized social norm of performing at least as well as one’s peers. I.e.,
the effect of the scorecards on the reputational concerns term captures both possible mechanisms described in Section 4.2.
29Ashraf et al. (2020) show that differences in the motivations of public servants is important for public service delivery.
30Table I.7 shows that in the control group, offices under-performing at baseline also extract substantially larger bribes.
This would not be the relationship if the differences in processing times were driven by a bureaucrat characteristic
uncorrelated with bribe payments, such as ability. However, this relationship should be interpreted as an association, as
the causal effect of the bureaucrat type on bribes is not identified by the experiment.
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determinant of the bribe value. Instead, what determines the amount of bribes that the bureaucrats
extract in the model is the trade-off between bribe money and reputational concerns.
The model also abstracts away from bribes that increase the speed of processing and the value
that fast processing-times have to the applicants. While this assumption is a simplification, Figure
I.1 shows that the average value an applicant put, even on the fastest reasonable processing time, is
just 33% of the average estimated value of a typical bribe payment. This suggests that most of the
bribes are not paid for increasing the speed of processing.
Finally, the model assumes that bureaucrats cannot buy reputation using money. This abstracts
away from situations where bureaucrats use bribe money to pay supervisors for promotions, but
the results would be the same if bureaucrats would pay for the position as ACL in the first place
but that they then cannot bribe their way to future career advancement or high social standing in
the bureaucracy.31
6.2 Model Predictions
The theoretical model has two main testable predictions. In what follows, I describe these predic-
tions, the intuition behind them, and how I test them empirically. Appendix Section A.1 provides
the formal model as well as the derivations and formal statements of the predictions.
6.2.1 Effects of Scorecard on Delays
The first set of predictions relates to the effect of scorecards on delays. The scorecards have two
different effects on delays, a substitution effect and an income effect. These effects are analogous to
the substitution and income effects from a wage increase in a standard labor supply model. The
substitution effect leads to a decrease in delays for all bureaucrats. This is because the scorecards
increase the importance of delays for bureaucrats’ reputational concerns. Therefore, the marginal
effect on utility from decreasing delays increases and bureaucrats provide more effort to avoid
delays.
The income effect from the scorecards on delays is positive for over-performing bureaucrats
and negative for under-performing bureaucrats. For over-performing bureaucrats, the scorecards
31Weaver (2020) analyses the effects of such bribes in the allocation of job applicants to positions in public service
delivery.
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increase their reputation by making the already positive performance more visible. Since reputation
has decreasing marginal utility, this decreases the marginal utility effect from changes to their
reputation and reduces the optimal amount of effort they provide to avoid delays. Therefore, the
model does not have a prediction for the effect of the scorecards on delays among over-performing
bureaucrats, the direction of the effect depend on if the substitution or income effects is stronger.
For under-performing bureaucrats, the scorecards make the negative performance more visible
and make their reputation worse. This increases the marginal utility from reputation and hence
increases the optimal amount of effort that bureaucrats provide to avoid delays. Hence, for these
bureaucrats the substitution effect and income effect are in the same direction and the model
predicts that the scorecards will reduce delays among under-performing bureaucrats.
Prediction 1: Scorecards improve processing times for bureaucrats under-performing at
baseline
Inconclusive: Ambiguous direction of the effect on processing times for bureaucrats over-
performing at baseline
These predictions are tested directly in Table I.6, described in Section 4.5. Consistent with Prediction
1, the scorecards improve processing times for offices under-performing at baseline leading to fewer
delays and shorter average processing times. The effect for over-performing offices is substantially
smaller than the effect for under-performers and the difference in the two effects on the ICW index
is marginally statistically significant.
6.2.2 Effects of Scorecard on Bribes
The second prediction relates to the effect of scorecards on bribe amounts extracted from applicants
and the levels of these amounts in the control group. In the model, the bureaucrats could increase
bribes by simply asking applicants for more money to approve their applications. What constraints
bureaucrats from extracting more bribes is their reputational concerns. Therefore, the marginal
utility from reputation is an important determining factor for bribe payments. When the scorecards
improve over-performing bureaucrats’ reputation, the marginal negative effect bribes have on
utility through the reputational concerns channel declines. This leads to an increase in bribes taken
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by over-performing bureaucrats when they receive the scorecards.32
For under-performing bureaucrats, the decrease in the reputational concerns term leads to an
increase in marginal disutility from bribes coming through the reputation channel. This could lead
to a decrease in bribes, but since effort increases in response to the scorecards, the overall effect on
reputation could be positive or negative. Since the effect on bribes for this group is ambiguous, the
model does not have a prediction for the effect of the scorecards on bribes for under-performing
bureaucrats.
Prediction 2: Scorecards increase bribes for bureaucrats over-performing at baseline
Inconclusive: Ambiguous direction for the effect on bureaucrats under-performing at
baseline
These predictions are tested directly in Table I.7, described in Section 4.5.2. The scorecards increase
bribes paid in offices over-performing at baseline. The effect of the scorecards on bribes is close to
zero for office under-performing at baseline.
6.3 Potential General Equilibrium Effects within the Civil Service
In the predictions described above, I do not allow for the scorecards to change the benchmark
performance that bureaucrats are compared against. In the context of the experiment, this does
not qualitatively alter the predictions since half of the bureaucrats creating the benchmark do not
receive the scorecards. However, if the scorecards were to be scaled-up to all bureaucrats, there
would be a larger effect on the benchmark performance. This would shift the whole distribution of
performance percentiles down and thereby have an income effect on all bureaucrats. The prediction
from the model is that this income effect would induce more effort and smaller bribe payments
than the partial experimental roll-out of the scorecards.
32This effect is dependent on that the income effect on delays is not so strong that it dominates the substitution effect
and mutes any positive effect on the reputational concerns coming from the increased visibility of the already good
performance. We see that this is not the case in Table I.6, where the overall performance of bureaucrats over-performing
at baseline is marginally positive, suggesting that the substitution effect marginally dominates the income effect and
hence the scorecards lead to an increase in the reputation of over-performing bureaucrats by increasing the visibility of
their positive performance.
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6.4 Alternative Explanations for the Effects of Scorecards
6.4.1 Increased Marginal Costs of Bureaucrats’ Time or Increased Willingness to Pay Among
Applicants
One potential explanation for the scorecards causing higher bribe payments, is that scorecards
increase the marginal value of the bureaucrats’ time. If bribe payments are made so that the
bureaucrats spend more time on an application, the marginal value of the bureaucrats’ time could
be an important determinant of the bribe amount. If the scorecards increase the overall amount of
time that bureaucrats are working, it is also likely that the marginal value of their time increased.
Hence, it is possible for scorecards to have increased bribes through this mechanism. Another
alternative explanation is that faster processing times lead applicants to be willing to pay more to
get their land record change.
However, both of these explanations are inconsistent with the result that in the offices where
the changes in processing times were the largest, bribe payments did not change. Instead, it is in
the offices where changes in processing times are small that bribe payments increase. If it had been
an increase in the willingness to pay by applicants or an increase in bureaucrats’ effort that lead to
the increase in bribes, the increase would take place in the offices that were under-performing at
baseline, because these are the offices where the scorecards improve processing times. Therefore, it
is unlikely that either of these mechanisms is a substantial reason for the increase in bribe payments.
6.4.2 Transfers of Over-performing Bureaucrats
An alternative explanation, that is consistent with the heterogeneity in the effects on delays and
bribes, is that over-performing bureaucrats get transferred due to receiving positive scorecards and
that they are replaced by average performing bureaucrats. If the average performing bureaucrats
both have slower processing times and collect more bribes, we expect that bribe payments would
increase in offices over-performing at baseline. Processing times may not change as the incentive
effects of the scorecards may cancel out the effect of high quality bureaucrats being replaced by
lower quality bureaucrats.
However, this explanation is refuted by the data on bureaucrat transfers. Appendix Table I.A.12
shows that the scorecards did not affect bureaucrats’ transfers. Column (1) shows the effect on
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the monthly probability of being transferred, Column (2) shows the heterogeneity in the effect by
offices over-performing and under-performing at baseline. Columns (3) and (4) show the overall
and heterogeneous effects on the duration of the posting for the first bureaucrat after the start of the
experiment, including postings that started before the experiment. Columns (5) and (6) show the
overall and heterogeneous effects on not having any ACL assigned to the office. All of the effects
are close to zero and not statistically significant.
6.4.3 Over-performing Bureaucrats using Scorecards in Negotiations over Bribes with Appli-
cants
Another alternative explanation is that positive scorecards help bureaucrats prove to applicants
that they have the ability to process applications quickly. This could then allow the bureaucrats
receiving positive scorecards to charge higher bribes while it would not affect the bribes in offices
receiving negative scorecards since these would not be shown to applicants.
There are three reasons why this explanation is implausible. First, the coefficients on "Overper-
form baseline" in Columns (4) and (5) of Appendix Table I.A.11, show that the expected processing
times are 14% lower in the over-performing offices not receiving the scorecards, suggesting that the
applicants are already aware of the faster processing times in these offices. Furthermore, in Column
(4) the point estimate for how the scorecards effect on applicants’ expectations in over-performing
offices is a 6% decrease, similar to the point estimate of a 3% decrease for the actual improvement of
the processing times in these offices, as shown in Column (2) of Table I.4. If the scorecards helped
bureaucrats change applicants’ expectations, the effect on the expectations should be larger than
the effect on the actual processing times. Second, although I cannot rigorously rule out that no one
in the land offices showed the scorecards to applicants, in none of the qualitative interviews done
with ALCs and applicants was it even mentioned that the scorecards were shown to applicants
and when directly asked, the applicants said they were not aware of the performance scorecards.
Third, the information intervention tried to accomplish the effect that a bureaucrat could achieve
by showing the scorecard to an applicant. Column (2) in Appendix Table I.A.11 shows that the
point estimate of the effect of the information intervention is just a 4% improvement in the expected
processing time, suggesting that it is difficult to move applicants priors through simple information
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interventions. Furthermore, Appendix Table I.A.4 shows that the information intervention did not
increase bribes.
7 Conclusion
I have shown that information flows about individual government bureaucrats performance within
a bureaucracy can improve the performance of these bureaucrats, even in the absence of explicit
performance incentives. The results from the experiment show that these effects can happen rapidly
and persist over at least 16 months. One plausible mechanism for this effect is that the bureaucrats
care about the reputation they have among their supervisors. A second potential mechanism is
that being measured and compared to your peers increases the salience of the performance to
the bureaucrats themselves and generates a sense of shame or pride that create an additional
motivation to perform well.
One way to assess the value of the improved processing times is to multiply the applicants’
average stated valuation of having their application processed one day faster with the reduction
in the total number of processing days due to the scorecards.33 For the 155 offices receiving the
treatment, this gives a value of approximately USD 9.7 million per year.34 This value should be
interpreted carefully since it relies heavily on the stated value of faster processing to the applicants.
However, the number is more than two orders of magnitude larger than the implementation costs of
the scorecards, which were approximately USD 20,000 per year, even when including the author’s
time and set-up costs. However, the value of the experimental intervention becomes less clear
when taking into account the effect on bribes. Multiplying the effect of the scorecards on reported
payments with the number of applications in the treatment area results in an estimate of the effect
on total bribes paid of 1.9 million per year. If the effect on the estimated typical payment is used
instead, the total increase is USD 7.6 million per year.
Except for the increase in bribe payments, I do not find any evidence for unintended con-
sequences or gaming of the scorecard’s quantitative performance indicators. It is possible that
33I calculate the value of having the application being processed one day faster using the following formula:
Value of processing in 7 days
Expected processing time from survey date−7 . All the information comes from the in-person survey made before the appli-
cation was actually processed.
34The number of applications per year is estimated by taking the number of applications in the last six months of 2019
when all offices had the e-governance system installed and multiplying by 2.
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monitoring or information flows that are not directly tied to explicit incentives are less likely to
have the unintended consequences that are common for explicit incentive structures. One reason
for this is that the receivers of the information can interpret the information flexibly. If bureaucrats
engaged in observable behavior leading to unintended consequences, it would be possible for the
supervisors to take this into account when interpreting the information on the scorecards. Further-
more, the scorecards were well received by most supervisors and there was no substantial backlash
among bureaucrats. This points to another difference from explicit performance incentives. Since
improved information flows do not reduce the discretionary power of supervisors, it is possible
that they are less likely to be opposed by important actors in the organization and, therefore, poorly
implemented (Banerjee et al., 2020).
The results have several policy implications. First, the result highlights that there exists un-
tapped potential in data generated by e-governance systems. As more and more public services
are delivered using e-governance systems, the cost of monitoring and evaluating civil servants’
performance has drastically decreased. The results of the experiment show that using the data
generated by e-governance systems for monitoring and evaluation has significant potential to
improve bureaucratic efficiency.
Second, the differential effects of the scorecards on under-performing and over-performing
offices suggest that it is especially important to improve information flows for under-performing
bureaucrats. Regardless of the mechanism for this result, it implies that the type of recognition
systems that are common for bureaucrats in low- and middle-income countries, where outstanding
performances are recognized without addressing inadequate performances, are ineffective. This is
because providing positive feedback has a negative effect stemming from the improved reputation
that the positive performance information generates. Instead, it is more important to make sure
negative feedback is provided to under-performing civil servants. Positive feedback might still
have an overall positive effect since it may motivate under-performing bureaucrats who want to
receive better feedback, but the positive feedback is likely less effective than the negative feedback
and can, in some cases, even be counter-productive.
Finally, the model points out a more general problem when using reputational concerns to
incentivize a socially desirable behavior by an agent. Any reform or intervention that increases the
reputation of some agents may also have a negative spill-over on other behaviors where reputation
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is a motivating factor. This is an especially important insight for government bureaucracies, where
compressed wage structures and secure employment of civil servants often make reputational
concerns more important motivators than in other organizations.
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Land value WTP for Record of Rights
WTP for 7 day processing Reported bribe payments
Payments > 0 Typical payments
The first bar of this figure shows the average of applicants’ estimates of the value of the land for
which the land record change is being applied for. The second bar shows the average of applicants’
stated value of getting the land record change approved and receiving a record of rights. The third
bar shows the average stated value of getting the application processed within seven days from the
time of the first survey. The fourth bar shows the average value of bribe payments reported by the
applicant, 73% of the applicants reported having paid no bribes. The fifth bar shows the average
value of bribe payments reported by applicants reporting having paid some bribe. The sixth bar
shows the average value of an estimated "typical bribe payment by a person like yourself" reported
by the applicant, 27% of the applicants responding to this question reported that a typical applicant
paid no bribes. The first two bars are measured on the axis on the left, the next four bars are
measured on the axis to the right. All variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Observations
are weighted by the inverse of the number of observations in their land office. Discussed in Sections
2.1 and 6.
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Figure I.2: Overview of randomization and data collection
Randomization
1st wave Scorecards,
















Follow-up phone survey, Jul-Sep
2019: 3,018 successful interviews
Randomization
2nd wave Scorecards,


















This figure provides a visual overview of the experiment design and data collection. Boxes
placed further down in the figure represent things that happened later with the exception of the
administrative data collection, which happened throughout the project. Red boxes represents
randomizations into treatment or control. Blue boxes represents the treatment and control groups.
Green boxes represents data collection. Discussed in Section 2.4.
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−45 Start Second randomization data ends
−100 −50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Application date: working days since experiment start
Treatment Control
This figure shows the two week moving average of the daily fraction of applications processed
within the 45 working day limit in the treatment and control groups. Data contains all applications
made from 100 working days before the start of the experiment until 45 working days before
the experiment ended (25 Apr 2018 - 20 Jan 2020). The first vertical line represents the date 45
working days before the first scorecard was sent out. In principle, the effect can have started for any
application made after this date. The second vertical line represents the date of the first scorecard,
applications made after this date were fully treated. The third vertical line represents the end of the
data from the second randomization wave. To the right of this line the figure is based on the 112
offices in the first randomization wave. Discussed in Section 4.1.1.
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Overall Months 0−6 Months 6−11 Months 11−16
Application start (since experiment start)
Pooled Rand. wave 1
Rand. wave 2
This figure shows the regression coefficients and confidence intervals for regressions using applica-
tions started during different time periods after the experiment started. The outcome variable is
the ICW Index from Column (3) of Table I.2. The overall estimate uses the same specification as in
Table I.2. The estimates for the three time periods are estimated by interacting a dummy variable
for if the application was made in that time period with the treatment variable. The figure show
results from regressions using data from all offices (triangle), offices in the first randomization
wave (squares), and offices in the second randomization wave (circles). The months are numbered
relative to when scorecards were sent out for that office’s randomization wave. Month 0 is the
month before the start of the experiment. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard
errors clustered at the office level. Discussed in Section 4.1.1.
41


















45 working day time limit
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200>
Processing time in working days
Treatment Control
This figure shows histograms of processing times for the treatment and control groups separately.
Processing times are top coded at 200 working days. Data contains all applications made between
one month before the start of the experiment and 45 working days before the experiment ended (13
Aug 2018 - 20 Jan 2020). Applications not processed as of October 2020 are excluded. Discussed in
Section 4.1.2.
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Table I.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median St. Dev. Observations
Panel A: Application level administrative data
Process time < 45 w. days 0.59 1 0.49 1,050,924
Actual process times (w. days) 50 34 45 972,589
Process time inc. imputed values (w. days) 63 36 70 1,050,924
Approval rate 0.69 1 0.46 972,582
Panel B: Monthly office level administrative data
Total applications 287 213 272 4,516
Applications processed 240 136 331 4,516
Apps. disposed within 45 w. days 150 79 195 4,516
Apps. pending beyond 45 w. days 382 97 732 4,516
Panel C: Applicant survey data
Applicant age 47 47 14 2,903
Female 0.06 0 0.24 3,018
Applicant monthly income (BDT) 23,902 20,000 21,093 2,791
Applicant HH per capita expenditure (BDT) 4,400 3,462 3,537 3,018
Land Value (BDT 100,000) 19 8 30 2,800
Land Size (Decimal = 1/100th Acre) 24 10 40 2,892
Any additional payment made 0.28 0 0.45 3,018
Reported payment amount (BDT) 1,456 0 3,456 3,018
Typical payment amount (BDT) 6,731 5,000 8,414 1,896
This table shows summary statistics for applications in the administrative data, offices, and appli-
cants in the survey data. Observations in Panel A and C are inversely weighted by the number
of applications in their land office. Observations in Panel B are uniformly weighted. Continuous
variables in the survey data are winsorized at the 99th percentile. USD/BDT≈84.3. Reported
payment amount is any payment reported by the applicant above the official fee. Typical payment
amount is the answer to the question of my much a "normal person, like yourself" typically pay to
get an application processed. Discussed in Section 2.5.
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Table I.2: Effect of Scorecards on Processing Times
(1) (2) (3)
<45 w. days IHS(w. days) ICW index
Scorecard 0.0608∗∗ -0.125∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0593) (0.0592)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924
Clusters 311 311 311
Control mean 0.56 65.64 -0.00
Fraction imputed 0.06
Fraction zero 0.003
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on the speed of application processing. Column (1)
shows the effect on the fraction of applications processed within the 45 working day time limit.
Column (2) shows the effect on the IHS transformation of processing time. Applications that are not
yet processed are given imputed processing times equal to the mean of processing times that are
longer than the application has currently been pending. Column (3) shows the effect on an inverse
covariance weighted matrix combining the outcome variables of Columns (1) and (2). Data contains
all applications made between one month before the start of the experiment and 45 working days
before the experiment ended (13 Aug 2018 - 20 Jan 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the land
office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of applications in their land office.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 4.1.
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Table I.3: Effect of Peer Performance List
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<45 w. days IHS(w. days) <45 w. days IHS(w. days)
Peer Performance List 0.00483 -0.0360 0.0116 -0.0404
(0.0452) (0.0948) (0.0394) (0.0823)
Scorecard 0.0570∗ -0.112∗
(0.0293) (0.0651)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 286,152 286,152 1,050,924 1,050,924
Clusters 155 155 311 311
Control mean 0.67 51.31 0.59 65.64
Fraction imputed 0.06 0.06
Fraction zero 0.003 0.003
This table shows the effect of adding the list of performances to the scorecard and sharing the
performance information about one office with the ACLs, UNOs, and DCs of 76 other offices.
Column (1) shows the effect on the fraction of applications processed within the 45 working day
time limit. Column (2) shows the effect on the IHS transformation of the processing time. Columns
(3) and (4) show the effects of both the scorecard treatment without the performance list and the
performance list separately. Columns (1) and (2) only use data from offices in the performance list
experiment and data from applications made one month before the first performance list until 20
January 2020. Columns (3) and (4) use data on all applications made between one month before the
start of the experiment started and 45 working days before the experiment ended (13 Aug 2018 - 20
Jan 2020). The dummy variable "Peer performance list" takes the value of one for applications made
in offices receiving the peer performance lists, made later than one calendar month before the first
performance list was sent out. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations
are inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Discussed in Section 4.2.
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Table I.4: Effect on Visits and Time Spent by Applicants
(1) (2) (3)
Visits Hours spent ICW index
Scorecard -1.034∗∗ -1.586 0.0851
(0.497) (1.855) (0.0552)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,018 3,018 3,018
Clusters 112 112 112
Control mean 8.99 23.66
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on visits to land offices and the number of hours
spent on these visits. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations inversely
weighted by the number of applications in the land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in
Section 4.3.
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Table I.5: Effect on Bribe Payments for Application Processing
Amount Any bribe Amount if > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scorecard 1,046∗ 265 -0.014 -0.003 1,573∗∗ 1,069∗∗
(615) (181) (0.022) (0.022) (768) (457)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,896 3,018 1,896 3,018 1,392 807
Clusters 112 112 112 112 112 111
Control mean 6,083 1,278 0.75 0.27 8,083 4,700
Bribe measure Typical Reported Typical Reported Typical Reported
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on bribe payments made for application processing.
Column (1) shows the effect on the estimate for how much a "normal person, like yourself" pays in
bribes to process an application. Column (2) shows the effect on reported payments to government
officials or agents beyond the official fee. Columns (3) and (4) show the effect on the fraction of
non-zero answers for the two questions. Columns (5) and (6) show the effect among applicants
who reported a non-zero bribe. All monetary amounts are in BDT. USD/BDT≈84.3. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the office level.
Observations inversely weighted by the number of applications in the land office. ***p<0.01;
**p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 4.4.
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Table I.6: Effects on Processing Times, Visits, and Time Spent by Office
Baseline Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<45 w. days IHS(w. days) Office visits Hours spent
Scorecard x Overperform baseline 0.00823 -0.0345 -0.678 0.358
(0.0372) (0.0804) (0.729) (2.626)
Scorecard x Underperform baseline 0.124∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -1.230∗ -2.973
(0.0402) (0.0876) (0.731) (2.843)
Overperform baseline 0.193∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -1.854∗ -7.095∗∗
(0.0502) (0.108) (0.949) (3.318)
P-value sub-group diff. 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.30
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050,924 1,050,924 3,018 3,018
Clusters 311 311 112 112
Overperformers: q-value 1.00 1.00 0.55 1.00
Underperformers: q-value 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.55
Overperformers: control mean 0.68 51.53 8.03 20.37
Underperformers: control mean 0.41 82.54 9.88 26.72
This table shows the effect of the scorecards separately for offices with above- and below-median
performance at baseline. In Columns (1) and (2), results are based on administrative data. In
Columns (3) and (4), results are based on survey data. Column (1) shows the effects on the fraction
of applications processed within the 45 working day limit. Column (2) shows the effects on the
IHS transformation of the number of working days it took to process the application. Column (3)
shows the effect on the number of visits to land offices needed for the processing of the application.
Column (4) shows the effect on the number of hours spent by the applicant for the processing
of the application. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Q-values are sharpened
false discovery rate q-values for the eight hypotheses that the effect of the scorecards is zero for
all outcome variables and for both over-performers and under-performers (Benjamini et al., 2006;
Anderson, 2008). Observations inversely weighted by the number of applications in the land office.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 4.5.1.
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Table I.7: Effect on Bribes by Office Baseline Performance
(1) (2)
Typical payment Reported payment
Scorecard x Overperform 2279.7∗∗∗ 638.4∗∗∗
(772.9) (229.1)
Scorecard x Underperform -162.4 -59.38
(954.6) (257.8)
Overperform baseline -1811.8∗ -819.0∗∗∗
(928.4) (287.8)
P-value sub-group diff. 0.06 0.05
Start month FE Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes
Observations 1,896 3,018
Clusters 112 112
Overperformers: q-value 0.01 0.01
Underperformers: q-value 0.76 0.76
Overperformers: control mean 5,313 916
Underperformers: control mean 6,817 1,616
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on offices with above- or below-median performance
at baseline. Column (1) shows the effects on what the applicant reports to be a typical payment for
a land record change for a person like themselves. Column (2) shows the effects on the payments
reported by the applicant. The outcome variables are in BDT. USD/BDT≈84.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the land office level. Q-values are sharpened false discovery rate q-values for the
four hypotheses that the effect of the scorecards is zero on both outcome variables and for both
over-performers and under-performers (Benjamini et al., 2006; Anderson, 2008). Observations are
inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.




A.1 Model of Reputation and Bureaucrat Behavior
A.1.1 Model Set-up
Government bureaucrats utility function:
U
(
Ei, Bi, tiR(Bi, vTi P (Ei))
)
= D (Ei) + M (Bi) + tiR
(
Bi, vTi P (Ei)
)
(3)
• Subscript i represent individual bureaucrats
• D (E) is disutility of effort E, which has negative first and second derivatives, D′ (E) < 0 and
D′′ (E) ≤ 0
• M (B) is the utility of bribe money B, which has a positive first derivative and a negative
second derivative, M′ (B) > 0 and M′′ (B) ≤ 0
• tR (B, vP (E)) is the utility from reputational concerns which is determined by B and visible
performance vP (E)
– R(.) has a negative derivative with respect to bribes R1 (B, vP (E)) < 0 and a posi-
tive derivative with respect to visible performance R2 (B, vP (E)) > 0. Both second
derivatives are negative, R11 (B, vP (E)) < 0 and R22 (B, vP (E)) < 0
– The cross derivative is positive, R21 (B, vP (E)) > 0, i.e., bribes and performance are
complements, or equivalently honesty (the lack of bribes) and performance are substi-
tutes
– A technical assumption used to ensure the existence of derivatives and avoid corner
solutions is R12 (B, vP (E)) ≤
(
R11 (B, vP (E)) R22 (B, vP (E))
) 1
2
• vTi is the visibility of performance P (Ei) and depend on bureaucrat i’s treatment Ti ∈
{scorecard, control} such that vscorecard > vcontrol
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– Connecting the performance term directly to the scorecards, I assume that performance
is the average ranking of a bureaucrat in terms of applications processed on time and
applications pending longer than the time limit
– P (E) is increasing in E, positive when E is above median effort and negative when E is
below median effort
* The second derivative is zero or negative, P′′ (E) ≤ 0
• t is the type of bureaucrat and reflects the degree to which the bureaucrat values reputation
– Bureaucrats only differ in their valuation of reputation t and their treatment status v
All of the assumptions, including the technical assumptions mentioned below, are fulfilled by a
simple Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form:
U = αln (1− E) + βln (B) + tln (c + v (E− Ē)− B)
Where c is a constant sufficiently large so that c + v (E− Ē)− B > 0 and Ē is the effort of the
median bureaucrat when vT = vcontrol .
For simplicity, I do not formally model applicants’ behavior but assume that they have no
choice but to accept the bureaucrats’ bribe request.
A.1.2 Solution to Bureaucrats’ Problem
Bureaucrats choose E and B to maximize U (E, B, tC(B, vP (E))). The first order conditions to the
bureaucrats maximization problem are:






vTP′ (E∗i ) = 0 (4)
Where E∗i and B
∗
i represent the choices of E and B that maximize utility for bureaucrat i. At the
optimum, the marginal disutility of effort equals the marginal utility of effort’s effect on reputational
concerns.








At the optimum, the marginal utility of bribe money equals the marginal disutility from a
decrease in reputation due to bribes.
A.1.3 Effect of Scorecards on Effort
Henceforth, I will drop the star superscript (∗) on E and B since all mentions will refer to the values
of E and B at the optimum. Taking the total derivatives of the first order conditions with respect to
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− (R12 (.) vTP′ (Ei))2
(6)
Using the technical assumption R21 (B, vP (E)) ≤
(
R11 (B, vP (E)) R22 (B, vP (E))
) 1
2 the denomi-
nator is positive. The first term in the numerator reflects the direct substitution effect of the changed
visibility of effort. This effect is always positive. The second term in the numerator represents the
income effect, i.e., the effect on effort stemming from improved reputation because of the change in
visibility of existing efforts. If P (E) < 0 then this term is also positive making the whole expression
positive.
Prediction 1: If P (E) < 0 then dEdv > 0. I.e., the scorecards improve processing times for
offices under-performing at baseline
For bureaucrats with an above-median performance, when their positive performance becomes
more visible, their reputation improves, and the marginal utility from exerting effort on improv-
ing reputation decreases. For bureaucrats with an above-median effort, the effect is, therefore,
ambiguous.35
A.1.4 Effect of Scorecards on Bribes
Taking the total derivatives of the first order conditions with respect to v gives us the following
expression for the derivative of B with respect to v:
35The ambiguous effect is analogous to the effect of a wage increase on labor supply. The income effect and substitution























22 (.) (vP′ (Ei))
2 + R2 (.) vP′′ (Ei)
)
− (R21 (.) vP′ (Ei))2
(7)
Again using the technical assumption R21 (B, vP (E)) ≤
(
R11 (B, vP (E)) R22 (B, vP (E))
) 1
2 the
denominator is positive. The first term in the numerator is positive and derived from the substi-
tution effect increasing effort, which leads to an improvement in visible performance which in
turn leads to an increase in bribes because of the complementarity between visible performance
and bribes. The second term is derived from the changed visibility of pre-existing performance
which also affects bribes due to the complementarity between visible performance and bribes. For
bureaucrats with an effort above the median effort this effect is positive. Their positive performance
becomes more visible so their reputation term improve and the complementarity decreases the
marginal disutility, through the reputation channel, from collecting bribes. Conversely, for bureau-
crats with below-median effort this effect is negative. Hence, for bureaucrats with above-median
effort the scorecards leads to higher bribes ( dBdv > 0) while for bureaucrats with below-median effort
the effect is ambiguous.
Prediction 2: If P (E) > 0 then dBdv > 0. I.e., scorecards increase bribes for offices over-
performing at baseline
A.2 Monopolistic Price Discrimination Model
The experiment was designed to test a specific model of how the speed of application processing
and bribes are connected. A full exposition of the complete model and its predictions is available
in the pre-analysis plan. Here I outline the intuition behind the model and its prediction for the
experiment. The model is based on an asymmetric information model of price discrimination
under monopoly where the bureaucrat acts as monopolists selling a service. Applicants get
utility from having their application processed, the faster the application is processed the more
utility the processing generates. Applicants differ only in their willingness to pay for the speed
of processing their applications. All applicants’ utility is linear in money and none of them are
liquidity constrained so their willingness to pay equals their ability to pay. The bureaucrat can ask
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for different bribe payments from the applicants and can offer the service with different processing
times or refuse to provide the service. Once a processing time and bribe payment is agreed upon
the applicant pays the bribe and the bureaucrat must honor the agreement. The bureaucrat gets
utility from receiving bribes. It can be costly for the bureaucrats to process applications faster
although this is not necessary for the main conclusions of the model.
Perfect information in the context of this model means that the bureaucrat can perfectly observe
the applicants’ willingness to pay for having the application processed faster. Under perfect
information, applicants will have their applications processed at a Pareto optimal speed where
the marginal benefit of having the application processed faster is the same as the marginal cost
of processing the application faster for the bureaucrat. Asymmetric information means that
bureaucrats cannot observe the applicants’ willingness to pay. Under asymmetric information, the
bureaucrat has to offer the same menu of processing times and bribe payments to all applicants.36
Under asymmetric information only the applicants with the highest willingness get their application
processed at the Pareto optimal speed. All other applicants have their applications slowed down as
the bureaucrats trade-off providing fast processing for applicants with lower willingness to pay
with how large of a bribe they can charge from applicants with a higher willingness to pay.
An easy way to see this trade-off is in a simple example where it is costless for the bureaucrat
to process the application immediately and there are two types of applicants, one with a higher
willingness to pay to have the application processed quickly. Under full information, the bureaucrat
can simply make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to all applicants at exactly their willingness to pay to
have the application processed immediately. The applicants will pay their respective willingness to
pay because they have no better outside option and the bureaucrat will process the applications
immediately. Under asymmetric information, the bureaucrat cannot differentiate between the
applicants ex-ante. It now becomes optimal, from the bureaucrat’s perspective, to offer to process
the application immediately at a higher bribe payment and slower at a lower bribe payment. The
applications for those with low willingness to pay are now intentionally delayed despite that
processing them immediately does not cost the bureaucrat anything.
36Realistically, some observable characteristics contain information about the applicants’ willingness to pay. In this
case, the bureaucrat has to offer the same menu to all applicants with the same observable characteristics.
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A.2.1 Model’s Predictions for the Experiment
The scorecards encourage bureaucrats to process applications within 45 working days. Section 4
shows that the scorecards led to an increase in the applications processed within 45 working days
and that the effect was driven by offices that were under-performing at the start of the experiment.
Under full information, an increase in processing speed is predicted to lead to a slight increase
in bribe payments among those whose applications are processed faster. This is because for these
applications the value of the processing has increased and they are now willing to pay more for it.
Under asymmetric information, an increase in processing speeds is predicted to reduce the bribe
payments among those with the highest willingness to pay for getting their applications processed
quickly. This is because the bureaucrat has to make the menu option of having applications being
processed quickly more attractive in order for these applicants to continue to pay for it now that
the processing speed of the option to pay less has increased.
A.2.2 Testing the Model’s Predictions
The main testable prediction of this model with respect to the experiment is that when delays
in processing times are reduced, bribe payments should decrease among those who have a high
willingness to pay for getting their application processed quickly. This result stems from that the
bureaucrat uses the difference in terms of processing times between those paying large and small
bribes, to maintain a separating equilibrium and maximize the amount of bribes extracted. In
particular, if long delays were reduced, but the bribes for those who paid the largest bribes and
subsequently got the fastest processing time did not change, then some of these applicants would
choose to pay a lower bribe and get a slower processing time. Anticipating this the bureaucrats
would reduce the bribes for those with the highest willingness to pay for fast services and thereby
maintain the separating equilibrium while still providing efficiently fast services for the applicants
with the highest willingness to pay.
Appendix Table I.A.3 shows that the results from the experiment are inconsistent with this
prediction. Column (1) shows the effect on bribes among those who had their applications processed
quickly, using 25 working days as the cutoff for if an application was processed quickly. Column
(1) shows the effect was positive and that the scorecards increased the bribe payments among
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applicants who had their applications processed within 25 working days by BDT 656. Column (2)
shows that for applications processed outside of 25 working days limit the estimated effect was a
BDT 333 increase but this effect is not statistically significant. Column (3) shows that even for offices
that were under-performing at baseline, that had the largest decrease in delays and processing time
as a result of the scorecards, the effect of the scorecards on bribes for applications processed within
25 working days is estimated to be an increase of BDT 686. Although the effect is not statistically
significantly different from zero, any meaningful negative effect can be rejected.
One potential explanation for the results within the framework of the monopolistic price
discrimination model is that the government officials taking the bribes have full information
about the applicants’ willingness to pay for processing speed. In this information setting the
speeding up of processing for those with lower willingness to pay would not affect those with
higher willingness to pay, since the bureaucrat could maintain the separating equilibrium by simply
requesting different bribes depending on the observed willingness to pay. However, even under full
information, the bribe payments are not predicted to increase for those with the highest willingness
to pay. The effects of the scorecards on bribes shown in Appendix Table I.A.3 are therefore not
consistent with the predictions of the model under any information setting.
Another explanation for why the results are inconsistent with the predictions of the model
is that information about the increase in processing speeds had not yet been disseminated to
applicants by the time of the survey period. The information treatment is designed to alleviate
this problem. Column (4) of Appendix Table I.A.3 shows that, for applications processed within
25 working days, the information treatment had no effect on bribes by itself or in combination
with the scorecard treatment. Finally, Column (5) shows that even for applicants that received the
information in offices that were under-performing at baseline, no negative effect on bribes can be
found for applications processed within 25 working days.
Taken together the results in Appendix Table I.A.3 rejects the model’s predictions.
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B Additional Details on Experiment and Data
B.1 Details on Randomization of Scorecards Treatment Assignment
The randomization of which land offices were assigned to receive the scorecards was done at
the office level. The first wave randomization was done separately for the group of land offices
classified by the Government as having full implementation of the e-governance system at the start
of the experiment and for the group with partial implementation at the start of the experiment.
After these two groups had been separated the the randomization strata were created using the
following variables:
• Number of applications processed within 45 working days in the months of June and July
2018
• Number of applications pending for more than 45 working days at the end of July 2018
For the group of offices with partial e-governance implementation, stratum were created based
on offices being in the first, second or third tertile in the distribution of these variables. Since the
group of offices with full e-governance implementation was smaller, stratum were created based
on offices being above or below the median in the distribution of these variables.
The second wave randomization was done separately for the group of land offices having
received above/below the median number of applications in February and March 2019. After
these two groups had been separated the randomization strata were created using the following
variables:
• Being in the first, second or third tertile in terms of number of applications processed within
45 working days in March 2019
• Being in the first, second or third tertile in terms of applications pending for more than 45
working days at the end of March 2019
Within each strata, half of the land offices were randomly assigned to treatment.37 If there was an
odd number of offices in a strata, the last office is grouped together with other such "misfits" in
their implementation group (first wave) or applications received group (second wave) and half of
37Random assignment was implemented by the author using the Stata command runiform.
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the misfits were randomly assigned treatment. Again, when there were misfits these are grouped
together with other misfits from the other implementation group and half of those were assigned
treatment. Finally, the last misfits were assigned treatment with a 50% probability.
B.2 Data
B.2.1 Administrative Data from E-governance System
The government partner transferred the data at the beginning of each month from August 2018
until October 2020. Due to privacy concerns the Government only shared administrative data
without personal identifying information. The administrative data is at the application level and
includes all applications made in the e-governance system since its inception in February 2017. To
calculate the number of working days between the date the application started until the end of the
application I use data on public, national and general holidays from Time and Date. 38
Although the performance scorecards are addressed to the current ACL of a land office, the
performance is based on how applications made in that land office are processed, regardless of
if that ACL was assigned to that office when the application was made or not. I infer what ACL
was assigned to what office using the administrative data on what ACL made updates on the
applications in a given month. I use administrative user data to separate ACLs from other users
and then assign a particular ACL to an office if that ACL is the ACL making the largest number of
updates in an office in a particular month. If an office has no updates made by any ACL in a month,
I do not assign any ACL to that office in that month, unless there is an ACL that was assigned to
that office both prior to and after that month, in which case I conclude that the ACL was assigned
to that office without making any updates in that month.
It would be very difficult for any individual bureaucrat to improve their performance scorecard
by manipulating the administrative data. The data is stored on a central server that the bureaucrats
do not have access to. While it would be possible to create fake applications in the e-governance
system, to process these applications with an acceptance the processing fee would have to be paid.
Creating fake unprocessed applications would decrease, not increase, a bureaucrat’s performance
ranking.
38As of September 2020, available from here: https://www.timeanddate.com/holidays/bangladesh/
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Some observations were deleted from the administrative data because they were not real
applications, but rather applications that had been made for training purposes. During the training
of bureaucrats in using the e-governance system, several example applications were made in two
land offices that had not yet installed the e-governance system. These "fake" applications were then
never removed from the system making it appear as if the e-governance system was active in these
two offices. Due to this, these offices were included in the first wave of randomization, one was
assigned treatment and one control. In September 2018 I found out that these two offices had not
yet installed the e-governance system and I removed all applications from these offices from the
administrative data and stopped sending the scorecards to the office that had been assigned the
treatment. I also found out that some other applications in the e-governance system are also the
result of examples created in training. Using information provided about the dates of the training, I
removed applications made before the first wave of randomization suspected to be the result of
training. I did not remove any applications made after the start of the experiment.
B.2.2 Survey Data
The survey was carried out in two stages. The average time between the two interviews was 3.3
months. All questions about bribe payments were asked in the second, interview made by phone.
Interviewees were given a BDT 50 (USD 0.6) reward in the form of a mobile phone recharge for a
completed in-person interview and BDT 100 (USD 1.2) for a completed phone interview.
B.2.3 Attrition in the Survey Data
The overall attrition rate in the survey was 18%. Appendix Table I.A.13 estimate the effect of the
scorecard and information treatments on the attrition rate. Column (1) shows that the scorecard
treatment is estimated to have had a positive effect on the attrition rate by 3%, an effect which is
statistically significant at the 10% level. Columns (2) and (3) show that the information intervention
did not affect attrition. Column (4) shows that the effect of the scorecards on attrition is mainly
concentrated among offices under-performing at baseline.
If the scorecards caused some applicants to drop out of the study and these applicants, on
average, had different values for an outcome variable, this would bias the estimates of the effect
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of the scorecards on those outcomes. To assess the potential bias stemming from the differential
attrition on the estimated effect of the scorecards on bribe payments, I construct lower Lee bounds
for the estimated effect (Lee, 2009). Lower Lee bounds are the relevant robustness check, since the
effects on bribe payments are positive (overall and for over-performing offices) or non-negative
(for under-performing offices). I create lower Lee bounds by creating a random selection of the
applicants from treated offices for whom there is no follow-up survey data, the random selection is
equal in size to the estimated effect of the scorecards on the number of applicants not completing
the follow-up interview. I then set the bribe payments for this sub-sample to zero, since that is the
lowest possible bribe payment. I then conduct the main analysis from Column (2) of Table I.5 and
Column (2) of Table I.7. The results are shown in Appendix Table I.A.14. The lower Lee bounds
does not qualitatively change the overall results. The estimated effect of the scorecards on bribes
is BDT 205. For offices over-performing at baseline the estimated lower Lee bound effect is BDT
639 and still statistically significant. For offices under-performing at baseline the estimated lower
Lee bound is BDT -177. The Lee bounds show that even if the entire effect of the scorecards on
attrition is on applicants who would have reported zero bribes, this does not substantially change
the results.
B.2.4 Cross-validation of Administrative and Survey Data on Processing Times
There are two application numbers identifying the applications making it possible to match appli-
cations from the survey with applications in the administrative data. One is a global identification
number automatically generated by the e-governance system. Another is a manually generated
local serial number, unique within a year and a land office. The local serial number can also be
entered into the e-governance system, but is not a required field and is hence missing for some
applications. Unfortunately, few applicants shared their digital application ID, either because they
were uncomfortable giving it out or because they could not find the text message through which
they received this number. There were many inconsistencies in how the local serial numbers were
recorded between and within offices. There also exist several other serial numbers, such as a serial
number for the record of rights, that could be confused with the application serial number and
that were sometimes reported in the survey instead of the application serial number. This caused
60
many duplicate serial numbers, even within an office by year combination. Due to these problems,
only 45% of the applications from the survey that could be matched to the administrative data.
Furthermore, it is possible that incorrect matches between the two data sets were made, although I
cannot measure how common this is.
I use these matched applications to rule out some potential, but unlikely, problems with the
data. One concern is that bureaucrats receiving the scorecards found a way to manipulate the dates
in the administrative data to improve their scorecards. This is unlikely since the administrative
data was kept on a government server and could only be accessed by a few government contractors.
I worked closely with this group since they were the ones transferring the data to me on a monthly
basis and there are no suggestions that they were ever contacted by bureaucrats to alter the data on
the server. Another concern is that applicants were pressured into saying that applications were
processed faster than they actually were. This is unlikely since the interviews were by phone and
there is no way for anyone from the land office to know what the applicant responded. Among the
matched applications, the average processing time provided by the applicants in the survey was 67,
while the same average time in the administrative data was 89. The average difference between
the times was 22 in the control group and 20 in the offices receiving the scorecards. This suggests
that there was no differential measurement bias between the treatment and control offices. The
correlation between applications being processed within 45 working days in the administrative
data and as measured by the processing time stated by the applicants was .25. The correlation in
the log of processing times was .24. The low correlations suggests that the matching process suffers
from a large number of false positive matches.
Appendix Table I.A.15 shows the results, as estimated in Table I.2, for matched applications
only, using both the administrative data and the survey data on processing times. Restricting the
applications to only matched observations reduces the precision of the estimates. However, the
point estimates for the faction of applications processed within the 45 working day time limit, the
outcome measure most important for the bureaucrats, are similar across the two data sets. This is
reassuring since it suggests that the overall effect is not driven by manipulations of the data by the
bureaucrats.
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B.2.5 Comparing Bribe Data with Transparency International Bangladesh Survey Data
Bribes are notoriously difficult to measure precisely. To validate the magnitude of my bribe
estimates I compare them to an independent estimate created by Transparency International
Bangladesh as part of their nationally representative National Household Survey (Transparency
International Bangladesh, 2016). The survey took place in 2015 and asked about bribes paid
between November 2014 and October 2015 and surveyed a nationally representative sample
of households. There are two main reasons for why this measure may be different from my
estimate of the average bribe payments, other than random differences between samples. First,
the survey was done in person, potentially allowing surveyors to build more rapport with the
respondents and making them more comfortable to discuss bribe payments. Second, the survey
was done in a nationally representative sample of households in Bangladesh and for a different
time period. In the Transparency International Bangladesh survey, 605 of the households had made
applications for land record changes, among these 57% reported having paid a bribe. Appendix
Figure I.A.8 shows that the bribes reported in the Transparency International Bangladesh survey
are on average higher than the bribes reported in the phone survey I conducted, but that the
difference shrinks substantially when excluding respondents reporting zero bribes. This could be
due to that fewer respondents were comfortable to discuss bribe payments over the phone. The
typical bribe payments reported in the scorecard experiment survey are slightly higher than the
average payment reported in the Transparency International Bangladesh survey but lower than the
average non-zero response. Overall, it is reassuring that the two different measures are of similar
magnitude, despite using different methodologies, covering different areas, and being done for
different time periods.
C Additional Empirical Analysis
C.1 External Validity of Results
The experiment was conducted at a large scale, with more than half of Bangladesh’s land offices
taking part in the experiment. The large scale of the experiment makes it plausible that the results
are externally valid within Bangladesh (Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2017). The experiment included
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59% of Bangladesh’s land offices, covering an area with a population of approximately 95 million
people. The experiment also spans a time frame of 16 months, reducing the concern for novelty
effects (Jayaraman et al., 2016), and differences in effects across time periods (Rosenzweig and
Udry, 2020). Moreover, the intervention was implemented with the Government of Bangladesh, the
same organization that may eventually scale-up the policy. However, the scorecards were designed
in a collaboration between a government agency and the author, and produced and distributed by
Innovations for Poverty Action, a non-profit research organization. Hence, one should be cautious
when extrapolating the results from the experiment to a potential scale-up by the Government itself
(Bold et al., 2018). Potential general equilibrium effects within the civil service are discussed in
Section 6.3.
C.1.1 Geographic External Validity within Bangladesh
The 311 land offices included in the experiment are the land offices that were actively using the
e-governance system by the end of March 2019. Hence, it would be a problem for external validity
if offices receiving the scorecard at different times had systematically different effects from the
scorecards. In Appendix Table I.A.16, I test if this is the case for the effect on processing times
by interacting the treatment with the date the land office started its first application using the
e-governance system. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficients on the interaction term are
close to zero for both the main outcome variables, the faction of applications processed within the
time limit and the overall processing time. In Column (3) the coefficient on the interaction term
for the ICW index is -0.005 (S.E. = 0.009). The point estimate is close to zero and my preferred
interpretation is that the size of the effect from the scorecards does not vary with the installation
date. However, one could interpret the point estimates as a decline in the effect of the scorecards
for each month later that the e-governance system was installed. Using a linear prediction, the
expected effect of the scorecards for the office in the experiment that had the latest installation
date, is expected to be 0.080 standard deviations. The expected effect for the last offices to have
the e-governance system installed in Bangladesh, in September 2019, is 0.057 standard deviations.
Therefore, although this predicted effect is smaller for offices that had the e-governance system
installed later, the scorecards are predicted to have a positive effect for all land offices in Bangladesh
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where the e-governance system is installed.
C.2 Potential Bias from Applicant Survey and Information Intervention
Another potential threat to external validity is that the information intervention, or more generally
the applicant survey, may have affected the behavior of bureaucrats and applicants. Since the
information intervention and the applicant survey were carried out both in offices receiving
scorecards and in control offices, it is unlikely that such effects have biased the results. To completely
rule out the possibility of such bias, in Appendix Table I.A.17, I conduct the main analysis for
processing times from Table I.2 using only applications that could not have been affected by the
survey. I restrict the sample to applications from offices that were never surveyed and applications
that were made more than 45 working days before the start of the survey in offices that were
eventually surveyed. All of the estimates in Appendix Table I.A.17 are very close to the estimates
found in Table I.2, ruling out any meaningful bias in the main estimates stemming from interactions
between the applicant survey and the scorecards.
C.3 Unintended Consequences of the Scorecards
A common implementation problem of quantitative performance measures is that they lead to
unintended and sometimes welfare reducing consequences (Banerjee et al., 2008; Rasul and Rog-
ger, 2018). Below I briefly discuss several potential unintended consequences the performance
scorecards could have led to. I do not find evidence for any substantial unintended effect except
the effect on bribe payments taken by bureaucrats over-performing at baseline, which I discuss at
length in the paper.
C.3.1 Improving Indicators without Improving Service Delivery
One potential concern is that land offices may reduce the number of applications, either by refusing
to serve some applicants or by processing some applications using the paper-based system and not
fully implement the e-governance system. With a smaller number of applications, it may be easier
to reach a higher performance. Anticipating this problem the scorecards measure performance
using the absolute number of applications processed within the time limit and not the fraction of
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applications. However, the number of applications pending beyond the time limit would still be
easier to keep down with fewer applications. Another potential problem could be that bureaucrats
only received applications which they knew would be easier to process. The size of the land for
which the land record change is being made is positively associated with the processing time.
Therefore, if bureaucrats indented to avoid accepting complex applications we would also see a
decrease in the average land size.
Appendix Table I.A.18 Column (1) shows that the scorecards did not substantially affect the
number of applications received in the e-governance system. Column (2) shows that the scorecards
did not decrease the number of scorecards more in the offices that were under-performing at
baseline and where the scorecards have the largest effect on processing times. Column (3) shows that
the scorecards did not substantially affect the average land size among applications received, and
Column (4) shows no evidence of a heterogeneous effect on land size among received applications.
Overall the results are consistent with the bureaucrats not altering the applications received in
response to the scorecards.
C.3.2 Quality of Decision Making
Another potential concern is that the quality of the decisions made by the bureaucrats was reduced
by the scorecards. The main decision the bureaucrat makes with regards to the application is
whether to reject or accept it. It is possible that when the bureaucrat spends less time on each
application, more acceptances or more rejections are made depending on what the quickest action
is to dispose of the application. Column (1) of Appendix Table I.A.19 shows that the scorecards
did not change the fraction of applications accepted. However, it is still possible that the quality
of the decision was worse, meaning that more applications that should have been rejected were
accepted and that more applications that should have been rejected were accepted. If an application
is wrongfully rejected, applicants typically reapply in the same office. Therefore, the fraction of
applicants reapplying after having been previously rejected can be used as an indicator for the
fraction of incorrect rejections. Column (2) of Appendix Table I.A.19 shows that the fraction of
applicants stating that they were reapplying, after having been previously rejected for the same
application, was not substantially increased by the scorecards. Together, these results suggest that
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the scorecards did not lead to a decrease in the quality of decision making.
C.4 Effects of Information Intervention on Bribes
Appendix Table I.A.4 shows that the information treatment did not have an effect on bribes, neither
by itself nor in combination with the scorecards. Column (1) and (4) show that the information
treatment by itself did not have a substantial impact on reported bribes or estimates of typical
bribe payments. Columns (2) and (5) show that even together with the information treatment, the
scorecards did not reduce bribes, neither for reported bribes nor for typical bribes. Columns (3)
and (6) show that even among under-performing land offices, that improved the processing times
the most, bribes did not decrease, neither with nor without the information treatment. Columns (3)
and (6) also show that the positive effect of the scorecards on bribes, among offices over-performing
at baseline, is similar across for applicants receiving the information intervention and applicants
not receiving the information intervention.
C.5 Effects of Scorecard on Applicant Satisfaction
Appendix Table I.A.20 shows the estimated effects of the scorecards on applicant satisfaction.
Satisfaction was measured in the follow-up phone survey by asking applicants "Overall, how
satisfied are you with the processing of your application?". The respondent could answer the
question on a five-point scale ranging from very satisfied to not satisfied at all. The response was
then transformed into standard deviations from the control group mean and used as an outcome
variables in regression Equation 1 and 2. Column (1) of Appendix Table I.A.20 shows the overall
effect on satisfaction which is negative but small and not statistically significant. Column (2)
splits up this effect between offices that were under-performing and offices over-performing at
baseline. The negative effect is driven by offices that were over-performing at baseline which is
consistent with the observation that the scorecards increased bribe payments increased in these
offices. Furthermore, despite that the scorecards were successful in reducing processing for offices
under-performing at baseline, the effect on the satisfaction stated by applicants in these offices is
close to zero. Overall the results are consistent with a low valuation of faster processing times by
the applicants but given the imprecise results it is hard to draw any definitive conclusion from the
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null result.
D Additional Tables and Figures
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This figure shows what fraction of countries have at least a partially implemented e-governance
system for four common interactions between the government and citizens or firms. The first is an
e-governance system for filing taxes. The second is an e-governance system for clearing customs.
The third is an e-governance system for public procurement. The fourth is legislation enabling
digital signatures. Data is from the World Bank’s Public Financial Management Systems And E-Services
Global Dataset updated August 2017. Discussed in Section 2.
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Figure I.A.2: Application Process for Successful Application
Applicant makes application
Sub-district land office staff checks documents
Application sent to Union Parishad Land Office
Union Land Office Assistant veri-
fies the applicants claim to the land
Union Land Office Assistant writes recomen-
dation for accepting/rejecting and sends
recomendation to Sub-district land office
Sub-district land office verifies doc-
uments against official records
Applicant has meeting with AC Land
where the application is accepted
Applicant pays BDT 1,150 fee
New record or rights issued and given to applicant
This figure provides a visual overview of the process of getting an application for a land record
change approved. Green boxes represents actions by the applicant. Red boxes represents actions
by the sub-district (Upazila) land office. Blue boxes represents actions by the local (Union Parishad)
land office.
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To get work done Avoid inconvenience
Faster processing Other
This figure shows the reason stated by the applicants for paying bribes. The responses are weighted
by the amount of the bribe. Therefore, the percentages should be interpreted as what percentage of
the total bribe amounts were paid for what reason. The question was open-ended and was coded
into response categories. Discussed in Sections 2.1 and 6.
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Figure I.A.4: Example of Performance Scorecard
This is an example of a performance scorecard in English. The ACL name and land office name are
changed to preserve the anonymity of the civil servant. A version in Bengali was also included.
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Figure I.A.5: Example Peer Performance List
This is an example of the first page of a list of a peer performance list, the full list contain two pages.
The office and district names have been removed to preserve the anonymity of the civil servants.
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Figure I.A.6: Information Pamphlet Given in Information Intervention
English translation of the information pamphlet given to applicants in the information intervention.
The pamphlet shows the median application time for processed applications made before September
2018 and applications made after September 2018 in the 112 offices where the interviews took place.
The data is as of February 2019. The same pamphlet was given to applicants in both treatment and
control offices.
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Figure I.A.7: Fraction of Applications Processed within 45 Working Days
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This figure shows the two-week moving averages of the fraction of applications processed within
the 45 working day limit in the treatment and control groups. Sub-figure I.A.8a shows data from
the first randomization wave Sub-figure I.A.8b shows data from the second randomization wave.
The effect of the treatment can in principle have started for applications started 45 working days
before the first scorecard was sent (first vertical dashed line) but only application made after the
first scorecard was sent (second vertical dashed line) were fully treated. The gap in the Sub-Figure
I.A.8a time-line is due to a server error that caused the e-governance system to temporarily shut
down in late July 2018. Discussed in Section 4.1.1.
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This figure shows the average bribe payments reported in the phone survey conducted to evaluate
the scorecard experiment and in an independent survey by Transparency International Bangladesh.
The first bar shows the average value of bribe payments reported by the applicant in the scorecard
experiment phone survey, 73% of the applicants reported having paid no bribes. The second bar
shows the average value of bribe payments reported by applicants reporting having paid some bribe
in the scorecard experiment phone survey. The third bar shows the average value of an estimated
"typical bribe payment by a person like yourself" reported in the scorecard experiment phone
survey, 27% of the applicants responding to this question reported that a typical applicant paid no
bribes. The fourth bar shows the average value of bribe payments reported by the applicants in the
Transparency International Bangladesh survey, 57% of the respondents reported having paid no
bribe for their land record change. The fifth bar shows the average value of bribe payments reported
by respondents reporting having paid some bribe in the Transparency International Bangladesh
survey. All variables are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Observations in the three first bars are
are inversely weighted by the number of observations in that land office. Discussed in Appendix
Section B.2.5.
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Table I.A.1: Balance of Randomization: Administrative Data
(1) (2) (3)
Control Scorecard T-test (1)-(2)
Variable N/[Clusters] Mean/SD N/[Clusters] Mean/SD Difference/SE












































This table shows the balance of randomization for treatment and control offices using adminis-
trative data from 45 working days before the first scorecard was sent (this date is different for
randomization wave 1 and randomization wave 2 offices). Due to this restriction only 292 of the
311 offices are part of the balance of randomization data. Applications not processed by the first
scorecard had the processing time imputed using the procedure described in Section 2.5.1. Data
on approvals are as per the start of the treatment. P-value for F-test of joint orthogonality: 0.83.
Observations are uniformly weighted. When using the weighted regression specification from
Equation 1 on this data the effect of the treatment is not statistically significantly different from
zero for any of the outcome variables. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 2.6.
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Table I.A.2: Balance of Randomization: Survey Data
(1) (2) (3)
Control Scorecard T-test (1)-(2)



































































































All data comes from the in-person survey of applicants, which was conducted before the conclusion
of the processing of the application, but after the start of the scorecards. USD/BDT≈84.3. 1 decimal
= 1/100 acre. P-value for F-test of joint orthogonality: 0.89. Observations are uniformly weighted.
When using the weighted regression specification from Equation 1 on this data, the effect of the
scorecards is not significant at the 5% for any of the outcome variables, and significant at the 10%
level only for land value. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 2.6.
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Table I.A.3: Testing Prediction from Monopolistic Price Discrimination
Model
Reported payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scorecard 656.4∗∗∗ 332.7 903.3∗∗∗
(214.6) (259.8) (319.2)
Scorecard x Overperform 635.2∗∗∗
(227.2)
Scorecard x Underperform 686.2∗
(399.1)
Overperform baseline 9.139 12.19
(322.2) (317.6)
Information treatment -111.2 -110.0
(239.1) (238.2)
Scorecard x Information -430.4
(431.3)
Info x Scorecard x Underperform 499.7
(512.0)
No info x Scorecard x Underperform 946.6∗
(495.2)
Info x Scorecard x Overperform 452.2
(295.5)
No info x Scorecard x Overperform 875.5∗∗
(385.7)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Appr. < 25 Appr. > 25 Appr. < 25 Appr. < 25 Appr. < 25
Observations 672 1,447 672 672 672
Clusters 109 111 109 109 109
This table shows the effect of the scorecard and information treatments on bribes made for applica-
tion processing. Column (1) and (3)-(5) use data only from applications that were approved within
25 working days while Column (2) uses data from applications that have an approval time of more
than 25 working days. USD/BDT≈84.3 Continuous variables winsorized at the 99th percentile.
Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in
Appendix Section A.2.
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Table I.A.4: Effect of Information Treatment and Scorecards on Bribes
Reported payment Typical payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information treatment 1.638 -10.88 252.1 -189.9
(146.5) (187.0) (495.4) (749.7)
Scorecard 261.0 644.9
(222.6) (720.1)
Scorecard x Information 8.499 812.3
(274.0) (1098.8)
Info x Scorecard x Overperform 674.2∗∗ 1761.7∗∗
(268.4) (871.3)
No info x Scorecard x Overperform 603.9∗∗ 2747.7∗∗∗
(253.3) (873.7)
Info x Scorecard x Underperform -94.80 999.7
(287.0) (1239.5)
No info x Scorecard x Underperform -17.53 -1440.1
(315.7) (875.8)
Overperform baseline -819.9∗∗∗ -1766.7∗
(287.9) (924.2)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,018 3,018 3,018 1,896 1,896 1,896
Clusters 570 112 112 544 112 112
Control mean 1,467 1,302 6,512 6,157
This table shows the effect of the scorecard and information treatments on bribes made for applica-
tion processing. Column (1)-(3) estimate the effects on reported bribes. Columns (4)-(6) estimate
the effects on typical bribe payments. USD/BDT≈84.3 All outcome variables are winsorized at the
99th percentile. In Columns (1) and (4) standard errors are clustered at the land office by day level.
In Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations are
inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Discussed in Appendix Section 5.1.
79
Table I.A.5: Robustness to Imputation Technique: Effect on Processing Times
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Office mean Rand. obs. No impute
Scorecard -0.125∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.123∗∗ -0.120∗∗
(0.0593) (0.0579) (0.0582) (0.0511)
Constant 4.417∗∗∗ 4.402∗∗∗ 4.406∗∗∗ 4.294∗∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0389) (0.0395) (0.0353)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924 972,589
Clusters 311 311 311 311
This table shows the robustness of the result in Column (2) of Table I.2 with regards to the imputation
procedure used to assign a processing time to applications that are not yet processed. Column
(1) uses the mean of processing times for all applications that were processed after the number of
days that the application that I am imputing the processing time for has been pending. Column (2)
uses the mean of processing times for applications in that land office that were processed after the
number of days that the application that I am imputing the processing time for has been pending.
Column (3) uses a randomly selected processing time of the processing times that are larger than
the number of days that the application that I am imputing the processing time for has been
pending. Column (4) drops all applications that are not yet processed from the sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of
applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 4.1.
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Table I.A.6: Robustness to Functional Form Assumption: Effect on Process-
ing Times
ln(Days) Working Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Scorecard -0.123∗∗ -6.492 -0.101 -0.0980∗
(0.0587) (4.033) (0.0646) (0.0585)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,048,876 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924
Clusters 311 311 311 311
Specification OLS OLS Poisson Neg. Binomial
This table shows the robustness of the effect of the scorecards on the processing time to different
assumptions regarding the functional form of the relationship between the processing time and
the scorecards. Column (1) uses the natural logarithm transformation treating observations with
the value zero as missing. Column (2) uses the untransformed number of working days. Column
(3) shows the results of a Poisson regression. Column (4) shows the results of a negative binomial
regression. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations are inversely
weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed
in Section 4.1.
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Table I.A.7: Robustness to Alternative Specifications: Effect on Processing
Times
ICW Index
Panel A. Overall effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scorecard 0.081 0.125* 0.126** 0.091 0.129**
(0.091) (0.069) (0.059) (0.078) (0.055)
Panel B. Heterogeneous effects
Scorecard x Overperform baseline -0.016 -0.002 0.002 0.023 0.020
(0.115) (0.089) (0.078) (0.097) (0.075)
Scorecard x Underperform baseline 0.210* 0.283*** 0.272*** 0.190* 0.259***
(0.121) (0.093) (0.087) (0.113) (0.082)
Overperform baseline 0.558*** 0.580*** 0.311*** 0.497*** 0.237**
(0.108) (0.087) (0.090) (0.131) (0.107)
Start month FE No No No Yes Yes
Stratum FE No No No Yes Yes
Weighted by office No Yes Yes No Yes
Baseline controls No No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924
Clusters 311 311 311 311 311
This table shows the robustness of the estimated effect of the scorecards on the IWC Index of being
processed within the time limit and the IHS of processing time to different regression specifications.
Panel A shows the estimates of the overall effect similar to the estimates in Table I.2. Panel B
shows the estimates of the heterogeneous effects, similar to the estimates in Table I.6. In what
follows I describe how the specifications differ from the specifications in those tables. Column (1)
shows the estimate from an unweighted regression with no fixed effects. Column (2) shows the
estimate from a regression with no fixed effects. Column (3) shows the estimate from a regression
with no fixed effects, controlling for baseline measures of the number of applications processed
within 45 working days, the number of applications pending beyond 45 working days, applications
received and the fraction of applications processed within 45 working days. Column (4) shows
the estimate from an unweighted regression. Column (5) shows the estimate from a regression
controlling for baseline measures of the number of applications processed within 45 working
days, the number of applications pending beyond 45 working days, applications received and the
fraction of applications processed within 45 working days. Standard errors are clustered at the land
office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 4.1.
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Table I.A.8: Effect on Office by Month Level Outcomes
Panel A. Overall effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IHS Dis.≤45 IHS Pen. > 45 Rank dis. Rank pen. ICW index
Scorecard 0.212* -0.058 2.133 1.464 0.080
(0.121) (0.140) (1.685) (1.782) (0.062)
Panel B. Heterogeneous effects
Scorecard x Overperform -0.039 0.280 -0.819 -2.524 -0.099
(0.149) (0.212) (2.209) (2.609) (0.082)
Scorecard x Underperform baseline 0.499** -0.441** 5.563** 5.899** 0.285***
(0.195) (0.180) (2.587) (2.356) (0.091)
1st PS>median 0.537** -0.286 7.685** 1.944 0.242*
(0.236) (0.264) (3.425) (3.401) (0.127)
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,516 4,516 4,516 4,516 4,516
Clusters 311 311 311 311 311
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on office by month level outcomes. Panel A shows the
estimates of the overall effect similar to the estimates in Table I.2. Panel B shows the estimates of
the heterogeneous effects, similar to the estimates in Table I.6. Column (1) shows the effect on the
IHS of the number of applications processed within 45 working days. Column (2) shows the effect
on the IHS of the number of applications pending beyond 45 working days. Column (3) shows
the effect on the percentile ranking in terms of the number of applications processed within 45
working days. Column (4) shows the effect on the percentile ranking in terms of the number of
applications processed within 45 working days, a higher number of pending applications leads to a
lower ranking. Column (5) shows the result on a ICW index created with the outcome variables
of Tables (1)-(4). Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table I.A.11: Effects on Expected Processing Time
ln(Expected processing time)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scorecard -0.0886∗∗ -0.0778
(0.0439) (0.0511)
Information treatment -0.0373 -0.0262
(0.0276) (0.0235)
Scorecard x Information -0.0211
(0.0439)
Scorecard x Overperform baseline -0.0640
(0.0682)
Scorecard x Underperform baseline -0.0944∗
(0.0562)
Info x Scorecard x Overperform -0.0758
(0.0666)
No info x Scorecard x Overperform -0.0526
(0.0784)
Info x Scorecard x Underperform -0.133∗
(0.0681)
No info x Scorecard x Underperform -0.0526
(0.0549)
Overperform baseline -0.137∗ -0.138∗∗
(0.0691) (0.0690)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,657 2,657 2,657 2,657 2,657
Clusters 112 528 112 112 112
Control mean 56 57 57
This table shows the effect of the scorecard and information treatments on expected processing
times at the time of the in-person interview. The outcomes variable is winsorized at the 99th
percentile. In Column (1) standard errors are clustered at the land office by day level. In Columns
(2) and (3) standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations are inversely weighted
by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section
6.4.
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Table I.A.12: Effect on Bureaucrat Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfer Transfer Duration Duration No ACL No ACL
Scorecard 0.00210 0.533 -0.000236
(0.00554) (0.671) (0.0241)
Scorecard x Overperform 0.00135 0.503 0.0103
(0.00792) (0.891) (0.0335)
Scorecard x Underperform 0.00288 0.563 -0.0125
(0.00821) (1.037) (0.0364)
Overperform baseline 0.00589 -0.202 -0.00531
(0.00962) (1.135) (0.0346)
P-value: sub-group diff. 0.90 0.97 0.65
Month FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,516 4,516 304 304 4,516 4,516
Clusters 311 311 304 304 311 311
Control mean 0.07 12.22 0.13
Control mean 0.07 12.19 0.12
Overperformers: control mean 0.07 12.26 0.14
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on transfers of ACLs. Columns (1) and (2) show the
effects on the fraction of ACLs transferred away from the office in a particular office-month, using
data for each office month after the start of the experiment until the last month of the experiment
(March 2020). Columns (3) and (4) show the effect on the duration of the posting in months for the
first bureaucrat to hold the position as ACL in each of the offices in the experiment. Columns (5) and
(6) show the effect on not having any ACL in a particular office-month. The data is administrative
data from the e-governance system. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level, except
for in Columns (3) and (4), where heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used. ***p<0.01;
**p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section 6.4.2.
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Table I.A.13: Treatment Effects on Survey Attrition
Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Scorecard treatment 0.0293∗ 0.0256
(0.0160) (0.0194)
Information treatment 0.00223 -0.00254
(0.0121) (0.0174)
Scorecard x Information 0.00708
(0.0233)
Scorecard x Overperform baseline 0.0123
(0.0214)




Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,696 3,695 3,695 3,696
Clusters 112 112 112 112
This table shows the effect of the scorecards and information treatment on attrition from the survey.
Attrition is measured from a survey being attempted at the time of the in-person survey until
having a successful follow-up survey by phone. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level.
Observations are inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01;
**p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Section B.2.2.
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Scorecard x Overperform baseline 638.51∗∗∗
(224.25)




Start month FE Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes




Overperformers: Control mean 916
Underperformers: Control mean 1,616
This table shows the lower Lee bounds (Lee, 2009) for the estimates of the effects of the scorecards
on bribe payments shown in Column (1) of Table I.5 and Column (1) of Table I.7. A number, equal
to the differential attrition rate, of randomly selected observations from the treatment group are
added back into the data and assigned a value of zero for bribe payments. Standard errors are
clustered at the office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of observations in
that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. The table is discussed in Appendix Section B.2.3.
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Table I.A.15: Comparison of Effects in Administrative and Survey Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<45 w. days <45 w. days ln(w. days) ln(w. days)
Scorecard 0.0449 0.0604 -0.141 -0.0250
(0.0699) (0.0509) (0.168) (0.0900)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,367 1,367 1,367 1,367
Clusters 108 108 108 108
Control mean 0.44 0.51 102.09 69.33
This table compares the effects estimated using the administrative and survey data. The regression
specification is the same as in Table I.2. All observations are applications matched between the
survey and administrative data. Columns (1) and (3) show the results estimated using the matched
administrative data. Columns (2) and (4) show the results estimated using the matched survey
data. Standard errors are clustered at the office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the
number of observations in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Appendix
Section B.2.4.
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Table I.A.16: Effect by Date of E-Governance System Installation
(1) (2) (3)
<45 w. days IHS(w. days) ICW index
Scorecard 0.0568∗∗ -0.117∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0596) (0.0593)
Treat x installation date -0.00303 0.00197 -0.00467
(0.00409) (0.00895) (0.00887)
E-governance installation date -0.0109 0.0253 -0.0246
(0.00812) (0.0179) (0.0177)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,050,924 1,050,924 1,050,924
Clusters 311 311 311
Control mean 0.56 65.64
Fraction imputed 0.06
Fraction zero 0.003
This table shows differences in the effects of the scorecards between offices that had the e-
governance system installed during different time periods. The e-governance installation date is
the date the first application was made using the e-governance system made in that office. The unit
of the installation date variable is months and the variable is measured relative to the weighted
mean of installation dates among the offices in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the land
office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office.
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Appendix Section C.1.1. Discussed in Appendix Section
C.1.
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Table I.A.17: Robustness to Excluding Applications Potentially Affected by
Applicant Survey
(1) (2) (3)
<45 w. days IHS(w. days) ICW index
Scorecard 0.0683∗∗ -0.168∗∗ 0.140∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0668) (0.0593)
Start month FE Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes Yes
Observations 545,742 545,742 545,742
Clusters 310 310 310
Control mean 0.52 79.75 -0.00
Fraction imputed 0.05
Fraction zero 0.003
This table shows the results from Table I.2 when restricting the sample to applications that were
made either in offices where the applicant survey did not take place, or made one month or more
before the start of the applicant survey. Hence these results are highly unlikely to have been affected
by the survey activities. Standard errors are clustered at the land office level. Observations are
inversely weighted by the number of applications in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Discussed in Appendix Section C.1.
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Table I.A.18: Effect on Applications Received and Land Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Apps. rec.) ln(Apps. rec.) ln(Land size) ln(Land size)
Scorecard -0.0517 0.0229
(0.0737) (0.0674)
Scorecard x Overperform baseline -0.0577 0.0243
(0.107) (0.0946)
Scorecard x Underperform baseline -0.0431 0.0214
(0.107) (0.0979)
Underperform baseline -0.157 -0.000536
(0.124) (0.112)
Observations 311 311 1,042,987 1,042,987
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Start month FE Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes
Clusters 311 311
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on the number of applications received and the land
size of those applications. In Columns (1) and (2) observations are at the office level. In Columns (3)
and (4) the observations are at the application level. Data contains all applications made between
one month before the start of the experiment started and 45 working days before the experiment
ended (13 Aug 2018 - 20 Jan 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the office level. Observations are
inversely weighted by the number of observations in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
Discussed in Appendix Section C.3.
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Table I.A.19: Effect on Rejections
(1) (2)
Rejection Previously rejected
Scorecard treatment -0.00810 0.0215
(0.0196) (0.0203)
Start month FE Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes
Observations 1,050,924 3,215
Clusters 311 112
Control mean 0.29 0.06
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on rejections of applications for land record changes.
Column (1) shows the effect of the scorecards on the fraction of applications rejected in the ad-
ministrative data. Column (2) shows the effect on the fraction of applicants surveyed who was
returning after having had their application rejected, which is a proxy for an incorrect rejection.
Standard errors are clustered at the office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number
of observations in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Appendix Section
C.3.2.
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Scorecard x Overperform -0.117
(0.0827)




P-value sub-group diff. 0.32
Start month FE Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes
Weighted by office Yes Yes
Observations 3,018 3,018
Clusters 112 112
This table shows the effect of the scorecards on applicants stated satisfaction transformed from a
five-point scale into standard deviations away from the control group mean. Standard errors are
clustered at the land office level. Observations are inversely weighted by the number of applications
in that land office. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Discussed in Appendix Section C.5.
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Part II
The Effects of Social Movements: Evidence from
#MeToo (Joint with Ro’ee Levy)
1 Introduction
Societal changes are often associated with movements advocating for new norms and behaviors.
For example, the increase in women’s labor force participation, the shift in attitudes toward LGBTQ
individuals, and the increased concern for the environment all happened in conjunction with social
movements advocating for these changes. Despite the importance of these changes, it is difficult to
establish if these movements are the drivers of change or if they are caused by external factors that
would have led to societal changes regardless of the movements. In this paper, we focus on the
MeToo movement and estimate its effect on reporting sexual crime to the police.
The MeToo movement started on October 15, 2017 and was exceptionally effective in rapidly
increasing awareness around sexual misconduct. We show that the movement dramatically in-
creased search interest in and news coverage of sexual misconduct. While the movement spread
internationally, there was large variation in its strength across countries. We exploit the variation
in the strength of the movement, along with the fact that it started almost instantly, to identify its
causal effect.
We focus on reporting sexual crimes because underreporting of sexual crimes is a major social
problem directly related to the goal of the MeToo movement—sharing one’s story and breaking the
stigma surrounding being a victim of sexual misconduct. In addition, reporting a sexual crime is a
high-stakes decision as it can come with substantial costs in terms of the victim’s time, social stigma,
the negative experience of reliving the trauma, and the risk of reprisals. Hence, using the number
of crimes reported to the police as the outcome variable is a high bar for the types of behaviors that
the MeToo movement might have changed.
We construct a dataset on the number of crimes reported to the police by quarter in 30 OECD
countries, covering 88% of the OECD population. We identify the effect of the MeToo movement
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using a triple difference strategy comparing countries with weak and strong MeToo movements,
sexual and non-sexual crimes, and the pre and post periods. We classify countries as having a
strong or weak MeToo movement based on Google search interest for terms related to the MeToo
movement. We find that the MeToo movement increased the number of reported sexual crimes by
10% during the first six months of the movement.39 While countries with strong MeToo movements
are different from countries with weak movements, we show that the two sets of countries have
similar pre-trends for the difference between sexual crime and non-sexual crime.
We confirm the reliability of the result by performing placebo tests where we estimate the effects
of fictional MeToo movements set in each of the six-month periods from the second quarter of 2010
to the third quarter of 2017 (Q2 2010-Q3 2017). The effect we find is larger than all the placebo
estimates. We also show that the result is robust to various specifications and alternative measures
of the strength of the MeToo movement. While the point estimates are similar, our power is limited
and the standard errors increase in some of the robustness tests. We also find an effect when
employing the matrix completion method (Athey et al., 2017), which uses more flexible patterns
in the data to create a counterfactual for the number of sexual crimes reported had there been no
MeToo movement. Furthermore, the result is similar when instrumenting the strength of the MeToo
movement with the share of the population speaking English.
To measure the persistence of the effects, we focus on the countries with an initially strong
MeToo movement and use a difference-in-difference strategy comparing sexual crime with all other
crimes over time.40 We find that the movement had a persistent effect, and estimate a strong effect
on reporting at least 15 months after it started.
The international_dataset allows for the strongest identification strategy, but it lacks details
on the crimes reported. To better understand the mechanisms underlying the effect of the MeToo
movement, we use detailed incident-level data from the US at both the national and city level. The
US national dataset is collected from the FBI National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
and covers approximately 30% of the US population. The city dataset, which includes additional
covariates and covers more crime categories, is collected from seven large US cities. The US lacks
39The estimate of the effect is 10 log points, which equals a 11% increase. For simplicity, we describe the effects in log
points as percentage changes throughout the paper, although this slightly understates the magnitude of the results.
40We use this strategy instead of our main triple difference specification since the MeToo movement became more
prominent over time in several of the countries where it was initially weak.
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substantial geographic heterogeneity in the strength of the MeToo movement; therefore we employ
a difference-in-difference strategy comparing sexual crimes to all other crimes over time. We find
that the MeToo movement increased the number of sexual assaults reported in the US by 8% in the
first six months after the movement started, and the effect is stronger in the city dataset which also
includes sexual harassment.
We present three additional findings based on the US data. First, the movement had a larger
effect on crimes that were reported at least a month after they occurred. However, the effect on
crimes that were immediately reported is also strong and statistically significant, implying that
even if part of the effect of the movement is due to the reporting of a stock of old crimes, the
movement also increased reporting of the flow of new crimes. Second, we do not find evidence
for the claim, commonly made in media reports, that the MeToo movement mainly affected white
women of high socioeconomic status. However, we do find that the movement has a stronger effect
among female victims and in counties with a smaller share of Trump voters. Third, we show that in
the long run, the movement also led to an increase in the number of arrests made for sexual crimes,
suggesting that reporting led to positive externalities.
We discuss several possible mechanisms explaining the increase in reporting. A potential
interpretation of the results is that the MeToo movement increased the incidence of sexual crimes.
By focusing on crimes that were committed before the start of the MeToo movement, while still
including crimes reported after the start of the movement, we show that an increase in the incidence
of sexual crimes cannot explain the effect we find, and therefore, we conclude that the movement
increased the propensity to report crime. The MeToo movement did not lead to major immediate
changes in laws or government institutions and therefore legal changes could not be driving the
increase in reporting. The mechanism that we have the strongest evidence for is a change in social
norms and information. Awareness of the problem of sexual misconduct increased after the MeToo
movement started, suggesting that awareness may have led to additional reporting.
The results are related to three different streams of literature. First, we contribute to a long
debate among social scientists on whether social movements have any political influence (Burstein
and Sausner, 2005). In a review of the topic, Amenta et al. (2010) state that “[t]he disagreement on
this basic issue is wide. Some ... hold that social movements are generally effective and account
for most important political change. Others ... argue that social movements are rarely influential.”
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Papers in this field often document a correlation between a movement’s activity and an outcome,
such as congressional attention (e.g., Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2005), but do not necessarily
identify causal effects. A smaller literature focuses on the causal effects of political protest, a
specific tactic often employed by social movements. This literature has shown that protests can
mobilize people and change voting behaviors, but that violent protest may also cause a political
backlash leading to less political support and subsequent electoral defeat (Madestam et al., 2013;
Wasow, 2020). We bridge these literatures by identifying the causal effect of an important social
movement. An additional contribution of our paper is that we do not focus on political outcomes,
which are typically studied, but rather show how a social movement can affect costly personal
decisions. Studying the effects of social movements on such decisions is important since many
social movements focus on changing norms or individual behavior and not only official policy.
Personal decisions also often carry high stakes for the individual, which may make them more
difficult to change than voting decisions, for example.
A second contribution to the literature is showing how norms can rapidly change. It is well
established that social norms, and especially gender norms, have strong effects on behavior (e.g.,
Alesina et al., 2013; Bertrand et al., 2015; Charles et al., 2018). However, there is still limited
understanding of how social norms change. Several studies have shown that popular culture
and education can affect norms and behavior (e.g., Jensen and Oster, 2009; Chong and Ferrara,
2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Dhar et al., 2018; Banerjee et al., 2019; Green et al., 2020). There
are also well-documented examples of how deceptive practices can lower trust toward certain
institutions and change behavior (Alsan and Wanamaker, 2017; Martinez-Bravo and Stegmann,
2018). A recent literature based on theory, as well as information interventions, argues that social
norms can "unravel" when individuals start expressing their personal beliefs (Bursztyn et al., 2017,
2018; Sunstein, 2019). We contribute to this literature by demonstrating in an important real-world
setting that norms can shift quickly and change important behaviors as awareness to a social issue
rises.
This paper also contributes to the literature on reporting gender-based violence by showing that
awareness-raising campaigns can have a large effect on the reporting of sexual crimes. Previous
studies have shown that the election of female politicians and the integration of women into the
police force increased the reporting of crimes toward women (Iyer et al., 2012; Miller and Segal,
99
2019), and that a high-profile rape and murder case increased reporting of sexual crimes in India
(Bhatnagar et al., 2019; McDougal et al., 2018). Public campaigns increasing awareness is a common
strategy to increase reporting.41 However, there is limited evidence on the effects of such campaigns.
The MeToo movement can be seen as a particularly successful attempt to raise awareness. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first rigorous evidence on the effects of the MeToo movement
on reported sexual crimes and thus demonstrates that increasing awareness can be effective in
increasing the reporting of sexual crimes, even in the absence of changes to laws and government
policies.42
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the underreporting of sexual
crime and describes the MeToo movement in more detail. Section 3 describes the international_data,
our identification strategy, and provides evidence for the effect of the movement. Section 4 describes
the US data and provides results on heterogeneity as well as the effect on arrests. Section 5 provides
evidence on which mechanisms the effect operated through and interprets the overall results, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Underreporting of Sexual Misconduct and the MeToo Movement
2.1 Reporting of Sexual Misconduct
Underreporting of sexual misconduct is a serious problem. Figure II.1 shows that among eight
countries that reported data to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Australia, Canada, France,
Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, and the US), on average 15% of sexual assaults were reported to
the police between 2010 and 2017, compared to 35% of other assaults.43 Underreporting decreases
social welfare by reducing the probability that perpetrators are held accountable. Thus it may
increase the incidence of sexual misconduct because repeat offenders are not prevented from
committing additional crimes, and future offenders are not deterred. Indeed, Green et al. (2020)
41For example, the largest US-based anti-sexual violence organization RAINN spends 27% of its budget on educating
the public.
42Rotenberg and Cotter (2018) present descriptive statistics showing that sexual crimes reported increased in Canada
after the MeToo movement started. Recent research has also examined other effects of the movement. Lins et al. (2020)
show that firms with women among the five highest-paid executives earned excess returns of 1.6% in the second half of
October, 2017, after the MeToo movement started. Luo and Zhang (2020) show that producers associated with Harvey
Weinstein were more likely to work with female writers after the movement.
43In the US, 34% of sexual crime victims stated that the crime is known to the police, compared to 47% of victims of
other violent crimes. These figures are based on 2010-2017 National Crime Victimization Survey microdata.
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and Iyer et al. (2012) provide suggestive evidence showing that increases in reporting reduce the
incidence of gender-based violence.
Reporting a sexual crime to the police is a high-stakes decision for the victim. The process of
reporting and attending hearings has monetary costs such as lost income, childcare, and travel
costs (Morabito et al., 2019). Moreover, reporting a sexual crime forces the victim to repetitively
relive the experience by giving detailed accounts of the crime. Reporting is especially hurtful for
victims whose account of the event is not believed by law enforcement officials (Spohn and Tellis,
2012). Furthermore, reporting a crime may lead to reprisals by the offender or the community
shared by the victim and the offender. According to National Crime Victimization Survey Data,
17% of sexual crime victims who did not report the crime to the police cite fear of reprisals as a
reason for not reporting the crime, while the same figure for victims of other violent crimes is 7%.
In this paper, we focus on reporting sexual crimes to the police. However, the MeToo movement
also highlighted cases of sexual misconduct that do not constitute a criminal offense but still have
negative welfare consequences, such as cases of workplace sexual harassment (Hersch, 2011; Folke
et al., 2020). Furthermore, a victim has a range of possible actions to take in response to sexual
misconduct. Reporting to the police is probably one of the actions with the greatest consequences.
It is therefore likely that if reports to the police increased, other lower-stakes behaviors changed as
well. Indeed, there have been anecdotal reports of an increase in the number of calls to helpline
centers following the MeToo movement.44 Therefore, the effects we find on reporting crime to the
police are probably a subset of the overall behavioral effects of the movement.
2.2 The MeToo Movement
The MeToo movement went viral on October 15, 2017, after the Harvey Weinstein sexual misconduct
allegations, when a tweet by Alyssa Milano encouraged people who had been sexually harassed or
assaulted to write "Me too" on social media.45 The movement uncovered a large number of sexual
misconduct cases, and within a year, more than 200 high-profile men had been ousted from their
44Chiwaya, Nigel - New data on #MeToo’s first year shows ’undeniable’ impact. NBC News. Oct 11, 2018. Online:
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-data-metoo-s-first-year-shows-undeniable-impact-n918821
45The phrase "Me Too" was first used by Tarana Burke in 2006, but widespread usage only started after October 15,
2017.
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positions in the US alone.46
The MeToo movement provides a setting particularly well suited to the study of the effects of
social movements on behavior for four reasons. First, the movement was very effective in drawing
attention to sexual harassment and sexual misconduct. While the movement started in the US, its
effect quickly spread to other countries. Figure II.2 shows that in the OECD, mean Google search
interest for MeToo and for sexual misconduct (sexual harassment and sexual assault) increased
substantially immediately after the start of the MeToo movement. In the year following the start of
the movement, there was an unprecedented increase of 85% in search interest in sexual misconduct
compared to January 2010-September 2017. The salience of the movement was widespread across
mediums. In the US, approximately eight months after the movement started, 65% of social
media users stated that some or a great deal of the content they see on social media is about
sexual harassment or assault.47 Consumers of mainstream media were also likely to encounter the
movement. Appendix Figure II.A.1 shows that among four major US newspapers, coverage related
to sexual assault and sexual harassment increased substantially after the movement started and
remained much higher than the average coverage before the movement started for at least nine
months.
Second, there was large variation in the strength of the movement between countries, as shown
in Figure II.3. The OECD country in the 75th percentile in terms of MeToo search interest had
a 651% larger interest in the MeToo movement in October 2017, compared to the country in the
25th percentile. This allows us to identify the causal effect of the MeToo movement by comparing
changes across countries. Third, one of the main objectives of the MeToo movement, increasing
reporting of sexual misconduct, is an outcome for which there is high-quality administrative
data across many countries. Fourth, while the MeToo movement had a big impact on the public
discourse, it did not result in immediate widespread changes to laws or government institutions.
This allows us to attribute the short-run effect we find to changes in information and social norms,
where norms are broadly defined to include the norms of victims, firms, and government employees,
such as police officers, but exclude any changes to laws or government policy.
While the MeToo movement was very successful in raising awareness, it is by no means unique.
46The New York Times - #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women.
October 23, 2018. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html
47Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Wave 35.
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In recent years, several social movements such as Black Lives Matter and March for Our Lives have
had similar success in raising awareness about their causes (Pew Research Center, 2018). Social
media has enabled new social movements to raise awareness at a larger scale, within shorter time
spans, and with almost no organizing structure.48 However, little is known about the effects of
these modern social movements that are often disconnected from party politics and do not use
traditional organizing techniques such as strikes or publishing lists of demands.
3 Identifying the Effect of the Movement: Analysis of International
Data
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Outcome: Reported Crimes
We build a dataset with quarterly data on the number of crimes reported in 30 OECD countries
representing 88% of the OECD population.49 We include in our sample countries that have quarterly,
or more frequent, data available, disaggregated by sexual crimes and non-sexual crimes. For 24
of the countries, the time period that a crime is counted in is based on the date the crime was
reported to the police, for the remaining countries it is based on when the crime occurred or some
combination of the two. We separately obtain data available from the start of 2010 until the end
of 2018 for each country. We harmonize the data by manually classifying offense categories as
sexual crimes or non-sexual crimes for each country. We define sexual crimes as all forms of sexual
assault and sexual harassment and define non-sexual crimes as all other crimes. When possible, we
exclude crimes of sexual nature that were not the focus of the MeToo movement, such as incest,
human trafficking, and pornography. For more details on crime classification and OECD data
collection, see Appendixes A.1 and A.2, respectively.
48Enikolopov et al. (2019) show how social media facilitated protests in Russia. Acemoglu et al. (2017) show that street
protests, but not Twitter protests, can reduce the valuation of politically connected firms and may serve as a check on
political rent-seeking. There is also a literature on how different technologies enable the diffusion of social movements
(e.g., Christensen and Garfias, 2018; García-Jimeno et al., 2018).
49See Appendix Table II.A.5 for a list of the countries and data sources.
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3.1.2 Strength of the MeToo Movement
We use monthly Google Trends data on search behavior from 2010-2018 to create a proxy for the
strength of the MeToo movement in each OECD country.50 The primary measure is based on the
proportion of total Google searches for the "topic" of the MeToo movement. Google defines a search
for a topic as any search query including a phrase directly linked to the topic in any language. While
Google search interest is an imperfect measure of the MeToo movement’s strength, it provides a
consistent measure of the movement’s strength among a majority of the population, as Google
is the dominant search engine in all of the countries in our data.51 Appendix A.3 provides more
details on how the Google Trends data was processed.
We define immediate interest as the interest in the MeToo movement during October 2017, the
month the MeToo movement started. In our main specification, we categorize a country as having
a strong MeToo movement if the immediate interest is above the OECD median and a weak MeToo
movement if the immediate interest is below the OECD median. Figure II.3 shows the immediate
interest of each OECD country, highlighting the countries for which we have crime data and
indicating which of these countries we classify as having strong and weak MeToo movements.
Appendix Figure II.A.2 confirms the validity of our primary measure for the strength of the MeToo
movement by comparing it with survey data on the fraction of the population that has heard of the
MeToo movement (YouGov, 2019). Even though the survey took place in February-March 2019 and
our measure is based on data from October 2017, there is a strong correlation of 0.69 between the
two measures.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our main empirical strategy to measure the causal effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crime
reported to the police is a triple-difference strategy where we use the difference over time, across
50Caputi et al. (2019) show that the MeToo movement affected Google search interest in the US.
51In October 2017 among the countries in our sample, the mean of Google’s market share of searches was 90%, while
the minimum was 66%. Authors’ own calculations using data from gs.statcounter.com.
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countries, and between sexual crimes and non-sexual crimes:
yitc = β1Postt × StrongMeTooc × SexCrimei + β2Postt × SexCrimei+ (8)
β3Postt × StrongMeTooc + β4Postt + β5,icTrendt + γi,c,q(t) + ε itc
• yitc is the natural logarithm of the number of reported crimes of type i, in quarter t, in country
c
• Postt is an indicator for Q4 2017 (when the MeToo movement started) and later quarters
• StrongMeTooc is an indicator for whether country c had a strong MeToo movement
• β5,icTrendt controls for differential linear time trends by the full interaction of country and
crime category
• γi,c,q(t) controls for the full interaction of country, calendar quarter, and crime category fixed
effects
The regression is unweighted and uses standard errors that are clustered at the country-by-crime
category level because that is where the MeToo movement varies.52 Our identifying assumption is
that without the MeToo movement, the difference between sexual crimes and non-sexual crimes
would have changed in the same way from the pre-period to the post-period (after controlling for
crime and country-specific seasonality and for differential linear time trends) in the countries with
strong and weak MeToo movements. For an omitted variable to explain the results, it would have
to have a non-linear change after October 2017 that affects the number of reported sexual crimes
more than it affects reported non-sexual crimes among countries where the MeToo movement was
strong, as compared to countries where it was weak. While the strength of the MeToo movement is
not random, we have no reason to believe it is correlated with an omitted variable affecting sexual
crimes differentially in the post period.
52The standard errors clustered at the country level are smaller so choosing to cluster the standard errors at the
country-by-crime category level is more conservative.
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3.2.1 Time Frame of Analysis
In Section 3.3, we focus on the effects of the MeToo movement in the short run, defined as the first
six months of the MeToo movement. In Section 3.4, we test if the effect is persistent over time.
There are two main reasons for separating out the short-run effects. First, the first six months is the
time period when there exists a substantial difference in interest between countries with a strong
movement and countries with a weak movement. Therefore, this is the only period in which we
can employ our triple-difference empirical strategy. Appendix Figure II.A.3 shows the convergence
of interest over time between the countries that we classify as having strong and weak MeToo
movements. Second, during the initial six-month period there were, to the best of our knowledge,
no changes to laws governing sexual crimes in any of the countries in our sample. After the initial
six-month period, some laws concerning sexual crime changed in at least three countries, probably
as a result of the MeToo movement. Therefore, in the first six months, we can interpret the effect as
being driven by a change in social norms or information.
3.3 Results
Table II.1 shows that the MeToo movement increased the reporting of sexual crimes. Column (1)
uses data only on sexual crimes to show a difference-in-difference estimator over time and between
countries with strong and weak MeToo movements. Column (2) uses all 30 countries and shows
a difference-in-difference over time and between sexual and non-sexual crime. While the two
columns use different sources of variation, they both find statistically significant effects of 11% and
7%, respectively. It is not surprising that Column (2) finds a smaller effect than Column (1) since it
estimates the average effect for countries with both strong and weak MeToo movements. Column (3)
estimates the effect from Column (2) separately for countries with strong and weak movements and
shows that the effect is driven by the countries that had a strong MeToo movement. These countries
had an effect of 12%, while the effect was only 2% among countries with weak MeToo movements.
Finally, Column (4) shows the results from our main triple-difference specification described in
Equation 8. Here the coefficient of interest is that on Postt × StrongMeTooc × SexCrimei and we
find an effect of 10%, statistically significant at the 10% level. Note, that in this column, countries
with weak MeToo movements serve as a control group. If the MeToo movement had some effect in
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these countries, the estimate is a lower bound for the total effect of the movement.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table II.1, the coefficient on Postt × StrongMeTooc can be interpreted
as a difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the MeToo movement on non-sexual crimes,
using variation between countries and over time. Since we do not expect the MeToo movement
to affect the number of non-sexual crimes reported, this coefficient can be used as a placebo test.
We estimate the coefficient to be close to zero, which confirms that our estimate of the MeToo
movement’s effect is not influenced by differential trends in non-sexual crime reporting between
countries with weak and strong movements.
To illustrate the triple-difference estimator, we present the raw data visually in Figure II.4.
Sub-figure II.4a shows the number of sexual crimes reported, indexed to be 100 in Q3 2017, and
averaged across the countries with strong and weak MeToo movements.53 A clear seasonality
is observed in the time lines, where the fourth quarter of each year tends to see a decrease in
the number of sexual crimes reported. This is true for both strong and weak MeToo movement
countries until Q4 2017, when the number of reported sexual crimes stays flat in the countries with
a the strong MeToo movement , while the countries with a weak movement experience the typical
decline. In Q1 2018, the number of reported sexual crimes in countries with strong and weak MeToo
movements continues to diverge. Sub-figure II.4b shows that this differential increase in reported
crimes for the countries with strong MeToo movements did not happen for non-sexual crimes.
The figures also shows that the strong and weak MeToo movement countries may have somewhat
different pre-trends for sexual and non-sexual crimes. In our main specification, we control for
linear time trends, and hence, these differential trends do not drive the effects as measured in Table
II.1. Furthermore, Sub-figure II.4c shows that there are no differential pre-trends in the difference
between the sexual and non-sexual crime indexes displayed in Sub-figures II.4a and II.4b, , while
there is a substantial divergence between countries with strong and weak MeToo movements after
the start of the MeToo movement.
Using a continuous estimate of the strength of the MeToo movement, we estimate the elasticity
of crimes reported to the national interest in the MeToo movement. Replacing the StrongMeTooc
term in Equation 8 with the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS) of the immediate search
53To make the average numbers more comparable over time, we shorten the data series to start in 2012, since we lack
data for many countries before 2012.
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interest in the MeToo movement provides an estimate of the effect of an IHS point increase on the
log of reported sexual crimes.54 This regression yields an estimate of 0.05. However, this estimate
is not statistically significant and it should be interpreted with caution because Google searches for
the MeToo topic is a noisy proxy for the underlying interest in the MeToo movement and thus the
estimate probably suffers from attenuation bias.55
3.4 Persistence of the Effect over Time
Was the effect of the MeToo movement driven by a short-term increase in the salience of exposing
sexual crime or did the movement change the underlying social norms leading to a lasting effect on
behavior? To estimate the long-term effects, we cannot use the triple-difference estimator, because
in some of the countries where a MeToo movement was initially weak, it gained traction and
became stronger after October 2017, as shown in Appendix Figure II.A.3. This means that when
measuring long-term effects, our counterfactual will become contaminated in later periods. We
use two alternative strategies instead. First, we use the difference-in-difference specification over
time and by crime type and focus only on countries where we know that the movement started in
October 2017. Second, in Appendix Section B.1, we exploit the gradual spread of the movement
and allow the MeToo movement to start at different time periods in different countries to estimate
the effect over time. Using both methods we find that the movement’s effect was persistent.
Table II.2 uses data from the countries with a strong MeToo movement to measure the persis-
tence of the effect over time. Column (1) shows that the average effect for the first five quarters
after the movement started is estimated to be 10%. Column (2) shows that the effect is relatively
stable until the end of our data, 15 months after the movement started. The effect stays between 8%
and 12%, and there is not a pattern of a continuous change in the effect over time.
54We use the IHS transformation instead of the natural logarithm since for one country the estimated interest is
negative, but very close to zero.
55When instrumenting the interest in the MeToo movement using the fraction of the population that speaks English,
the point estimate increases substantially, suggesting attenuation bias is affecting the estimate. For a more detailed
description of the instrumental variable approach see Section 3.6.
108
3.5 Placebo Tests
We conduct a set of placebo tests to further assure that the MeToo movement is driving our result
and not some other mechanism, such as non-linear differential trends between countries with
strong MeToo movements compared to those with weak movements. Figure II.5 presents placebo
tests setting the start of the MeToo movement in every second quarter from Q2 2010 to Q4 2017
and then measuring the effect over six-month periods.56 We estimate the effect of these placebo
MeToo movements using the triple-difference specification from Equation 8, just as we do in our
main specification in Column (4) of Table II.1. Of the 15 placebo tests, only one is statistically
significant at the 10% level. The actual effect of the MeToo movement (Q4 of 2017) has a larger
absolute coefficient than any of the 15 placebo tests.
3.6 Robustness Checks
Table II.3 shows that our primary triple-difference estimator is robust to using different time peri-
ods, alternative regression specifications, alternative empirical strategies, and to most alternative
definitions for the strength of the movement. Row (1) repeats the main estimate from Column (4) of
Table II.1. Row (2) shows the effect of the MeToo movement during its first quarter by restricting the
sample to end in Q4 2017. Note that the first two weeks of this quarter could not have been affected
by the movement and therefore this result probably underestimates the effect of the movement.
Row (3) shows the effect of the MeToo movement during the first three quarters of the movement.
All the effects range from 6% to 10%.
Rows (4)-(6) estimate the effect with different measures of the strength of the MeToo movement.
Row (4) shows that the result is robust to using Google searches for the MeToo topic between
October 2017 and March 2018, the same period for which we measure the number of reported
crimes. Row (5) uses the sum of the Google search interest in the topics of sexual assault and sexual
harassment.57 Using this noisier measure of MeToo strength produces a smaller estimate. Row (6)
56We set the start date in every second period to avoid having two adjacent estimates using overlapping data and
thereby introducing a mechanical autocorrelation. When estimating the placebo effect for every quarter, we still find
that only one placebo test has a statistically significant effect at the 10% level and that the actual effect of the MeToo
movement has a larger absolute coefficient than any of the 31 placebo tests.
57Since there was a meaningful interest in these topics even before the start of the MeToo movement, we use the
increase in search interest at the start of the MeToo movement after controlling for linear trends and monthly fixed effects
in each country separately. This allows us to parse out pre-MeToo levels of interest, linear trends, or seasonality, which
are not indicative of the strength of the MeToo movement.
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uses a survey measure of the fraction of the population that has heard of the MeToo movement in
February-March 2019 (YouGov, 2019). The analysis is conducted for the 12 countries in our sample
where the survey was conducted. This analysis yields a point estimate similar to our main estimate.
Row (7) shows the result of a regression weighted by the population of each country.58 Using
these weights changes the interpretation of the estimate from the average effect of the MeToo
movement on the number of sexual crimes reported in countries that had a strong MeToo movement
to the average effect of the MeToo movement on the population in the countries that had strong
MeToo movements. This effect is estimated to be 12% and is more precisely estimated than our
main estimate since we put more weight on countries with a large population that on average have
a more stable quarter-to-quarter number of crimes reported. While most of our data is based on the
date crimes were reported to the police, some of the data is based on the date crimes occurred. This
may bias the results as crimes that occurred before the start of the MeToo movement could also be
affected by the movement. Row (8) shows the results of our main specification including only data
based on the date a crime was reported and confirms that differences in this reporting practice do
not drive the results.
To ensure that our specification of the outcome variable is not driving the result, Row (9) shows
the result when using the number of crimes reported as an outcome variable, whereas our main
specification uses the log of crimes reported. We normalize the number of crimes reported to
average one in the year before the start of the MeToo movement in each country by crime type
category. The estimated effect is an 11% increase over the baseline year (Q4 2016 - Q3 2017). Row
(10) shows the result is robust to using a negative binomial regression with the count data of crimes
reported as the outcome variable.
Row (11) analyzes the data using the matrix completion method which creates a counterfactual
for the number of sexual crimes that would have occurred in countries that had a strong MeToo
movement, based on flexible patterns in the data.59 Despite using a very different empirical strategy
the estimated effect is qualitatively similar to our main estimate. A potential problem with our
main specification is that reverse causality could bias the results if an increase in sexual crime
58We use UN population data for 2015 from the 2017 revision of World Population Prospects.
59Each row in the matrix is a crime*country category and each column in a year-quarter (for example a control category
may be damage to property in Ireland and a treated category may be sexual harassment in Iceland). For more details on
the method see Section 4.4).
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reporting increased the interest in the MeToo movement and thus affected the classification of
strong and weak movements. To rule out such a mechanism we instrument having a strong MeToo
movement with the fraction of the population speaking English.60 Since an increase in reported
sexual crimes could not have affected the fraction of the population speaking English, this estimate
should not suffer from reverse causality bias. Row (12) shows that our main result is robust to
using this two-stage least squares regression.61
4 Heterogeneity and Effect on Arrests: Analysis of US data
To study heterogeneity and mechanisms in the effects of the MeToo movement, we focus on the US
since that is where the movement started and because rich incident-level data is available for the
US.
4.1 Data
We use US data from two sources: the FBI National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) and
more detailed crime data for seven large US cities.
4.1.1 National Data: FBI NIBRS
Law enforcement agencies voluntarily report data on offenses as part of the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) Program. Agencies have been gradually shifting from reporting summary
statistics of the most severe offenses to reporting incident-level data using the NIBRS for 52 specific
crimes, defined as Group A offenses.62 By 2017, more than 7,000 agencies covering approximately
30% of the US population reported data using the NIBRS program. In our main specification,
we use 2010-2018 NIBRS data aggregated at the state by crime category level for each month.
Similarly to the international analysis, we aggregate data into two main categories: sexual crime
60We use two variables based on Ethnologue data: the share of the population speaking English as a first language and
the fraction of the population speaking English. We instrument the interactions of Post× Sexual Crime× Strong MeToo
and Post× Strong MeToo with the the same interactions, where Strong MeToo is replaced with each English speaking
measure. See Appendix Section A.4 for a description of the data on English usage.
61The Kleibergen-Paap Wald test statistic is 32.
62For more details, see the 2019 National Incident-Based Reporting System User Manual. Available online:
https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/nibrs-user-manual
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and non-sexual crime. Group A offenses do not include sexual harassment, therefore our estimates
measure the effect only on sexual assaults.
The main advantage of using NIBRS data is that the crime categories and the variables de-
scribing each incident are harmonized across law enforcement agencies. This allows us to test for
heterogeneous effects by crime type, the characteristics of the victim and offender, and whether an
arrest was made. Appendix A.5 provides more details on how the NIBRS data was processed.
4.1.2 Incident-Level Data from Cities
We collect incident-level data from seven large US cities with a combined population of 16 million:
Denver, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Louisville, Nashville, New York City, and Seattle. Our sample
consists only of cities that provide incident-level data on all crimes and provide both the date each
crime occurred and the date it was reported, along with the crime’s approximate location. The
seven cities selected are the cities that met our inclusion criteria among the 50 largest US cities.
The city data is used to complement our analysis in three ways. First, information on the
location of each incident allows us to analyze heterogeneity in the effect of the MeToo movement
by neighborhood. Second, we use the detailed reporting and occurrence dates to analyze heteroge-
neous effects according to whether the crime was immediately reported. Third, the data includes
virtually all crimes reported to the police, and not only the relatively severe offenses covered by
NIBRS.63 Specifically, this allows us to analyze the effect of the movement on sexual harassment, in
addition to sexual assault.
We aggregate the incident-level crime data into three main categories: sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and non-sexual crime. We manually classify the crime categories for each city sep-
arately and exclude crimes that could be indirectly affected by the MeToo movement. In our
main specification, we aggregate data at the city by crime category by month level. Appendix A.6
provides more details on how the city data was processed.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
We analyze US data using a difference-in-difference specification over time and by crime type. We
do not use a triple-difference strategy, as we do not observe meaningful variation in the strength of
63There are several exceptions, such as cities excluding crimes related to child abuse cases or unfounded complaints.
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the MeToo movement across different regions within the US, as seen in Appendix Figure II.A.4.64
This is unsurprising as the national media covered the movement and the allegations related to
it. Furthermore, the movement generated substantial public discussion in social media, which is
not limited to a specific media market. Indeed in a PEW survey from November-December 2017,
92% of Americans reported reading or hearing about recent allegations of sexual harassment and
assault.65
We use the following regression as our primary specification:
yitc = β1SexCrimei × Postt + β2Postt + β3,icTrendt + γi,c,m(t) + ε itc (9)
• yitc is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of reported crimes of type i,
in month t, in location (state or city) c. The inverse hyperbolic sine is used instead of a log
transformation because there are months when no crime is recorded for a specific location
and crime category
• Postt is an indicator for October 2017 and later
• β3,icTrendt controls for differential linear trends by the full interaction of location and crime
category
• γi,c,m(t) controls for the full interaction of location, calendar month and crime category fixed
effects
The specification is similar to our triple-difference specification described in Equation 8 with several
differences. First, we aggregate the data at the monthly level, instead of the quarterly level. For each
location, we exclude months when no crimes were reported. Second, we use robust standard errors.
Since our main specification includes only two crime categories, we cannot cluster the standard
errors at the crime category level (where the treatment occurs). Appendix Table II.A.6 uses the same
specification, with a finer aggregation of crime categories, which allows us to cluster the standard
64While the OECD country in the 75th percentile in terms of search interest had a 651% larger interest in the MeToo
movement, compared to the country in the 25th percentile, the same figure for US states was only 47%. Furthermore, the
variation between OECD countries was relatively stable over time with a correlation of 0.95 between interest in October
2017 and interest in November 2017, while the same correlation for US states was just 0.34. The low correlation indicates
that a large part of the variation in interest between US states is probably due to noise and not actual differences in the
strength of the MeToo movement.
65Pew Research Center, December 2017 Political Survey.
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errors at the crime category level, and shows that the point estimates and standard errors remain
similar. In Section 4.4, we show that the results are also robust to an estimation strategy using a
finer aggregation of crime categories at the city level and bootstrapping the standard errors. A third
difference is that we weight regressions by the average number of crimes that occurred in a location
in the pre-period since we are interested in the effect of MeToo on the number of crimes reported
and not in the effect of the movement on an average city or state.66 An additional advantage of
weighting the data is that the weights reduce the importance of the aggregation method in our
estimates (e.g., whether we aggregate the data by state or county).
4.2.1 Heterogeneity by Demographics
We estimate heterogeneity by the county where the crime occurred using the following regression:
yitc = β1SexCrimei × Postt + β2Postt + β3SexCrimei × Postt × Demogc+ (10)
β4SexCrimei × Demogc + β5Postt × Demogc + β6Demogc + β7,icTrendt + γi,c,m(t) + ε itc
The regression is based on Equation 9 with c now representing a county instead of a city/state and
β3 estimating heterogeneous effects by the demographics of the county. Each demographic variable
(Demogc) is constant across time and its weighted mean is subtracted to keep β1, the estimates for
the effect of the MeToo movement, consistent across specifications. Data on county-level income,
education, race, and ethnicity is based on the American Community Survey 5-year 2016 estimates.
The share of Trump voters in each county is based on the MIT Election Data and Science Lab
(2018). We exclude counties with a population of less than 10,000 and county-years where the
police agencies reporting data cover less than 85% of the population.
4.3 Results
Table II.4 shows that the MeToo movement had a strong and statistically significant effect on
crimes reported based on both the NIBRS and the city datasets. Column (1) uses NIBRS data to
show that the MeToo movement increased the number of reported sexual assaults in the US by
66The international analysis regressions in Section 3.5 are not weighted, since in this analysis the treatment occurs at
the country level and we are interested in the average effect of the MeToo movement on different sets of countries.
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8% in the six months after the movement started. This effect may be smaller than our primary
specification based on the international data because the NIBRS dataset includes mostly severe
crimes. Column (2) shows that in our sample of large cities, the effects on sexual assault and sexual
harassment are approximately 11% and 15%, respectively. As both effects are related to the MeToo
movement, in Column (3), we aggregate sexual assault and sexual harassment into one category,
labeled sexual crime, which we will focus on throughout the rest of the analysis. We find an effect
of approximately 13% on sexual crimes reported in our city sample. To ensure that the effect in
one city is not driving the results, we run our main specification separately for each city. Appendix
Table II.A.7 shows that the effect is positive for six of the seven cities in our sample and statistically
significant for four of the seven cities.
Appendix Table II.A.8 shows that the effect of the movement was persistent in the US and
does not decline over time, both based on FBI data and on our sample of cities. One concern with
estimating long-run effects is that they can potentially be affected by depletion in the stock of old
crimes, and not due to a change in the effect on the propensity to report crime. The city data allows
us to mitigate this concern by focusing only on the flow of crimes that were reported within a
month after they occurred. Column (5) shows that the results are similar when focusing only on
new crimes reported.
4.3.1 Heterogeneous Effects by Report Timing and Crime Type
Table II.5 tests for heterogeneity by crime type. Column (1) splits the category of sexual crime
according to the specific offense type and shows that the MeToo movement had a large effect on the
number of rapes reported, the most severe sexual offense category, and on fondling cases. Column
(2) shows that the movement had a stronger effect on offenses where the victim was not physically
injured. In Column (3) we do not find substantial heterogeneity by whether the victim knew the
offender.
Table II.6 uses city data to show that while the MeToo movement had a stronger effect on
crimes reported at least a month after they occurred, the movement also affected crimes which
were immediately reported. For this analysis, we aggregate crime into three main categories: sexual
crimes reported more than a month after they occurred, sexual crimes reported a month or less
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after they occurred, and non-sexual crimes, which is the reference category. Column (1) shows
that the movement had an effect of 10% on crimes reported within 30 days, and an effect of 22%
on crime reported more than 30 days after they occurred. The total effect on all crimes (shown in
Column (3) of Table II.4) is similar to the effect on crimes reported within 30 days since only 20% of
crimes are reported more than a month after they occur. Column (2) presents the results for the
next nine months and shows a declining effect on crimes reported with a lag. This suggests that
some of the short-term effect could be due to a stock of old crimes that was exhausted. However,
even in the 7-15 months after the movement started, there is a large effect on crimes reported at
least a month after they occurred. This long-term effect on crimes reported with a lag could be
explained by either a persistent effect on a flow of cases which are not immediately reported or a
very large stock of unreported crimes, which is gradually affected by the MeToo movement.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Gender, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Political Ideology
The MeToo movement has been criticized for focusing on white victims of high socioeconomic
status and ignoring the experiences of working-class women and women of color (Onwuachi-Willig,
2018). Based on the analysis of victim, offender, county, and neighborhood demographics, we
find that the effect was larger for female victims, male offenders, and politically liberal counties.
However, we do not find evidence that the MeToo movement mostly affected the reporting of
whites or those with high socioeconomic status.
We test for heterogeneous effects among victims by separating sexual assault into sub-categories
according to the victim demographics.67 Column (1) of Table II.7 shows that the movement had
a larger effect on female victims than among male victims. This is consistent with the general
narrative of the MeToo movement, which tended to focus specifically on female victims of sexual
crimes. Column (2) finds a similar effect on black and white victims, and we cannot reject a
homogeneous effect across the victim’s race.68 Column (4) repeats the analysis according to the
offender’s demographics and points to a similar effect among black and white offenders.
Table II.8 shows that the MeToo movement mostly did not have large heterogeneity in the effect
67For example, when estimating heterogeneous effects by race, the treated categories are sexual assaults of black
victims and sexual assaults of white victims, and the reference category is non-sexual crimes.
68The NIBRS also includes data on Hispanic ethnicity. We do not find a stronger effect of the movement on individuals
who are not Hispanics or Latinos. We do not present the results by ethnicity since the ethnicity could not be identified
for 28% of victims and 82% of offenders.
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between counties with different demographic profiles, relative to the total effect of the movement.
In Column (1) we show the effect of the movement based on our specification in Equation 9, and
in Columns (2)-(7) we estimate heterogeneous effects according to each demographic variable as
described in Equation 10. Some of the coefficients are statistically significant, but the magnitude of
most of the effects is small. While counties with a larger share of college graduates are associated
with a slightly larger effect, the difference in the expected effect on reporting between a county
in the 75th percentile of the share of individuals with a college education and a county in the
25th percentile is only expected to be 2 percentage points, compared to the average effect of 9%.69
One exception to the relatively homogeneous effects we find is that the MeToo movement had a
smaller effect in counties with a larger share of Trump voters. The difference in expected reporting
between a county in the 25th percentile of Trump voters and county in the 75th percentile is 7
percentage points. We emphasize that these estimates are not intended to capture causal effects,
but rather to describe which types of counties are associated with a larger increase in reporting
sexual crimes during the MeToo movement. Appendix B.2 exploits the more detailed city data
to analyze heterogeneity at the neighborhood-level. We do not find substantial heterogeneity by
neighborhood demographics.
4.3.3 Effect on Arrests
The NIBRS data allows us to test not only whether crime reporting increased, but also whether the
movement had an effect on the number of arrests made by the police. The FBI defines an arrest as a
case where a suspect is taken into custody based on a warrant or a previously submitted report,
arrested on view (without a warrant), or summoned to court.
Table II.9 shows that the movement increased the number of arrests in sexual assault cases,
but that this increase is smaller than the effect on reporting. In Column (1), the short-run effect is
estimated by aggregating the data into three separate categories: sexual crimes where an arrest
was made, sexual crimes where no arrest was made, and non-sexual crimes, which is the control
group. In the short run, we find no effects on arrests. One concern with this specification is that the
null effect could be explained by a decrease in the arrest rate over time for all crimes. Columns
69Just like the rest of the US analysis, the average effects and the percentiles are weighted by the mean number of
crimes in the pre-period.
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(2) and (3) show that the results are robust to using a slightly different specification: we run the
regression separately only on crimes where an arrest was made and crimes where no arrest was
made so that the control group for each group of sexual crimes is the non-sexual crimes in the same
arrest category. Columns (4)-(6) repeat the analysis for the long-run effect over 15 months. In this
period, the MeToo movement increased the number of arrests substantially, albeit the increase is
still smaller than the effect on the number of crimes cleared.70
Why did the MeToo movement not lead to a larger increase in the number of arrests? One
possible explanation is that the movement affected mostly the type of cases where the probability
of arrest is low. Indeed, as shown in Table II.6, the MeToo movement had a stronger effect on cases
reported more than a month after they occurred.71 However, the movement also had a strong effect
on crimes reported within a month, which are far more common. Therefore, the increased reporting
of old crimes cannot explain the disproportionately smaller effect on arrests.72
In Appendix Table II.A.10, we test whether other observables associated with the crimes affected
by the movement could explain the arrest rate. We focus on the police agency where the crime
occurred, the type of crime, the age, race, and sex of the victim, whether the victim was injured, the
weapon used, the relationship between the victim and offender, and the type of location where
the crime occurred. Even though some of these covariates have been shown to be associated
with arrests (Lonsway and Archambault, 2012), they do not explain the decrease in the arrest rate.
However, there could be unobservables associated with crimes affected by the MeToo movement
that are correlated with the likelihood of arresting an offender.
70In Appendix Table II.A.9 we estimate the effect on cases cleared by the police. A case is cleared if it is associated
with an arrest or if the police have sufficient probable cause to arrest a suspect but could not make an arrest for reasons
outside their control, including the victim refusing to cooperate, the prosecutor declining prosecution for a reason other
than lack of probable cause, the offender being in the custody of another jurisdiction, and the offender being a juvenile.
The effects on clearances are similar to the effects on arrests.
71Anecdotal evidence suggests that it was difficult to clear MeToo-related cases since they were reported long after
they occurred. For example, see Maddaus, Gene - Many Accused, None Prosecuted: Why #MeToo Hasn’t Led to a Single
Criminal Charge in L.A. Variety. September 25, 2019
72Based on cities that collect arrest data (Kansas City, LA, and Nashville), the share of cases resulting in an arrest in the
pre-period is 10% for sexual assaults reported at least a month after they occurred, compared to 12% for sexual assaults
reported within a month. This gap is not large enough to explain the small effect on the number of arrests. We regress
whether an arrest was made on the interaction of crimes and the post-period and find that the MeToo movement had a
small negative effect on the arrest rate, at least in the short run. To test whether this is explained by increased reporting
of crimes that were reported at least a month after they occurred, we control for the lag between the occurrence of the
crime and its reporting date. The effect stays almost exactly the same when controlling for the lag.
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4.4 Robustness: Matrix Completion Method
Our difference-in-difference specification relies on the assumption that other crimes are a suitable
control group for sexual crimes after controlling for crime and location-specific seasonality and
differential linear time trends. In this section, we relax those assumptions, and instead of estimating
an effect based on the standard difference-in-difference specification, we use the matrix completion
method and show that the results are robust to the method used.
The matrix completion method (Athey et al., 2017) is used for panel data and is based on a
matrix where each row is a unit and each column is a time period. The method attempts to predict
the counterfactual outcome for treated units in the post-period. We use the method to create a
counterfactual for the expected number of sexual crimes in the post periods, which would have been
reported if there was no MeToo movement. The counterfactual matrix is created for all observations,
and values are chosen to minimize the sum of squared differences between the actual outcomes and
the predicted counterfactual outcomes for observations that were not affected by the movement
(non-sexual crimes in all periods and sexual crimes in the pre-periods), with penalization according
to the nuclear norm of the predicted matrix. Penalization is required to prevent overfitting, and
the regularization parameter is selected through cross-validation. Finally, the average treatment
effect is the weighted difference between the actual outcomes and counterfactual outcomes for the
treated units in the post-periods. The main advantage of the matrix completion approach is that
it is “able to model more complex patterns in the data, while allowing the data (rather than the analyst) to
indicate whether time-series patterns within units, or cross-sectional patterns within a period, or a more
complex combination, are more useful for predicting counterfactual outcome” (Athey, 2018).
We use this method with our city data and define each unit as a crime category by city combina-
tion, and each time period as a month. We use the original crime categories defined for each city
and do not aggregate crimes to broader categories.73 We exclude categories for which there was
at least one month with no crimes reported. All sexual assault or sexual harassment crimes that
occurred on or after October 2017 are considered treated. In total, we have 39 treated groups and
399 control groups. We explicitly control for category and time fixed effects and do not add any
73For example, indecent exposure in Los Angeles is a row in the matrix and is considered treated for time periods
(matrix columns) on or after October 2017. Simple assault in Nashville in an example for a row in the matrix which is
untreated in all time periods.
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additional controls. We weight each crime group by the number of reported crimes for that crime
group in the pre-period.74
We find an average treatment effect over six months of 18% and a long-run 15-month effect of
16%. Both effects are significant at the 1% level using standard errors generated by bootstrapping.
Appendix Figure II.A.5a shows that the counterfactual created by the method fits the actual outcome
well in the pre-period, and Appendix Figure II.A.5b highlights that the treatment effect is relatively
persistent.
5 Mechanisms and Interpretation
How did the MeToo movement increase the reporting of sexual crimes? In this section, we show
that neither an increase in the incidence of sexual crime occurrence nor changes in legislation are
likely to be driving the results. We provide evidence that beliefs regarding sexual misconduct
changed after the start of the movement. Specifically, increased awareness of the extent of the
problem of sexual misconduct may have led to the effect on reporting.
5.1 Changes in the Incidence of Sexual Crimes
The effect of the MeToo movement on the number of crimes reported could be driven by an increase
in the incidence of crimes (a “backlash effect”) and not an increase in the propensity to report
crimes. Ideally, it would be possible to disentangle the effects on incidence and the propensity to
report using survey data, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey or the Campus College
Survey. However, the MeToo movement could have affected individuals’ definition of sex crimes
and decreased the stigma in reporting victimization to a surveyor. Indeed, in two October 2018
surveys by Ipsos, 54% of respondents agreed with the statement “my views on what constitutes
sexual harassment have become more clear” (Ipsos, 2017a), and 24% of employed respondents
agreed with the statement “The #MeToo movement has made me realize now that I may have been
a victim of sexual harassment in the workplace” (Ipsos, 2017b). Furthermore, Dhar et al. (2018) find
that a school-based intervention discussing gender equality, including harassment, increased girls
74The method was estimated using the R package gsynth by Yiqing Xu and Licheng Liu. Available online:
https://yiqingxu.org/software/gsynth/gsynth_examples.html
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reporting that they experienced harassment. The authors attribute the effect to increased awareness
or destigmatized victimization.
Instead of relying on self-reported survey data, we rule out that an increase in incidence is
driving the entire increase in reporting by restricting our analysis to crimes that were committed
before the start of the MeToo movement and thus their incidence could not have been affected by
the movement. Table II.10 uses the data from US cities and includes only crimes that were reported
at least three months after they occurred and that were reported by December 2017 (i.e., occurred
before the start of the movement in October 2017). The table shows that the MeToo movement
had a strong and statistically significant effect on the reporting of crimes that occurred before
the movement started. This evidence complements self-reported survey evidence and anecdotal
reports of an increase in the propensity to report sexual crimes.75 Furthermore, we are not aware of
any anecdotal reports suggesting that the number of sexual crimes committed increased as a result
of the MeToo movement.
5.2 Changes to Laws and Government Policy
The MeToo movement could also affect reporting by changing the laws governing sexual crimes,
for example, due to an expansion of the behavior classified as illegal. We find evidence against
this mechanism, at least in the short term. A report by the International Lawyers Network (2019)
shows that among the 11 OECD countries covered by the report, no country made changes to laws
governing sexual misconduct between the start of the MeToo movement and the end of Q1 2018,
while some introduced legal changes after this date.76 The lack of legal changes in the immediate
aftermath of the MeToo movement is not surprising given that passing legislation is a lengthy
process, often taking more than a year.77
75in October 2018, 62% of Americans stated that if it happened to them, they would be more likely to report sexual
harassment now, compare to a year ago (Ipsos, 2017a). Anecdotally, an increase in the propensity to report sexual crimes
has been reported in various settings including colleges (Binkley, Collin - MeToo inspires wave of old misconduct reports
to colleges. PBS October 13, 2018); the entertainment industry (Maddaus, Gene - Many Accused, None Prosecuted: Why
#MeToo Hasn’t Led to a Single Criminal Charge in L.A. Variety. September 25, 2019); and with respect to congressional
candidates (Godfrey, Elaine, Felton, Lena and Hosking, Taylor - The 25 Candidates for 2018 Sunk by #MeToo Allegations.
The Atlantic. July 26, 2018).
76To the best of our knowledge only three countries in our data, Iceland, Sweden and the US, changed major laws
with respect to sexual crimes between October 2017 and the end of 2018. In Iceland and the US, the earliest changes took
effect in Q2 2018 and in Sweden the change took effect in the Q3 2018. Therefore, these changes could not have directly
influenced reporting in the first six months of the movement.
77An analysis of US laws conducted by USA Today one year after the start of the MeToo movement found that
Congress passed no laws related to sexual harassment in the workplace since the movement started. While there was a
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5.3 Changes in Awareness and Beliefs
Table II.11 uses survey data to show that awareness of sexual misconduct increased after the
movement started. We use data from the Views of the Electorate Research Survey since the survey
asked a large panel of respondents the same set of questions before and after the start of the
movement: in July 2016 and April-May 2018. In contrast to most recent surveys focusing on
issues raised by the MeToo movement, the timing of the survey was not affected by the movement.
Column (1) shows that agreement with the statement “sexual harassment against women in the
workplace is no longer a problem in the United States” decreased by 0.14 standard deviations in 2018,
compared to 2016.78 Other surveys also provide evidence for increased awareness (Castle et al.,
2020). In a Washington Post-ABC poll in January 2018, 72% of respondents stated that sexual
harassment of women in the workplace is a serious problem, compared to 47% in November 2011.
Awareness can affect behavior by decreasing the stigma associated with reporting (Bursztyn
et al., 2017), by allowing individuals to coordinate and provide corroborating evidence (Cheng and
Hsiaw, 2019), or by aggregating information and encouraging people to report as a form of protest
if they learn that sexual assault is a large social problem (Battaglini et al., 2020). Since awareness
affects reporting and is affected by it, an initial increase in awareness may lead to a tipping point
that further increase reporting and awareness substantially.79
We cannot identify the exact mechanism through which awareness affects reporting, but we can
explore the mechanisms further using survey data. Column (2) of Table II.11 provides evidence
for heterogeneous effects in awareness between men and women. While men’s agreement with
the statement that sexual harassment is no longer a major problem decreased by 0.24 standard
deviations, women’s agreement decreased by only 0.05 standard deviation and is not statistically
different from zero. Interestingly, it seems that a general increase in awareness may have an effect,
even when the awareness of women, who are much more likely to be victims, is not substantially
affected. The results suggest that individual behavior can be affected by a change in the beliefs of
other individuals, complementing experiments demonstrating that second-order beliefs can affect
slight uptick in state laws related to sexual misconduct, they were mostly limited in scope. Kelly, Cara, and Hegarty,
Aaron - #MeToo was a culture shock. But changing laws will take more than a year. USA Today. October 4, 2018.
78The increase persists in the next wave of the survey conducted in November 2018-January 2019.
79A similar tipping point may have occurred around 2002 for clergy sexual abuse scandals (Bottan and Perez-Truglia,
2015).
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behavior (Bursztyn et al., 2018). Second-order beliefs may have affected reporting if they changed
victims’ expectations regarding the response to reporting a sexual crime, either of the police or the
wider community. In columns (3) and (4), we show that while awareness increased, agreement
with the statement “women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve”
did not change substantially between 2016 and 2018. This suggests that reporting can increase even
when the average stereotype associated with reporting does not substantially change.
6 Conclusions
This study shows that the MeToo movement had a substantial, persistent effect on the propensity
to report sexual crimes to the police. This result is consistent across multiple samples and is robust
across multiple estimation techniques. Focusing on the US allows us to analyze who was affected
by the movement. The effect is strong and statistically significant for both sexual harassment and
sexual assault. While the movement may have disproportionately focused on the experiences of
white women of high socioeconomic status, it increased the reporting of sexual crimes to the police
for both white and black victims, offenders, and counties, as well as in counties with both high and
low socioeconomic status.
The heterogeneity results provide additional evidence for the causal effect of the MeToo move-
ment, in contrast to some other event that occurred around October 2017. The MeToo movement
focused on female victims and often on cases that occurred several months or years before they
were discussed in the media. We find a strong significant effect among female victims and an
especially strong effect among crimes that are reported at least a month after they occurred.
We estimate that the MeToo movement increased the number of sexual crimes reported by
25,870 in the first six months after the movement started. In the first 15 months, 66,658 crimes were
reported as a result of the movement. Out of these crimes, 33,542 were sexual assaults reported in
the US, and we find that the movement led to 4,174 arrests in the US.80 The effect found in the US
is equivalent to closing 25% of the gap between the reporting of sexual crimes and other violent
80We use the difference-in-difference specification to estimate an effect of the MeToo movement for each country
separately and compare the actual number of reported sexual crimes with the predicted number of reported sexual
crimes if the MeToo movement had not taken place. The calculation for the countries where we have partial police data
(the US, the UK, and Australia) is based on the assumption that the MeToo movement had the same effect per-capita on
areas for which we obtained data as in other areas in the country.
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crimes observed in the National Crime Victimization Survey.
While the effect on the number of arrests is smaller than the effect on the number of reports, it is
still an important channel through which reporting can have positive externalities. Increased arrests
may deter offenders from committing future crimes, and if the arrests lead to convictions, they may
also decrease the number of sexual crimes further by preventing potential repeat offenders from
committing more crimes. Furthermore, even when a report does not lead to an arrest, it may lead
to other disciplinary action, for example in a workplace or a university.
One limitation of this study is that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of the MeToo movement
on the incidence of crimes from its effect on the propensity to report crimes. We show that a change
in incidence cannot explain the effect found and is unlikely to drive the results. However, if the
incidence of sexual crimes decreased as a result of the movement, our primary estimates should be
interpreted as lower bounds for the increase in the propensity to report sexual crimes, as they are
reduced by a lower incidence of crime.
The findings show that social movements can have large, long-lasting effects on social norms,
influencing individuals to make meaningful changes in their personal decisions. This effect may
occur almost immediately and can change high stakes individual action.
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Figure II.1: Share of Assaults Reported to the Police
This figure show the average share of sexual assaults and other physical assaults reported to the
police in the years 2010-2017. Data is based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Indicator
16.3.1.
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Figure II.2: Google Search Interest in the OECD
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The figures show the monthly time series for the OECD means of both measures of the strength
of the MeToo movement from 2010 to 2018. Data is from Google Trends. The vertical dashed line
represents the start of the MeToo movement (October 2017). Sub-figure (a) shows search interest
in the topic of the MeToo movement. Mean pre-MeToo interest is subtracted from the time series
for each country separately so that the pre-MeToo period has a mean of zero, the variable is then
normalized so that the post-MeToo OECD mean equals 1. Sub-figure (b) shows search interest in the
topics of sexual harassment and sexual assault. The variable is normalized so that the pre-MeToo
mean equals 1 for each country.
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Weak MeToo Strong MeToo No police data
This figure shows the strength of the MeToo movement in OECD countries based on Google Search
interest in the topic of the MeToo movement during October 2017. The Weak MeToo group of
countries have below-median interest, the Strong MeToo group of countries have above-median
interest, and the rest of the countries are not included in our sample since we have not obtained
access to their police data.
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Figure II.4: Crimes Reported over Time
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(c) Difference Between Sexual and Non-Sexual Crime Reported in Countries with Strong
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Figures (a) and (b) show the number of reported sexual crimes and the number of reported non-
sexual crimes, both normalized to 100 in Q3 2017 for each country, and averaged separately for the
countries with strong and weak MeToo movements. Figure (c) shows the difference between the
normalized number of sexual crimes and the normalized number of non-sexual crimes. The vertical
dashed line represents the start of the MeToo movement, Q4, 2017. Data include all 30 countries in
our sample. For four countries data is available for only part of the period, see Appendix Table
II.A.5 for details.
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Figure II.5: Placebo Tests, Setting the Start Date of the MeToo Movement in




















Q4, 2009 Q4, 2011 Q4, 2013 Q4, 2015 Q4, 2017
Coefficient 90% CI
This figure shows the results from 15 placebo triple-difference regressions (Q2 2010-Q2 2017) and
our main triple-difference result (Q4 2017, shown in red). Each coefficient comes from a regression
using the full Q1 2010 - Q1 2018 dataset, but with a different six-month period for when the
placebo MeToo movement happened. The corresponding confidence intervals are constructed
using standard errors clustered at the country by crime type level.
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Table II.1: Effect of the MeToo Movement During the First Six Months
ln(crime)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post * Strong MeToo 0.114** 0.009 0.009
(0.048) (0.031) (0.031)
Post * Sexual crime 0.072** 0.019
(0.030) (0.044)
Post * Strong MeToo * Sexual crime 0.123*** 0.104*
(0.036) (0.057)
Post * Weak MeToo * Sexual crime 0.019
(0.044)
Country * Crime type * Lin. trend X X X X
Country * Crime type * Quarter X X X X
Post X X X X
Crime data used Sexual crimes All crimes All crimes All crimes
Final quarter Q1 2018 Q1 2018 Q1 2018 Q1 2018
Observations 904 1,808 1,808 1,808
Clusters 30 60 60 60
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crimes reported using data from 30
OECD countries for the period from Q1 2010 to Q1 2018. Column (1) uses data on sexual crime only
while Columns (2)-(4) uses data on both sexual and non-sexual crimes. A country is categorized
as having a strong MeToo movement if search interest for the topic of the MeToo movement was
above the OECD median in October 2017. Standard errors clustered at the country by crime level
in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Post * Sexual crime 0.104***
(0.035)
2017 Q4 * Sexual crime 0.121***
(0.033)
2018 Q1 * Sexual crime 0.122**
(0.051)
2018 Q2 * Sexual crime 0.083**
(0.037)
2018 Q3 * Sexual crime 0.087**
(0.037)
2018 Q4 * Sexual crime 0.108**
(0.043)
Country * Crime type * Lin. trend X X
Country * Crime type * Quarter X X
Post X
Q4 2017-Q4 2018 FE X
Final quarter Q4 2018 Q4 2018
Observations 1,012 1,012
Clusters 30 30
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement over time using data from the 15 OECD
countries with a strong MeToo movement in October 2017. Standard errors clustered at the country
by crime level in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table II.3: Robustness Checks
(1) Preferred specification 0.104*
(0.057)
Length of short-term period:
(2) 3 month effect 0.060
(0.063)
(3) 9 month effect 0.095*
(0.055)
Different measures of MeToo strength:
(4) 6m MeToo search interest 0.102*
(0.060)
(5) SA/SH immediate search interest -0.015
(0.061)
(6) % heard of MeToo movement 0.095
(0.080)
Alternative specifications:
(7) Weighted by country population 0.119**
(0.052)
(8) Only data based on date crimes were reported 0.119*
(0.065)
(9) Outcome variable: Normalized number of crimes 0.112*
(0.057)
(10) Negative binomial regression 0.118**
(0.048)
Alternative empirical strategies:
(11) Matrix completion method 0.171***
(0.043)
(12) 2SLS: Fraction Eng. speakers as IV 0.096
(0.071)
This table shows robustness checks for our main triple-difference estimate. Row (1) repeats the
main estimate from Column (4) of Table II.1. Rows (2)-(3) use different periods over which the
effect is measured. Rows (4)-(6) use different measures of the strength of the MeToo movement.
Row (7) shows the result of our main specification weighted for the countries population. Row (8)
only includes data from the 24 countries basing their statistics on the date the crimes were reported
to the police. Row (9) uses the normalized number of crimes as the outcome variable. Crimes are
normalized to be one on average for each country by crime type group, in the year leading up to
the start of the MeToo movement. Row (10) shows the result of a negative binomial regression
using the count data of crimes reported as the outcome variable. Row (11) shows the result of using
the matrix completion method. Row (12) shows the result of a two-stage least squares regression
where having a strong MeToo movement is instrumented for by the fraction of English speakers.
All rows except Rows (6) and (8) use data from 30 OECD countries. Row (6) uses data from the 12
OECD countries surveyed in the 2019 YouGov survey. Standard errors clustered at the country by
crime level are in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table II.4: Effect of the MeToo Movement on Sexual Crimes in the US
ihs(crime)
(1) (2) (3)
Post * Sexual Assault 0.081∗∗∗
(0.015)
Post * Sexual Assault 0.112∗∗∗
(0.036)
Post * Sexual Harassment 0.148∗∗∗
(0.055)
Post * Sexual Crimes 0.129∗∗∗
(0.036)
State * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X
State * Crime Type * Month X
City * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X
City * Crime Type * Month X X
Post X X X
Data NIBRS City City
Final Month Mar 2018 Mar 2018 Mar 2018
Observations 6,654 1,863 1,242
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crimes reported based on NIBRS and
city crime data. Regressions are weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in each state/city
before the MeToo movement started. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05;
*p<0.1
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Table II.5: Effect of the MeToo Movement by Relationship and Crime Type
ihs(crime)
(1) (2) (3)
Post * Fondling 0.111∗∗∗
(0.019)
Post * Rape 0.093∗∗∗
(0.017)
Post * Sodomy −0.024
(0.031)
Post * Statutory Rape 0.027
(0.042)
Post * Sexual Assault, No Injury 0.093∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post * Sexual Assault, Injury 0.028
(0.022)
Post * Sexual Assault, Knew Offender 0.089∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post * Sexual Assault, Stranger 0.104∗∗∗
(0.035)
Difference 0.065∗∗∗ -0.015
State * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X X
State * Crime Type * Month X X X
Post X X X
Final Month Mar 18 Mar 18 Mar 18
Observations 16,635 9,981 9,981
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on different crime types. In each column, crimes
are aggregated into different categories. The reference group for all columns is non-sexual crimes.
In Column (1), the category “Sexual Assault With An Object” is excluded since approximately a
third of state*months had zero crimes reported. Incidents related to multiple sexual offense crime
categories are also excluded. In Column (2), cases where it is unknown if a victim was injured are
excluded. In Column (3), cases where the relationship between the victim and offender was not
reported or where the relationship is unknown are excluded. 2010-2018 NIBRS data. Regressions
are weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in each state before the MeToo movement
started. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
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Table II.6: Effect of the MeToo Movement by the Lag Between the Occurrence
and Reporting Dates
(1) (2)
Post * Sexual Crimes, Lag<=30 Days 0.095∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.023)
Post * Sexual Crimes, Lag>30 Days 0.215∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.048)
City * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X
City * Crime Type * Month X X
Post X X
Treatment Dates Oct 17-Mar 18 Apr 18-Dec 18
Pre period mean Lag<=30 170 170
Pre period mean Lag>30 44 44
Observations 1,842 1,905
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crimes according to when the crime
was reported. In all columns, the data is aggregated into three categories: sexual crimes reported
within 30 days, sexual crimes reported after more than 30 days, and non-sexual crimes. Non-sexual
crimes is the reference category. Column (1) focuses on the primary main short-term effect and
includes data until March 2018 and Column (2) excludes October 2017-March 2018. Regressions are
weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in each city before the MeToo movement started.
City crime data 2010-2018. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
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Table II.7: Effect of the MeToo Movement by Victim and Offender Demo-
graphics
ihs(crime)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post * Sexual Assault, Victim Female 0.091∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post * Sexual Assault, Victim Male 0.033
(0.024)
Post * Sexual Assault, Victim Black 0.077∗∗∗
(0.024)
Post * Sexual Assault, Victim White 0.082∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post * Sexual Assault, Offender Female 0.015
(0.042)
Post * Sexual Assault, Offender Male 0.098∗∗∗
(0.016)
Post * Sexual Assault, Offender Black 0.095∗∗∗
(0.022)
Post * Sexual Assault, Offender White 0.092∗∗∗
(0.017)
Difference 0.058∗∗ -0.005 -0.083∗ 0.003
State * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X X X
State * Crime Type * Month X X X X
Post X X X X
Final Month Mar 18 Mar 18 Mar 18 Mar 18
Observations 9,981 9,981 9,981 9,981
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement by victim and offender demographics. In each
column, crimes are aggregated into different categories. The reference group for all columns is all
non-sexual crimes. In Columns (1) and (3), crimes where the sex of the victim or the offender is
unknown are excluded along with crimes with multiple victims or offenders. In Columns (2) and
(4), crimes with a single white or black victim or offender are included. 2010-2018 NIBRS data. All
regressions are weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in each state before the MeToo





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table II.10: Effect on Crimes that Occurred Before the MeToo Movement
Started
ihs(crime)
Post * Sexual Crimes 0.194∗∗
(0.077)
City * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X
City * Crime Type * Month X
Post X
Final Month Dec 2017
Crimes Included 3 Month <= Lag
Observations 1,179
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crimes, which were reported at
least three months after they occurred. The table only includes crimes reported by December 2017.
Therefore, all crimes included in this table occurred before the MeToo movement started. 2010-2017
city crime data. Regressions are weighted by the number of crimes in each city before the MeToo
movement started. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1
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Table II.11: Change in Beliefs Regarding Sexual Harassment
Workplace sexual harassment no
longer a problem
Accusers cause more problem
than they solve
(1) (2) (3) (4)
April-May 2018 −0.136∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.032) (0.025)
Women, 2018 −0.047 0.004
(0.042) (0.034)
Men, 2018 −0.234∗∗∗ −0.026
(0.047) (0.035)
Ref. Group 2016 2016 2016 2016
Respondent FE X X X X
Observations 9,252 9,236 9,212 9,196
This table shows the change in beliefs regarding sexual harassment between 2016-2018. The data is
the pooled 2016 and 2018 responses for the Views of the Electorate Research Survey. Columns (1)
and (2) refer to respondents’ agreement with: “Sexual harassment against women in the workplace
is no longer a problem in the United States.” Columns (3) and (4) refer to respondents’ agreement
with “Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.” The
answers are coded between 0 (strongly disagree) and 3 (strongly agree) and then standardized. The
results are similar when a binary coding of the response is used instead. All regressions control for





For both the US and international data we classify each crime as belonging to one of the following
categories: sexual assault, defined as a sexual crime that includes physical contact; sexual harass-
ment, defined as a sexual crime that does not include physical contact (e.g. stalking or indecent
exposure); non-sexual crimes and crimes which are not directly affected by the MeToo movement
but could be indirectly related to it. Crimes indirectly related to the MeToo movement include
crimes related to bestiality, bigamy, crime against children, domestic assault, harassment where it is
not clear if the harassment is of sexual nature, incest, pedophilia, pornography, prostitution, and
registration of sexual offenders. We exclude these crimes from the analysis since spillovers from
the MeToo movement can affect this group of crimes, and therefore, they are not a suitable control
group. We also exclude from the analysis cases appearing in police records that are not related to
any specific crime (e.g., missing person investigation) and traffic tickets.
Throughout most of the analysis, we aggregate the sexual assault and sexual harassment crimes
into one category, defined as sexual crime.
A.2 OECD Crime Data Collection and Processing
To collect high-frequency crime data from as many OECD countries as possible, we first down-
loaded the data available on the websites of the statistics agencies and the police. If no data
was available online, we contacted both the main statistics agency as well as the national police
requesting data on the number of crimes reported at a monthly or quarterly level. Finally, if these
contacts did not yield the required data, we filed the equivalent of a Freedom of Information Act
request or purchased data specifically aggregated for our project from the statistics agency.
To quality control our international data, we crosschecked our data for the 19 EU countries
in our sample with the 2017 Eurostat data on sexual violence. To avoid correlation between the
two datasets driven by the population size of the countries, we compared the sexual crimes per
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population of 100,000. Reassuringly, the correlation in the number of sexual crimes per population
of 100,000 is 0.96. The average percentage difference between the numbers in the two datasets is
-1% showing that there is no systematic difference in the level of the numbers and corroborating
that the data we collected is in line with EU estimates. Finally, the average absolute percentage
difference between the numbers in the two datasets is 24% showing that for most estimates the two
numbers are similar in magnitude. The difference could be explained by the fact that we excluded
specific sexual crimes that did not seem directly related to the MeToo movement (such as crimes
against children) and since we include crimes that can appear outside the sexual assault category,
such as stalking.
In Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, high-frequency data on the number
of crimes reported are not available for the whole country.81 For Australia, we have data for New
South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and Western Australia, covering 88% of the population, but
not for the Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia, and Tasmania. For
the United Kingdom, we have data for England, Northern Ireland, and Wales, covering 92% of
the population, but not Scotland. For the United States, we use the NIBRS data described in more
detail in Appendix Section A.5.
The 30 countries in our dataset are listed in Appendix Table II.A.5 together with the organi-
zations providing the data, the time period covered as well as the percentage of the population
covered by the police agencies providing the data.
For most countries in the data, the quarter that a crime is counted in is based on the date the
crime was reported. For four countries, Belgium, Colombia, Germany, and Iceland crimes are
counted in the quarter when they occurred. For the UK and US, some of the crimes are counted in
the quarter they were reported while other crimes are counted in the quarter they occurred. For
Switzerland, the crime is counted in the quarter information about the case was transmitted to the
Federal Statistical Office, which for the vast majority of crimes is in the same quarter as the crime is
reported to the police. Only one of the countries not providing data based on the date the crimes
were reported is a country classified as having a weak MeToo movement. Therefore, the small
81In the US, crime data for many agencies is also available through the UCR Summary Report System. We do not use
that dataset since the definition for rape has changed in 2013 and agencies are gradually changing their reports based
on the new definition. Furthermore, this system only collects data on the most severe crimes and therefore it does not
include data on sexual assaults besides rapes.
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effect of the MeToo movement in countries with weak movements cannot be explained by the data
from these countries being based on the date of occurrence as opposed to the date of reporting.
A.3 Google Search Data Processing
As our primary measure of the MeToo movement’s strength, we use the search interest in the topic
of the MeToo movement in October 2017. Our search interest data is scraped from Google trends
and contains monthly search interest figures for all of the OECD from 2010-2018.82 To ensure that
our primary measure of MeToo movement strength is not higher for countries that more frequently
use search terms related to the MeToo movement, before these terms had been given the meaning
they were given by the MeToo movement, we difference out the average search intensity for these
terms from the period before the MeToo movement for each country, so that each country has an
average interest of zero in the pre-period. Finally, to simplify the interpretation of this measure,
we normalize the magnitude of the interest so that the average interest in the OECD is one in the
post-period.
Google does not provide information on the phrases defined as being part of the MeToo
movement topic. Therefore, we also create our own definition of the MeToo movement topic in
all of the languages used in the OECD, for which we could find a phrase related to the MeToo
movement. We restricted our measure to phrases with search interest in their country of origin of at
least 1% of the search interest for "me too" in the US, these terms are: "me too", "balance ton porc",
"moi aussi", "quella volta che" and "yo tambien" as well as these terms written without spaces.83 In
October 2017, searches for these phrases has a 0.997 correlation with the MeToo movement topic
defined by Google across countries. We prefer to use the search for the MeToo movement topic
instead of our list of exact phrases since it is more likely that the topic search will include searches
for additional phrases related to the MeToo movement in other languages.
In Tables II.A.1 and II.3, we use an alternative measure of search interest based on searches
related to the topics of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Again, the topics are defined by
Google as all searches that include the concept of sexual harassment or sexual assault in any
82For scraping, we used the R package gtrendsR written by Philippe Massicotte and Dirk Eddelbuettel. The data was
scraped on October 26, 2020.
83We exclude searches that contained the term “me too” along with the words "meghan", "trainor" or "song" since the
song "Me too" by Meghan Trainor caused an increase in search interest around its release in May 2016.
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language. In contrast to searches for the MeToo topic, searches for the topics of sexual harassment
and sexual assault have the same interpretation before and after the start of the MeToo movement.
Therefore, we normalize the search interest so that the pre-MeToo period mean is one for each
country.
A.4 Fraction of English Speakers Data Processing
We use data on the fraction of English speakers from the 23rd edition of the Ethnologue Global
Dataset. The data contains estimates for the population using English as their first language, the
population using English but for whom English is not a native language and the total population.
We divide the population using English as a first language by the population to get the fraction of
first-language English users. We take the sum of the population using English as a first language
and the population using English as a non-native language and divide it by the total population to
get the fraction of the population who uses English.
For five countries (Chile, Colombia, France, Slovenia, and Slovakia) we do not have an estimate
for the number of first-language English users. We impute the fraction using Enlish as their first
language using the median fraction of first-language English users for the country’s region (South
America, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe). For Japan, there is no estimate
for the fraction of non-native English users in the Ethnologue data. Instead, we use an estimate of
5% provided in communications with Ethnologue and confirmed in a report from Mitsue-Links.84
A.5 NIBRS Crime Data Processing
We classify NIBRS offenses as either sexual assault or non-sexual crimes. The sexual assault offenses
are fondling, rape, sexual assault with an object, sodomy, and statutory rape. We exclude incest,
human trafficking, and the pornography/obscene material crime categories. All other 43 offense
types form the non-sexual crimes category. Domestic assault is not a separate offense type in the
NIBRS dataset. To exclude domestic violence crimes which may have been affected by the MeToo
movement, we exclude all aggravated assaults where the circumstances of the assault are defined
in the NIBRS as a “lovers quarrel” and all assaults or aggravated assaults for which the relationship
84https://www.mitsue.co.jp/english/global_ux/blog/201709/14_1700.html
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between the offender and victim is defined in the NIBRS as one of the following: victim was
ex-spouse, victim was spouse, homosexual relationship, victim was boyfriend/girlfriend, victim
was common-law spouse.
In the NIBRS data, an incident can include multiple crimes if they occurred in concert, at the
same time and place. Since our classification of incidents depends on the type of offense committed,
we define an incident as a sexual assault if one of the offenses which occurred as part of the incident
is a sexual assault. Similarly, if the incident is not a sexual assault, we exclude it if one of the
offenses which occurred as part of the incident should be excluded (e.g., if an incident includes both
a pornography/obscene material offense and a weapon law violations offense, it will be excluded).
When analyzing state-level data, we exclude state-years where there are months with fewer
than 100 crimes reported in total.
One potential concern is that police agencies started reporting sexual assaults through the
NIBRS as a result of the MeToo movement. However, we find no evidence that the movement
affected reporting or that agencies determine when to include sexual assault in their reports. We
check whether agencies participating in the NIBRS system started reporting sexual assaults in a
specific month. Since there is natural variation in reporting, we focus on cases where agencies did
not report any sexual assaults in twelve consecutive months and then reported at least four assaults.
This occurred in only seven agencies out of over 2,000. Even in those agencies, the increase is from
zero cases reported to four or five cases, and the increase does not occur after the MeToo movement
started. Therefore, this increase probably represents noise and not a decision of an agency to start
reporting sexual assaults.
A.6 City Crime Data Processing
Data for each city was obtained separately from the city’s open data website. For each city, we
first categorize a crime as a sexual assault, sexual harassment, non-sexual crime, or a crime that
should be excluded since it is indirectly related to the MeToo movement (as explained in Appendix
Section A.1). If an observation is defined at the crime level and the data include multiple crimes per
incident, we then aggregate crimes at the incident level. The incident crime category is defined as
the most severe crime of the crimes composing the incident, where we use the following hierarchy:
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Sexual assault, sexual harassment, excluded crimes, other crimes.85
In the city data, we define each month as spanning from the 15th day of the calendar month
to the 14th day of the next calendar month. By defining months in this way, we can cleanly
categorize each observation in the aggregated data as occurring before or after the start of the
MeToo movement, since the movement started on October 15, 2017.86
B Additional Analysis
B.1 Allowing for Different MeToo Start Dates in Each Country
In addition to the strategy described in Section 3.4, we also use the variation in the start dates of
the movement to estimate the effect of the movement over time. We restrict the sample of countries
to countries that at some time before the end of 2018 had a MeToo movement and use the following
regression:
yitc = β1MeTooct × SexCrimei + β2MeTooct + β3,icTrendt + γi,c,q(t) + ε itc (11)
where MeTooct takes a value of one if the MeToo movement in country c started before or in the
first month of quarter t and MeTooct equals one-third or two-thirds if the movement started in the
second or third month of quarter t, respectively. The other terms of the equation are defined in the
same way as in Equation 8.
We use two different strategies for estimating the start of the MeToo movement in each country.
First, we define the start of the movement as the first month when Google search interest in
the MeToo topic was higher than the OECD median in October 2017. Under this classification,
all the countries that were classified as having had strong MeToo movements in the analysis in
Section 3.3 have MeToo movements starting in October 2017, but additional countries have MeToo
85Typically, multiple crimes which form an incident occur at the same date. However, in Kansas City, an incident (or a
“case”) can be continuously updated and appear multiple times in the dataset, for example, when the victim reports a
crime and when the police has a suspect. In cases where an incident appears more than once in the dataset and includes
at least one report from a victim, we include only the report of the victim. If an incident still has multiple updates, we
include only one observation and define the date the incident was reported as the minimal date among all observations
related to the incident. If an incident is associated with crimes that occurred over multiple days, we define the date the
incident occurred as NA.
86We do not use a similar definition when analyzing the international data or NIBRS data since most international data
we collect is already aggregated at the month or quarter level, and since we want to keep the NIBRS results consistent
with the international analysis.
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movements starting after October 2017. Our second criterion is based on search interest for the
sexual harassment and sexual assault topics. We classify the start of a MeToo movement as the
first month, in or after October 2017, that had the highest search interest for the sexual harassment
and sexual assault topics since 2010. Appendix Table II.A.2 shows the start dates of the MeToo
movement for each country according to both criteria. Note that both these specifications have
potential reverse causality problems since an increase in sexual crimes reported to the police could
affect searches for the topics of the MeToo movement, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. Due
to this problem, we see this analysis as supplemental to our main analysis.
Table II.A.1 shows the results of our analysis using different start dates of the MeToo movement.
Columns (1) and (2) use the start date based on searches for the MeToo topic, and Columns (3) and
(4) use the start date based on sexual harassment and sexual assault topic searches. Column (1)
reports an overall effect of the MeToo movement of 12%. Column (2) splits these estimates by the
number of quarters since the start of the MeToo movement and shows that the effect is stable over
time with all of the point estimates for each of the quarters since the start of the MeToo movement
being between 9% and 13%.87 The results of Column (3)-(4) are slightly smaller but qualitatively
similar.
B.2 Neighborhood-Level Heterogeneity
In this section, we analyze heterogeneous effect of the MeToo movement by neighborhood demo-
graphics in the sample of seven large US cities. To determine the neighborhood where each crime
occurs, we use the most coarse definition of police administrative areas available in the dataset.
We use the most coarse definition (e.g., a police division instead of a police beat) to ensure that
the number of crimes is positive for most observations. The jurisdictions are detailed in Appendix
Table II.A.3. In the case of Nashville, the police precinct where the crime occurred is not reported
in the city’s crime dataset, and we identify the precinct based on the rounded coordinates of the
crime’s location.
We use the shapefiles for the police boundaries of each city to identify the geographical bound-
aries of each neighborhood. For most cities, we use the most recent shapefile available. For
87In Columns (2) and (4), the dummy variables take the value of either one or zero, regardless of when in a quarter the
MeToo movement started.
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Seattle, where changes in the shapefiles are clearly defined, we use different shapefiles for different
years and determine the boundaries of each police precinct according to the year when the crime
occurred.
The demographics of each neighborhood are determined by spatially matching the neighbor-
hood with census block groups. We calculate each neighborhood’s demographics as the weighted
average of the demographic covariates among overlapping block groups, where the weight of each
block group is the population of the block group multiplied by the share of the block group’s area
overlapping with the neighborhood. The demographics for each block group are based on the
American Community Survey 5-year 2016 estimates.
Table II.A.4 does not find evidence for strong heterogeneity by the neighborhood demographics.
While some of the point estimates are consistent with a stronger movement among higher-income
and college-educated neighborhoods, the estimated heterogeneity is relatively small. For example,
the difference in the expected effect on reporting between a neighborhood in the 75th percentile of
the share of individuals with a college education and a neighborhood in the 25th percentile is only
expected to be 3 percentage points, compared to the average effect of 13%. Similarly, the difference
between neighborhoods in the 75% and 25% percentile in the median income, the share of blacks,
the share of Asians and other races, and the share of Hispanics, is 5, 2, 1, and -5 percentage points,
respectively.
C Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure II.A.1: Newspaper Coverage




















(b) Newspaper Articles Mentioning the Terms Sexual Harassment or Sexual Assault
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The first sub-figure shows the weekly average number of articles mentioning the term “metoo” in
the newspapers USA Today, New York Post, Denver Post, and Chicago Sun-Times. The second
sub-figure presents the weekly average number of articles mentioning the terms “sexual assault”
or “sexual harassment” (articles mentioning both terms are counted twice). The vertical dashed
line represents the start of the MeToo movement (October 2017). The newspapers were chosen
based on circulation and data availability. The number of articles is determined using the website
newslibrary.com.
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Figure II.A.2: Relationship Between Google Search Interest and Knowledge
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Log Google interest in MeToo, October 2017
This figure shows the relationships between the log of Google search interest for terms related to
the MeToo movement in October 2017 and the fraction of respondents who had heard about the
MeToo movement in a YouGov survey conducted in February-March 2019 (YouGov, 2019).
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Figure II.A.3: Search Interest by the Strength of the MeToo Movement
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The figures show monthly search interest for OECD countries with strong and weak MeToo
movements. Countries are classified as weak or strong by search interest in the MeToo topic in
October 2017. Data is from Google Trends. The first vertical line represents the start of the MeToo
movement, the second vertical line represents the end of the six month period we use to measure
short-term effects. Sub-figure (a) shows search interest in the topic of the MeToo movement. Mean
pre-MeToo interest is subtracted from the time series for each country separately so that the pre-
MeToo period has a mean of zero, the data is then normalized so that the post-MeToo OECD mean
equals 1. Sub-figure (b) shows search interest in the topics of sexual harassment and sexual assault.
The data is normalized so that the pre-MeToo mean equals 1 for each country.
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Figure II.A.4: Variation in MeToo Interest Across US States
This figure shows the strength of the MeToo movement in US states, based on Google Search
interest in the topic of the MeToo movement during October 2017.
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Figure II.A.5: Matrix Completion Results
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Sub-Figure (a) shows the actual and counterfactual reported sexual crimes (in logs) based on the
matrix completion method for our sample of US cities. The method is described in Section 4.4.
Sub-Figure (b) presents the average treatment effect - the difference between the actual crimes and
the counterfactual. Standard errors are bootstrapped.
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Table II.A.1: Effect of the MeToo Movement, Using Different MeToo Start
Dates
ln(crime)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.092** 0.083***
(0.034) (0.030)
Quarter of MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.076* 0.066**
(0.043) (0.028)
1Q after MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.106** 0.055
(0.049) (0.045)
2Q after MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.102** 0.076**
(0.041) (0.033)
3Q after MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.081** 0.106***
(0.036) (0.029)
4Q after MeToo start * Sexual Crime 0.090** 0.103**
(0.043) (0.039)
Country * Crime type * Lin. trend X X X X
Country * Crime type * Quarter X X X X
Post MeToo start X X
Quarters since MeToo start FE X X
Final quarter Q4 2018 Q4 2018 Q4 2018 Q4 2018
Sample MeToo only MeToo only MeToo only MeToo only
Observations 1,276 1,276 1,324 1,324
Clusters 38 38 40 40
MeToo start indicator MeToo search interest SH/SA search interest
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement using different start dates of the MeToo
movement in each country. In Columns (1) and (2) a start of the MeToo movement is the first month
when searches for the MeToo movement topic was higher than the OECD median for October
2017. In Columns (3) and (4) a start of the MeToo movement is the first month, from October 2017
onward, when searches for the sexual harassment and sexual assault topics were the highest since
2010 in that country. Data from 30 OECD countries from 2010 to 2018. Standard errors clustered at
the country by crime level in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table II.A.2: MeToo Movement Start Date by Country
Country Start date using search interest in
MeToo topic
Start date using search interest in
sexual harassment and sexual assault
topics
Australia October 2017 November 2017
Belgium October 2017 No strong MeToo movement
Canada October 2017 October, 2017
Chile No strong MeToo movement November 2017
Colombia No strong MeToo movement April 2018
Czech
republic
November 2017 No strong MeToo movement
Denmark October 2017 October 2017
Estonia No strong MeToo movement No strong MeToo movement
Finland October 2017 October 2017
France October 2017 October 2017
Greece No strong MeToo movement November 2017
Germany October 2017 No strong MeToo movement
Iceland October 2017 No strong MeToo movement
Ireland October 2017 October 2017
Israel No strong MeToo movement November 2017
Japan No strong MeToo movement April 2018
Korea February 2018 No strong MeToo movement
Lithuania March 2018 November 2017
Mexico No strong MeToo movement November 2017
Netherlands October 2017 No strong MeToo movement
New Zealand October 2017 October 2017
Poland No strong MeToo movement No strong MeToo movement
Portugal No strong MeToo movement October 2017
Slovakia No strong MeToo movement No strong MeToo movement
Slovenia No strong MeToo movement December 2018
Switzerland October 2017 October 2017
Spain No strong MeToo movement November 2017
Sweden October 2017 October 2017
United
Kingdom
October 2017 October 2017
United States October 2017 October 2017
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Table II.A.3: Definition of the Neighborhood Used by City
City Neighborhood Level
Denver Police District
Kansas City Police Division
LA Patrol Division
Louisville Police Division
Nashville MNPD Zone (Patrol Area)






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table II.A.5: Data Sources for international_data
Country Data Providing Organization Time period Share of the
population
covered
Australia New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics
and Research, Queensland Police, Crime
Statistics Agency of Victoria, and Western
Australia Police
2010-2018 88%
Belgium Federale politie 2010-2018 100%
Canada Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics 2010-2018 100%
Chile Policía de Investigaciones 2010-2018 100%
Colombia Policía Nacional 2010-2018 100%
Czech
republic
Policie České republiky 2010-2018 100%
Denmark Danmarks Statistik 2010-2018 100%
Estonia Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet 2010-2018 100%
Finland Tilastokeskuksen 2010-2018 100%
France Ministère de l’Intérieur 2010-2018 100%
Germany Bundeskriminalamt 2012-2018 100%
Greece Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) 2010-2018 100%
Iceland Ríkislögreglustjóri 2010-2018 100%
Ireland Central Statistics Office 2010-2018 100%
Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2010-2018 100%
Japan National Statistics Center 2015-2018 100%
Korea Supreme prosecutors’ office 2010-2018 100%
Lithuania Informatikos ir Rysiu Departamentas 2012-2015 and
2017-2018
100%
Mexico Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 2015-2018 100%
Netherlands Korps Nationale Politie 2012-2018 100%
New Zealand New Zealand Police Q3 2014-2018 100%
Poland Wydział ds. Parlamentarnych i Informacji
Publicznej
2010-2018 100%
Portugal Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2010-2018 100%
Slovakia Statisticky Urad 2010-2018 100%
Slovenia Statistični Urad 2010-2018 100%
Switzerland Bundesamt für Statistik 2010-2018 100%
Spain Ministerio del Interior 2010-2018 100%
Sweden Brottsförebyggande rådet 2010-2018 100%
United
Kingdom
Home Office: Crime and Policing Analysis
Unit and Open Data Northern Ireland
2010-2018 92%
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010-2018 30%
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Table II.A.6: Effect of the MeToo Movement in the US with Crime Aggre-
gated by Offense Types
ihs(crime)
(1) (2) (3)
Post * Sexual Assault 0.081∗∗∗
(0.015)
Post * Sexual Assault 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.025)
State * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X X
State * Crime Type * Month X X X
Post X X X
Agg Crimes Sexual/Other NIBRS Categories NIBRS Categories
S.E Robust Cluster by Cluster by
Crime Type Crime*State
Num of Clusters 21 735
Final Month Mar 18 Mar 18 Mar 18
Observations 6,654 69,867 69,867
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement using different crime aggregation and inference
methods. Column (1) is our main estimate where crimes are categorized as either sexual crimes or
non-sexual crimes, and robust standard errors are used. In columns (2)-(3), crimes are aggregated
according to the NIBRS offense types. Incidents that include multiple offense types are excluded.
Column (2) clusters standard errors by crime category and column (3) clusters by the interaction of
state and crime category. All regressions are weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in

































































































































































































































































































































Table II.A.8: Persistence of the Effect in the US
ihs(crime)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post * Sexual Crimes 0.100∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.021)
2017 Q4 * Sexual Crimes 0.070∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.033) (0.039)
2018 Q1 * Sexual Crimes 0.093∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.081
(0.020) (0.065) (0.067)
2018 Q2 * Sexual Crimes 0.101∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.018) (0.038) (0.037)
2018 Q3 * Sexual Crimes 0.106∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.035) (0.035)
2018 Q4 * Sexual Crimes 0.137∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.026) (0.038) (0.041)
Location * Crime Type * Lin. Trend X X X X X
Location * Crime Type * Month X X X X X
Post X X X X X
Data NIBRS NIBRS Cities Cities Cities
Crimes All All All All Reported
Within 1 M
Observations 7,266 7,266 1,368 1,368 1,361
This table shows the effect of the MeToo movement on sexual crimes by quarter. Data is aggregated
at the monthly state/city by crime category level. Columns (1) and (2) are based on 2010-2018
NIBRS data. Columns (3)-(5) are based on the sample of US cities. Columns (1) and (3) report the
long-run effects until December 2018. Columns (2), (4), (5) report the effect by quarter. Column
(5) includes only crimes that were reported within 30 days of their occurrence. Regressions are
weighted by the number of crimes that occurred in each city before the MeToo movement started.
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